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ABSTRACT 
Sentimentalism Made Strange: Shklovsky, Karamzin, Rousseau 
Alison Beth Annunziata 
This dissertation investigates the use of sentimentalist tropes in the work of Viktor 
Shklovsky, Nikolai Karamzin, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau in order to draw conclusions 
regarding the overlaps between eighteenth- and twentieth-century aesthetic imperatives. 
Specifically, it looks at love’s literary forms—epistolary, triolet, conte—as models and 
spaces for autobiography, and compares love and self-expression as two literary 
phenomena that, for these three authors, demand the undoing of cultural mores as the 
means for their artistic portrayal. For the bulk of my analysis, I take the three authors’ 
“Julie” texts—Rousseau’s Julie, or The New Héloïse, Karamzin’s “Julia,” and 
Shklovsky’s Zoo, or Letters Not About Love, a Third Eloise—in which love and self-
expression meet to enact what I call Sentimentalism made strange.  Using estrangement 
(ostranenie), the literary device identified by Shklovsky, as an organizing principle, I 
investigate the cultural shift towards an underlying crude, elemental, and ultimately 
‘savage’ aesthetic that is treated in the work of the three authors I examine, and which 
sanctions a shift towards de-acculturation, de-institutionalization, and disarticulation that 
is seen in both sentimental and formalist fiction and criticism. While Rousseau factors 
into my analysis as the model sentimentalist, as the basis for Karamzin’s and Shklovsky’s 
own forays into Sentimentalism, in his effort to capture an authentic literary self he also 
estranges Sentimentalism’s canonical forms, revealing, along with Karamzin, proto-
formalist tendencies.
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Note on Transliteration 
 
I am using a dual system of transliteration, following the guidelines in J. Thomas Shaw’s 
Transliteration of Modern Russian for English-Language Publications: 
 
In the text and in all discursive parts of the endnotes, Shaw’s “System I” is used, which 
anglicizes Russian proper names: the “y”-ending is used instead of “ii”; “yu”/“ya” is used 
instead of “iu”/“ia”; Tynianov and OPOIAZ are two exceptions.  
 
When citing Russian sources in the bibliography and notes, I use the Library of Congress 






Sentimentalism Made Strange: Shklovsky, Karamzin, Rousseau 
This dissertation traces the junctions and disjunctions between the fiction and 
criticism of Russian Formalism and the sentimental prose of Russia’s and France’s late 
eighteenth century through the work of twentieth-century Russian Formalist Viktor 
Shklovsky, eighteenth-century Russian Sentimentalist Nikolai Karamzin, and eighteenth-
century French Sentimentalist Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In the hope of closing the gap 
between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries, and of uncovering the inherent 
similarities between two contrasting critical approaches to literature—Sentimentalism 
and Formalism—this dissertation looks at the phenomenon of love as an organizing 
principle that guides literary self-expression. The proliferation of scholarship (from 2001 
onward) that reexamines the major tenets of Formalism within the disciplines of 
literature, architecture, art history, and political science, among others, suggests that this 
topic is immediately relevant.1 I hope that considering the eighteenth century—in terms 
of both the literature it produced and as a period that is re-imagined in the literature of 
later generations—as a productive lens through which to assess the development of 
Formalism will contribute to this academic trend. This investigation leads to conclusions 
not only regarding how the eighteenth century influenced the development of Formalism, 
but also, inversely, how Formalist strategies were already alive in the eighteenth century. 
The motivation for this project is above all to satisfy an intellectual curiosity 
regarding the fundamental links between Shklovsky, Karamzin, and Rousseau in their 
central conceits; most importantly, I examine love as a coping mechanism that sanctions 
                                                 
1 For example, W. J. T. Mitchell, “The Commitment to Form; or Still Crazy after All These Years,” 
 PMLA 118, no. 2 (March 2003): 321–325; Alexei Bogdanov, “Ostranenie, Kenosis, and Dialogue: The 
Metaphysics of Formalism According to Shklovsky,” The Slavic and East European Journal 49, no. 1 
(April 2005): 48–62; Cristina Vatulescu, “The Politics of Estrangement: Tracking Shklovsky's Device 
through Literary and Policing Practices,” Poetics Today 27, no. 1 (March 1, 2006): 35–66. 
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and initiates a rebellion from the (neoclassical) mandates confining literary expression.  
In so doing, I demonstrate how the Formalist Viktor Shklovsky drew upon the eighteenth 
century as a source of inspiration for drafting his literary science. I investigate why he 
consistently, if quietly, engages eighteenth-century sentimental tropes and techniques in 
his fictional pursuits, and whether this relationship between periods—that is, late 
eighteenth century and early twentieth century—can be understood as intentional or as 
the ‘accidental’ result of a matrix of events that coalesce in the late eighteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.  
In taking a giant leap over the nineteenth century, I am methodologically inspired 
most by the thesis set forth in Jeffrey Perl’s critical work, The Tradition of Return, in 
which Perl uses The Odyssey to illustrate a trajectory that is characteristic of how history 
is often read and philosophized. This trajectory he reads as an A-B-A cyclical pattern, the 
logic of which proceeds as follows: Odysseus leaves home (Classical Antiquity [A]) in 
search of the ideal (Middle Ages [B]) only to return home to reinstate the status quo 
(Renaissance [A]). This orientation towards homecoming, or nostos, from the Homeric 
tradition, Perl defines as “a return to something old but also a new beginning: it is a 
meeting of oldest and newest, yet it is in addition the seemly conclusion of an unbroken 
continuum.” 2 As Perl argues, nostos does not presume a perfect return. As “something 
old” as well as “a new beginning,” the Renaissance (A-copy) recognizes itself as a 
“revival” and not a “replica” of Classical Antiquity (A-original). Thus, if history were 
poetry its rhyme sequence would scan as A-B-A, but the rhyme would be imperfect. My 
                                                 
2 Jeffrey M. Perl,  The Tradition of Return: The Implicit History of Modern Literature. (Princeton, NJ: 




dissertation is in a sense a recasting of Perl’s hermeneutic, with Russian Formalism as the 
imperfect return to the eighteenth century—its A made strange.  
By “making strange” I mean two different theories. On the one hand, as per Perl’s 
assessment and as regards Shklovsky’s position within Russia’s literary canon, I mean a 
return (however, imperfect) to an earlier cultural period. On the other hand, I refer 
explicitly to Shklovsky’s estrangement (ostranenie), an artistic strategy for de-
historicizing and de-contextualizing the reader by engaging his senses and dispelling the 
automatized forms that congest his modern mind; this, I believe, is a possible method for 
‘reviving,’ according to formalist standards, the tropes, devices, systems, and conceits of 
literary sentimentalism. With estrangement as a guiding principle, I read Karamzin’s and 
Shklovsky’s idiosyncratic sentimentalisms as attempts to estrange Rousseau’s, to engage 
Rousseau’s techniques and philosophical approach, while at the same time reorganizing 
his principles to an unexpected, de-automatized, and counterintuitive end. This analysis 
will be conducted with the use of what Gary Saul Morson defines as “boundary works,” 
works that boast fluid lines between fiction and non-fiction, between criticism and 
literature, and thus challenge our expectations, in effect performing the very same 
estrangement that inspires this analysis. The fluidity of genre, which, as Morson argues, 
is a concept born not in form but in flux as a dialogue between forms, is an inspiration for 
this dissertation, for it is “boundary works” that are most ripe for this comparative 
project. 3 
In order to explore what it means to make Sentimentalism strange, I must first 
address two fundamental issues: what are the defining features of Sentimentalism and 
                                                 
3 Gary Saul Morson, The Boundaries of Genre: Dostoevsky’s Diary of a Writer and the Traditions of 




Formalism, and how might these broad -isms relate to each other. While this dissertation 
engages with –isms, it does so only peripherally, adopting them as points of reference, 
recognizing the instability of any doctrine, and remaining sensitive to the variables that 
make exact categorization impossible. In fact, to explore the links between 
Sentimentalism and Formalism, through the prism of three distinct and disparate authors, 
works well as a strategy for undoing these literary systems by breaking barriers to gather 
data regarding the overlaps between principles, techniques, and strategies as opposed to 
doctrines. This is not to do away with categories altogether but rather to make a critical 
move in an alternative direction—to move from theme to approach—to see how 
sentiment, specifically love, dictates the developments of (Rousseau and Karamzin’s) 
Sentimentalism and (Shklovsky’s) Formalism, and to consider the possible connections 
and correlations between these two –isms as ‘points of reference.’  
This dissertation offers a twofold understanding of the Enlightenment: it is a 
delimited historical period that begins and ends in the eighteenth century, yet whose exact 
dates are still the subject of debate; and it is a particular brand of anthropocentric 
philosophy that takes man’s empirical reality as the foundation for epistemology.  Only 
that which is rationally ordered and catalogued can be considered ‘known’ (such is the 
philosophy behind L’Encyclopédie). As a result, “to enlighten” in this period means to 
make things known, and yet also to limit what constitutes knowledge. Totalizing projects, 
such as L’Encyclopédie, which, according to Robert Darnton, tried to “impose an order 
on the new world” while being fully “conscious of the arbitrariness in all ordering,” 
become symbols of this paradox.4  
                                                 
4 Robert Darnton, The Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in French Cultural History (New York: 
Basic Books, 1984), 195.  
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Together with Neoclassicism, Sentimentalism is one of the Enlightenment’s main 
modes for processing and representing positive reality, and thus shares in the esprit 
systématique5 of the period. However, inherent in Sentimentalism is the tension between 
reason and sentiment and therefore much of what is “brought to light” runs counter to the 
standards of the Enlightenment—the subject can be undisciplined yet still rational. 
Expressing the interiority of the mind, valorizing the ‘natural world,’ evoking sentimental 
response, and co-opting sentimental expression for social commentary are all earmarks of 
sentimental literary expression. In its most general capacity, Sentimentalism is a call for 
revelation in order to unveil human emotions, concretize them in literature (as the 
primary keeper of one’s authenticity) and to thereby restore sentiment to its rightful 
position as the cornerstone of the human condition.  
As regards the term “Formalism” it is well known that not one of the original 
Russian Formalists—Boris Eikhenbaum, Osip Brik, Boris Tomashevsky, Viktor 
Shklovsky, Yury Tynianov, Roman Jakobson, Grigory Vinokur, among others—agreed 
to this nomenclature. While it is difficult to define precisely what Formalism is, this 
school of literary thought was divided into two distinct intellectual circles—in Saint 
Petersburg, OPOIAZ (Общество изучения Поэтического Языкa [Society for the Study 
of Poetic Language, 1916-1930], which included Shklovsky, Tynianov, and Eikhenbaum; 
and in Moscow, the Moscow Linguistic Circle [1916-1924]), whose most notable 
members were Jakobson, Petr Bogatyrev, and Tomashevsky. On the distinction between 
the Petersburg and the Moscow Circles, Peter Steiner cites Bogatyrev and Jakobson: 
                                                 
5 Ernst Cassirer, “The Mind of the Enlightenment,” in The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, trans. Fritz 
C.A. Koelln and James P. Pettegrove (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968); see also Etienne 
Bonnot, abbé de Condillac, Treatise on Systems, in Philosophical Writings of Etienne Bonnot, abbé de 
Condillac, trans. Franklin Philip (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1982). 
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“while the Moscow Linguistic Circle proceeds from the assumption that poetry is 
language in its aesthetic function, the Petersburgers claim that the poetic motif is not 
always merely the unfolding of linguistic material. Further, while the former argue that 
the historical development of artistic forms has a sociological basis, the latter insist upon 
the full autonomy of these forms.”6 In other words, while the Moscow Linguistic Circle 
focused on how the word, as a carrier of socio-cultural traits, functioned artistically 
within literature, members of OPOIAZ isolated the “literary fact” (according to 
Tynianov, the devices, motifs, and modes that distinguish literature from other verbal 
texts), which was more than a linguistic unit. They were interested in how the literary fact 
evolved and changed autonomously (outside of sociological, psychological, or cultural 
influences) within the realm of literature. 
This sharp contrast between ‘formalist’ schools is one reason that members 
considered it impossible to find an all-encompassing, unifying term. From the OPOIAZ 
camp, Eikhenbaum, in his essay “Theory of the Formal Method” (Teoriia formal’nogo 
metoda [1925]) argues that the term “formalism” worked more as a ‘battle cry’ than as an 
appropriate term to define the work the OPOIAZ and Moscow Linguistic Circle groups 
were doing, not to mention the individuals from each group.7 Beyond the philosophical 
differences between the two, the term “formalism” implies a polemic with content, 
which, argues Eikhenbaum, was across the board fundamentally not the case. Formalists 
understood ‘form’ somewhat idiosyncratically, not as a mere shell that kept content’s 
shape, but a living “force” that acted upon and in conjunction with content. In re-
conceiving the relationship between content and form as equally contentious and 
                                                 
6 Quoted in Peter Steiner, Russian Formalism: A Metapoetics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 18. 
7 Boris Mikhailovich Eikhenbaum, “Teoriia formal’nogo metoda,” in Literatura: Teoriia, Kritika, Polemika 
(Leningrad: Priboi, 1927). 
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collaborative, Russian Formalists were able to rescue form from its undue negative 
relationship to content (form as anti-content), which, the Formalists argued, did nothing 
to capture form’s “dynamic,” aggressive spirit (Tynianov). Form was valued as more than 
the sum of devices at work in a text; the term was used as a battle cry against 
homogenizing poetics that collapsed form and content and thereby diminished their 
distinct qualities.  
Just as sentimental release marked the end of neoclassical restraint in the late 
eighteenth century8, so too did the rise of Russian Formalism mark the close of Russia’s 
twentieth-century Neoclassical Revival, a conservative modernist movement—arguably, 
most clearly expressed in architecture, yet also found in the literature and criticism of 
turn of the century9—that advocated for artistic stability and uniformity. If we accept that 
Neoclassicism leads to Sentimentalism, then this suggests that Russian Formalism may 
be understood as a parallel Sentimentalism. While on the surface these two modes of 
literary expression seem incompatible, upon closer inspection similarities emerge. 
Generally speaking, Sentimentalism is a style of writing that, through finessing content 
and form, attempts to capture personal authenticity and sincerity, and Formalism is a 
style of literary analysis that, by comparing and contrasting content and form, attempts to 
tease out the attributes that make literature authentically literature, or in the words of 
Tynianov, to isolate the “literary fact.” Moreover, both engage phenomenology as the 
basis for their disciplines; for instance, as I argue in Chapter One, not unlike Rousseau’s 
                                                 
8 Neoclassical motifs, however, do return in the late eighteenth century within the applied and verbal arts.  
9 See, for example, the 1908-09 critical compendium Literaturnyi raspad: kriticheskii sbornik, ed. Iu. 
Steklov et al. (St. Petersburg: Izd. ‘T-va Izdatel’skoe Biuro’, 1908-09), a multi-authored attack on the 
“degenerate” state of contemporary Russian literature, specifically, its willful disregard for moral 
boundaries; or the poetic movement, Acmeism, a neoclassical cleansing of symbolist obscurity inspired by 
Kuzmin’s groundbreaking article, “On Beautiful Clarity” (O prekrasnoi iasnosti, 1910). 
  
8 
sentimental philosophy, Shklovsky’s famed estrangement takes the art object as a means 
for affecting your mind on a sensory level to generate an artistic response. Finally, both 
movements are liberation projects—Sentimentalism seeks to liberate subjectivity from 
Neoclassicism’s emotional restraints, its order and its logic, and Formalism seeks to 
liberate the word and the work of art from the trappings of life, denying the relevance of 
psychological and social influences. As I demonstrate in Chapter Three, this defiant anti-
psychology manifests itself as a search for autonomy and (primitive) a-historicity.  
Part and parcel of this comparative project is investigating the use and 
manipulation of literary models, and for this reason I have decided to design my project 
to be cross-cultural and comparative, isolating Rousseau as one literary manifestation of 
the French sentimentalist school that was used and modeled by the Russian late 
eighteenth century authors, and came to be known among Formalists in the early 
twentieth century as one likely paragon of sentimental expression.10 Although it may 
seem unnecessary to include the French tradition, my decision to do so is informed by 
two significant academic traditions, one in the study of Russian Sentimentalism and one 
in the study of Russian Formalism. Scholarship on Russian Sentimentalism—
Sentimentalism that was developed in the works of N.M. Karamzin, I.I. Dmitriev, A.N. 
Radishchev, V.V. Kapnist, and N.A. L’vov, to name a few—acknowledges the 
fundamental influence of the French eighteenth-century literary canon on the Russian 
literature of the same period.11 The French model bequeathed to the Russians a 
                                                 
10 For instance, see M. Rozanov’s article on “Russoizm” in Literaturnaia entsiklopediia: Slovar’ 
literaturnykh terminov, in which he writes that Rousseau was a leading figure of the sentimental school and 
also that he inspired the French revolution as a “prorok i filosof revoliutsii [prophet and philosophe of the 
revolution],” (742) (volume 2 [P—IA], 1925, pp. 741-748). 
11 See, for example, L.V. Pumpianskii, “Sentimentalizm,” in Literatura 18-ogo veka, Istoriia russkoi 
literatury 4, eds V.A. Desaitskii, G.A. Gukovskii (Leningrad; Moscow: Institut russkoi literatury, 1941), 
pp. 430-435; P.A. Orlov, Russkii sentimentalizm (Moscow: Izd-vo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1977). 
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vocabulary for developing its own sentimental aestheticism, to borrow from Rudolf 
Neuhäuser,12 which developed in the late eighteenth century. For instance, the pleasant 
“middle style” of Karamzin’s sentimental prose, and the strides he made in the Russian 
sentimental (chuvstvitel’nyi) language, is intrinsically linked to French vocabulary and 
syntax, not to mention the salon culture and societal models of eighteenth-century 
France.13 Moreover, I would argue that the French sentimental model (as opposed to the 
English) passed on to the Russians a rich storehouse of emblems, motifs, and, especially, 
a lexicon, for speaking, reading, and writing about liberty, first to be used in the political 
sphere but also in literature. For this reason, French sentimental literature registered in 
the mind of the Russian sentimentalist as a space of liberation, disobedience, and self-
recovery, practices that Neoclassicism tried to stifle, and that later became the major 
tenets of nineteenth-century Romanticism. 
The deep-seated relationship between French sentimentalism and liberty is what 
most inspires the inclusion of the French model and most justifies its connection with 
Russian Formalism. The historical trajectory I believe to be in place—the analogous 
evolutions of Neoclassicism to Sentimentalism, Neoclassical Revival to Formalism—
helps bridge the eighteenth and twentieth centuries, and with it Sentimentalism and 
Formalism; however, it is this particular undercurrent of French Sentimentalism that I 
believe connects Sentimentalism and Formalism on a more intimate and substantial level. 
To both engage and disavow neoclassical principles, to both abide and fight against the 
                                                 
12 Rudolf Neuhäuser, Towards the Romantic Age: Essays on Sentimental and Preromantic Literature in 
Russia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), 28. 
13 See Yurii Lotman, Sotvorenie Karamzina (Moscow: Kniga, 1981); Gitta Hammarberg, From the Idyll to 
the Novel: Karamzin’s Sentimentalist Prose (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); William 
Mills Todd, Fiction and Society in the Age of Pushkin: Ideology, Institutions, and Narrative (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986), B. A. Uspenskii, Iz istorii russkogo literaturnogo iazyka XVIII-
nachala XIX veka: Iazykovaia programma Karamzina i ee istoricheskie korni (Moscow: Izd-vo 
Moskovskogo universiteta, 1985). 
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system, to have dual, mutually competing “orientations” (Tynianov) are the primary 
imperatives of the subtle revolutions that are Sentimentalism and Formalism. This 
connection I hope will explain why Shklovsky engages with Rousseau’s Julie (beyond 
the obviously common theme of forbidden love). What, for Shklovsky, does Rousseau’s 
sentimentalism provide in terms of solace? What gaps in his literary practices does it fill? 
While the French line of influence is well documented with respect to Russian 
Sentimentalism, with respect to Russian Formalism the opposite is true. This influence, 
however, can be discerned. In addition to Shklovsky’s explicit engagement of Rousseau’s 
Julie in Zoo, or Letters not about love, a Third Eloise, there are several other reasons to 
consider the French sentimental model as undeniably influential for the development of 
Formalism. Benjamin Sher, in the introduction to his translation of Shklovsky’s Theory of 
Prose, claims that “[l]ike Pasternak, Mayakovsky, Tsvetaeva, Mandelshtam, Akhmatova 
and other luminaries of the post-Revolutionary era, Shklovsky was undoubtedly an 
outstanding representative of a pre-Revolutionary Russian intelligentsia that called Paris 
its home no less than St. Petersburg or Moscow. That is, it had strong links with Western 
values as we have come to know them since the Renaissance.” 14 The fascination with the 
French-Russian connection was mutual, however, from the Western European 
perspective, not in Russian culture, but rather in Russian francophilia. Intellectual 
curiosity in Russian-French (unidirectional) cultural overlaps inspired the Parisian serial 
publication, Bibliothèque de l'Institut français de Saint-Pétersbourg (1912-1938), which 
covered topics from explicitly Russian (such as “Emplois des aspects du verbe russe” 
                                                 
14 Benjamin Sher, introduction to Theory of Prose, by Viktor Shklovsky, trans. Benjamin Sher (Elmwood 
Park, IL: Dalkey Archive Press, 1991), xvi. 
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[tome 4]) to cross-cultural (such as “L’Architecture Classique à Saint-Pétersbourg” [tome 
2] and “La Correspondance de Falconet avec Catherine II” [tome 7]).15   
While it may be impossible to define succinctly the term Formalism, some of its 
central tenets—the poetic function of the word, the development of genres as the result of 
literary evolution, a purist approach to literary analysis—are consistently read as 
trademarks of German Romanticism, specifically, Hegel’s phenomenology.16 My 
decision to include the French model means to go both with the grain, with respect to 
scholarship on Sentimentalism, and against it, with respect to scholarship on Formalism. 
This is not to say that I wish to replace the German with the French as Formalism’s 
primary foreign influence (such a project would be ill-conceived); I would rather attempt 
to show that the relationship between French and Russian sentimental literature is both 
directly and inadvertently influential for the development of specifically Shklovsky’s 
Russian Formalism. Conceived as a locus amoenus for individual revolution and 
freedom, literary form is taken as an emblem of liberty that breaks what was once the 
imposed co-dependence between a text’s content and its form (that a novel should 
contain fiction, a critical essay should contain criticism, or that an epistolary novel should 
contain letters about love) and re-conceives the relationship between form and content 
obliquely (the novel may contain literary criticism, the critical essay may contain fiction, 
and the epistolary novel, for Shklovsky in particular, letters not about love). While the 
proposed antagonism between form and content falls in step with the modernist trends of 
                                                 
15 Institut français de Saint-Pétersbourg, Bibliothèque De l’Institut Français De Saint-Pétersbourg (Paris: 
H. Champion).  
16 See, for example, B. Paramonov, “Formalizm: Method ili mirovozzrenie” NLO 14 (1996): 35–52; Victor 
Erlich, Russian Formalism: History, Doctrine (The Hague: Mouton, 1965); Douglas Robinson, 
Estrangement and the Somatics of Literature: Tolstoy, Shklovsky, Brecht, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2008). 
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the early twentieth century, Formalism’s particular take on form as a declaration of 
independence I believe betrays the influence of the late eighteenth century. Thus, while I 
argue that Russian Formalism is Sentimentalism made strange—that is, inverted, negated, 
distorted, made anew—I also demonstrate the striking overlaps in their capacities as 
literary (and life) philosophies. 
Chapter One, “Love and the Literary System: The Autobiographical Attempts of 
Shklovsky and Rousseau,” explores the genre of autobiography as an efficient way for 
matching Sentimentalism and Formalism, and, more centrally, for enacting 
Sentimentalism made strange. Occupied foremost with issues of authenticity and 
sincerity, Chapter One investigates the degree to which love and its traditional literary 
forms—here, the epistolary novel and the triolet—interact with autobiography, and how 
this matching of sentiment and literary structure results in a model genre for proper self-
exploration, and thereby self-representation. The degree to which autobiography should 
or might correspond with reality is a line of inquiry that, particularly with respect to the 
eighteenth century, is far from novel. However, Formalism (Shklovsky’s brand thereof), 
a literary discipline that advocates for the reduced importance of psychologism and the 
exclusion of extra-literary facts, provides an interesting counterbalance to Rousseau’s 
eighteenth-century Sentimentalism.17 Thus, it is my hope that in comparing seemingly 
disparate texts from authors of seemingly disparate periods I can offer a new 
                                                 
17 On the subject of using diary entries and other examples of ‘realia’ as tools for exegesis, Shklovsky 
argues: “There is a hidden lie here—as though a writer creates and writes all by himself and not in 
conjunction with his genre and all of literature, with all its conflicting tendencies…Moreover, diaries lead 
us into the psychology of the creative process and the question of the laboratory of the genius, when what 
we need is the thing.” Viktor Shklovsky, Third Factory, ed. and trans. Richard Sheldon (Ann Arbor, MI: 
Ardis, 1977), 61.  
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understanding of sentimental writing, and with it autobiography—to clarify what it means 
to treat the author’s subjectivity with artistic form.  
In order to offer a new take on an old matter, I use two “boundary,” quasi-
autobiographical texts—Rousseau’s Dialogues: Rousseau judges Jean-Jacques 
(Dialogues de Rousseau juge de Jean-Jacques, 178218) and Shklovsky’s Third Factory 
(Tret’ia fabrika, 1926)—as the main texts for my analysis, with supplementary evidence 
drawn from each author’s epistolary novel: Rousseau’s Julie, or The New Heloise (Julie, 
ou la Nouvelle Héloïse, 1761) and Shklovksy’s Zoo, or Letters Not About Love (Zoo, ili 
Pis’ma ne o liubvi, 1923).19  The least read and most experimental of all of his 
autobiographical works, Dialogues was Rousseau’s follow-up defense, after his previous 
first-person account, Confessions (Les Confessions, published in 1782), against the 
extreme backlash he faced from his peers. Like Rousseau, Shklovsky composed his 
autobiography, Third Factory, in response to opposition on both aesthetic and political 
fronts. While Zoo, the first of Shklovsky’s three autobiographical texts (Third Factory 
and Sentimental Journey [Sentimental’noe puteshchestvie, 1923] being the other two), 
was composed soon after he fled persecution in Russia and settled in Berlin, Third 
Factory appears right after its author’s repatriation and yet is all the more rife with 
indignation and recalcitrant prose, against which, as Richard Sheldon shows, Veniamin 
Kaverin, member of the 1920s literary group, Serapion Brothers, struck the harshest 
                                                 
18 1772: publication of the first dialogue; 1773-74: second dialogue; 1774-75: third dialogue; 1775 (end): 
preface; 1776 (summer): postface. 
19 Republished four times, with some letters removed and others added, Zoo has a publishing life that suits 
a literary mapping of the effects of (self-)censorship. Richard Sheldon writes in the preface of his 
translation of Zoo: “The second edition of Zoo was substantially different from the first. Twelve letters 
were omitted (1, 2, 3, 8, 10, 16, preface to 19, 19, 20, 21, 23, and 28), and five new letters were added. In 
the third edition, all the original letters were restored, with the exception of Letters 7 and 20…the fourth 
and fifth editions…kept the same basic format as the third, except that one of the new letters…was 
omitted.” Richard Sheldon, preface to Zoo, or Letters Not about Love, by Viktor Shklovsky, trans. Richard 
Sheldon (Normal, IL: Dalkey Archive Press, 2001), v-vi. 
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blow.20 In contradistinction to their attempts at autobiography, Rousseau and Shklovsky’s 
epistolary novels were by far more widely appreciated at the time of publication. Julie 
was not only the more popular of Rousseau’s twin philosophical novels (the other being 
Emile, 1762), but was one of the most commercial novels of its time, not only because it 
takes up a love plot that was popular in the eighteenth century—the affair between the 
instructor Abélard and his student Héloïse—but, most significantly, because it seeks to 
rescue France’s beloved twelfth-century couple by providing them with a hypothetical 
moral program for how to properly pursue love. Although bearing the mark of 
Rousseau’s roman à these, Shklovsky’s Zoo does not have the same moralistic or even 
philosophical overtones; the expression of love (or, for that matter, not love) that lies at 
the center of his epistolary work is as formative for the characters within as it is linked to 
broader notions of freedom, relevance, and self-expression, and for this reason had 
greater appeal for the reading public, even for Shklovsky himself. Thematically, 
Dialogues and Julie, Third Factory and Zoo, autobiographies and epistolary novels, could 
not be more disconnected, nor their authors, Shklovsky and Rousseau, more contextually 
distant. However, I demonstrate that Rousseau and Shklovsky are united 
methodologically in that their attempts at autobiography share a fractured, unorthodox 
approach to self-representation that is more system- than plot-driven, and that takes cues 
from love’s literary forms while, counterintuitively, using (and abusing) sentimentalist 
tropes to de-centralize the ego in their acts of mimesis.  
Chapter Two, “Love and Negative Poetics: Karamzin’s Self-reading,” looks at 
Karamzin as a figure who stands between Rousseau and Shklovsky, not only historically, 
                                                 
20Richard Sheldon, “Viktor Shklovsky and the Device of Ostensible Surrender,” introduction to Third 
Factory, by Viktor Shklovsky, ed. and trans. Richard Sheldon (Ann Arbor, MI: Ardis, 1977), xxx. 
  
15 
but also with respect to his literary praxis. Owing in part to the “performativity” of 
eighteenth-century Russian Sentimentalism—the literary conceit of posturing as equal to 
self-expression, what Lotman calls the “dual perception”21—I look at Karamzin’s 
sentimental prose, most specifically his short stories “Natalie, the Boyar’s Daughter” 
(“Natal’ia, boiarskaia doch’,” 1792), “Island of Bornholm” (“Ostrov Borngol’m,” 1793), 
and “Julia” (“Iuliia,” 1796) in order to develop a comprehensive picture of how this 
relationship between love and self-representation functions in a selfless literary world, 
where the text is a stage upon which the self is merely a performance. However, in this 
chapter sentimentality interacts with life-writing in an unexpected way, showing 
Karamzin’s “implied” reader as a trope of feigned intimacy, a stylistic tool for 
circumventing the modalities of self-expression, and revealing the degree to which love, a 
sentiment carrying ontological weight in Shklovsky and Rousseau, is diminished to 
device.  
Critics often read Karamzin’s sentimental prose collectively as the place where 
Karamzin composes his autobiographical voice through an author-narrator lyrical meld. 
When read in succession, Karamzin’s sentimental prose forges an “implied” reader that 
supports the author’s articulation of an intimate self, transforming his writing into a 
surreptitiously self-representative project. However, as I demonstrate, Karamzin’s lyrical 
combination of narrator and author serves a tripartite function—he is writer, reader, and 
interpreter, manifesting as an internal schizophrenia. In a step beyond artistic mimesis, 
Karamzin re-qualifies the process of interpretation as a means of self-expression such that 
                                                 
21 “The Russian nobleman of the post-Petrine period has assimilated this sort of everyday life, but at the 
same time felt it to be foreign. This dual perception made him treat his own life as highly semioticized, 
transforming it into a play.” Yurii Lotman, “The Poetics of Everyday Behavior in Eighteenth Century 
Russian Culture,” in The Semiotics of Russian Cultural History: Essays, ed. Alexander D. Nakhimovsky 
and Alice Stone Nakhimovsky (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 72.  
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reading, in addition to or possibly more so than writing, becomes his approach to 
autobiography. If the author is traditionally identified as the creator of the literary text, 
then, by making ‘reading’ the primary task of his narrator-cum-author, Karamzin designs 
the authorial persona in the negative: he is no longer the active agent who creates the 
work of art, but rather the witness or interpreter of the work’s apparent autogenesis. This 
negative approach to authorship, which in Karamzin is applied to narrator and characters 
alike, all of whom come to life through the act of (self-)reading, unites Karamzin with 
Shklovsky across the generational divide.  Both employ negative poetics—here 
understood as a method of artistic representation that finds fecundity in absence, as 
opposed to the negative approach found in Rousseau. While Rousseau gives negativity a 
name (enemies who espouse and spread negative rumors), Shklovsky and Karamzin, in 
contradistinction, engage with negativity as a space, a void, a literal absence that is ripe 
for artistic play. 
Chapter Three, “Love and the Devices of Primitivism: The Portrait of 
Autonomy,” continues to explore manipulations of love’s literary forms (each of the 
authors’ “Julie” is taken as the primary texts for analysis); here however, I use love as a 
point of access for examining another phenomenon that finds expression in both the 
eighteenth and twentieth centuries: primitivism and, later, neo-primitivism. This chapter 
broadens its scope to return to the overlaps that unite the two critical periods that set the 
parameters of this dissertation—Sentimentalism and Formalism—and isolates ‘the 
primitive’ as a particularly striking commonality between the two. Starting with 
Giambattista Vico’s New Science, I outline the development of the ‘primitive’ as a 
philosophical and historical principle that advances a strict divide between ‘primitive’ 
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and ‘civilized,’ axiomatic categories determined by their contrasting relationships to time, 
epistemology, and autonomy. Vico’s categorization proves highly influential particularly 
for Rousseau. To recuperate a lost world is a driving force behind Rousseau’s various 
political programs, which culminate in his Social Contract. Interestingly, the French 
philosopher’s idealized, savage man—who is happy and above all autonomous—
influences Karamzin and Shklovsky in opposite ways: in Karamzin it inspires cultural 
anxiety, while in Shklovsky we find the autonomous consciousness monumentalized in 
Formalism’s championing of the autonomous text.   
In order to draw critical conclusions regarding the similarities and differences 
between the cultural shifts towards an underlying “crude,” “elemental,” explicitly 
“primitive” outlook that occurs in the eighteenth and twentieth centuries, I balance 
Karamzin, Rousseau, and Shklovsky’s critical work against their fiction in which the 
primitive, as an artistic technique, is valorized and/or challenged. Karamzin meets 
Rousseau in this chapter through their respective critical engagements with the primitive 
past, read as a space from which—for better (Karamzin) or for worse (Rousseau)—
mankind has emerged. For Shklovsky, however, the primitive modality provides the 
bearings needed to break the habits of the automatized reader and help the author 
overcome the limitations of linear time. As a means of superimposing new and old forms, 
estrangement transforms the work of art into an expression of polychronicity—it 
demands that the past, automatized reading be considered alongside the new.  
 The methodological apparatus that inspires my analysis comes from criticism by 
Formalism’s direct successors, as many of the linguistic ideas set forth by the Formalists 
were later taken up after World War II by the Structuralists (represented in the 
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dissertation by Hammarberg, Lotman, and arguably Foucault)22—and later 
engaged/challenged by the post-Structuralists (de Man, Derrida, and obliquely 
Starobinski of the “Geneva School”). These voices help me demonstrate how the cult of 
personality that Rousseau’s sentimentalism engenders is complicated in Russia’s 
eighteenth and twentieth centuries by certain aesthetic-political realities; the slack in the 
reins that is typically allotted the sentimentalist writer in terms of freedom of expression 
is consequently handled in other ways. Without relying too heavily on the cultural divide 
between French and Russian breeds of Sentimentalism, this dissertation traces Shklovsky 
and Karamzin’s reformulations of the Rousseauian model, the result of which I call 
Sentimentalism made strange. 
                                                 
22 For more on the intellectual evolution, see Fredric Jameson’s Prison House of Language: A Critical 
Account of Structuralism and Russian Formalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972), which 





Love and the Literary System:  
 
The Autobiographical Attempts of Shklovsky and Rousseau 
 
 “The love boat has crashed up against the everyday [byt]” 
Mayakovsky 
 
What most complicates a comparative study of Shklovsky and Rousseau is not 
only the fundamental distinction between the freedom of expression of traditional 
eighteenth-century sentimental prose and the formal rigidity that accompanies the 
aesthetico-political reality of the 1920s, but also the contradiction between Shklovsky’s 
formalist theory and his sentimental praxis; between what he describes as the 
phenomenon of art, an autonomous form of expression that is devoid of emotionality, and 
the art he creates, like Zoo and Sentimental Journey, which, as he articulates in a late 
work of criticism, Bowstring (Tetiva, 1970), “bled.”23 Zoo, in particular, is a cogent 
example of this contradiction at work: it is an emotional love story told to us as a story 
not about love. Shklovsky treats Zoo, his “boundary” work, with more care than literature 
in general (even more than his other works), in the sense that he refers to the text on 
numerous occasions in his diary and elsewhere, noting humorously its birthday, the 
means through which it was composed, and how the text itself must feel. It is interesting 
to compare the late evaluation of Zoo in Bowstring with Shklovsky’s earlier assessment 
of art in general in Theory of Prose (O teorii prozy, 1925) in which he argues that “in art, 
‘blood’ is not bloody. No, it just rhymes with ‘flood.’ It is material either for a structure 
                                                 
23 Viktor Shklovsky, Bowstring: On the Dissimilarity of the Similar, trans. Shushan Avagyan (Champaign: 
Dalkey Archive Press, 2011), 440. In this moment in Bowstring, Shklovsky himself notes the contradiction 
between his theory and praxis: “Back then [during his time with OPOIAZ] I used to say that art had no 
content, that it was devoid of emotion, while at the same time I wrote books that bled, like Sentimental 




of sounds or for a structure of images.”24  Shklovsky here proposes that words do not 
themselves carry emotion, only sound and image—they emit a sound when spoken, and 
are themselves images to be seen. However, while words are emotionless, Shklovsky, in 
conversation with Lydia Ginzburg, later reveals that literature—the formal organization 
of (emotionless) words within an enclosed system—is capable of bleeding. Ginzburg 
records Shklovsky as saying that Zoo “was so in love that it was impossible to hold it in 
your hands without burning yourself.”25 While the word ‘blood’ is not bloody, Zoo 
bleeds, falls in love, and generates heat. By Shklovsky’s own admission, Zoo is not only 
a sentimental work; it is itself capable of sentimentality, thereby adding a literal 
dimension to what the Formalists believed was the inherent “autonomy” of art. Thus, if, 
as Shklovsky argues in his essay on Rozanov, “a work of literature is the sum-total of all 
stylistic devices employed in it,”26 then Sentimentalism, or what he might more likely 
refer to as literary emotionality, is, paradoxically, the “sum-total” of the emotionless 
words employed within. 
Even if for Shklovsky art is meant to be apathetic, to a large extent Shklovsky’s 
formalist discourse, possibly in spite of himself, is inherently sentimental. In its modern 
usage, “sentimental” not only signifies emotional overindulgence but also characterizes a 
relationship recognized by Locke at the end of the seventeenth century between 
epistemology and the senses that limits human comprehension to the material world.27 
According to Locke, only that which can be perceived can be known. This experience-
                                                 
24 Viktor Shklovsky, Theory of Prose, trans. Benjamin Sher (Elmwood Park, IL.: Dalkey Archive Press, 
1991), 159. 
25 Lidiia Ginzburg, Chelovek za pisʹmennym stolom: Esse, Iz vospominanii, Chetyre povestvovaniia 
(Leningrad: Sov. pisatelʹ, Leningradskoe otd-nie, 1989), 7. 
26 Quoted in Victor Erlich, Russian Formalism: History, Doctrine (The Hague: Mouton, 1965), 15.  




based, epistemic practice was formative for aesthetes and philosophers alike in the 
eighteenth century; however, it moved to the periphery in the nineteenth century as the 
focus of knowledge turned extra-empirically toward the abstract metaphysical world 
(which becomes the focus of the Romantics). Sentimentalism’s anthropocentric 
limitations have ties with Shklovsky’s ostranenie (estrangement, or defamiliarization), as 
well as with the modernist environment from which ostranenie emerges. In its efforts to 
convey the new, industrial civilization, Russian Modernism sought to transform 
articulated fact into felt fact; to make palpable the world rendered impalpable by 
modernization.28  In his 1914 essay “Resurrection of the Word” (“Voskreshenie slova”), 
Shklovsky calls for a return to the “sensation of the world” (oshchushchenie mira):  
We have lost our awareness of the world; we are like a violinist who has 
ceased to feel the bow and the strings, we have ceased to be artists in 
everyday life, we do not love our houses and clothes, and easily part from 
a life of which we are not aware. Only the creation of new forms of art can 
restore to man the sensation of the world, can resurrect things and kill 
pessimism.29  
 
To avoid the petrifaction, or “fossilization,” that breeds “pessimism,” Shklovsky, in his 
later essay, “Art as Device” (“Iskusstvo kak priem,” 1918) proposes ostranenie, a method 
of intentioned perception that turns ossified forms into motion, de-automatizes in order to 
re-animate, and thus “make[s] a stone feel stony” (Theory of Prose, 6). “Art,” he 
proposes in Third Factory, “converts the particularity of things into perceptible form” 
(61). When executed properly, ostranenie charts the process through which reality is 
transformed into artistic expression, which makes reading laborious and breathes new life 
into old forms. For Shklovsky, as well as for the other founding members of the OPOIAZ 
                                                 
28 See Victor Erlich, Modernism and Revolution: Russian Literature in Transition (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1994). 
29 Stephen Bann and John E. Bowlt, eds., Russian Formalism: A Collection of Articles and Texts in 
Translation (Edinburgh, UK: Scottish Academic Press, 1973), 46. 
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School, ossification, monumentalization, what Derrida might call “non-
biodegradability”30 are all consequences of heavy modernization and thus states of 
existence to be either avoided or ameliorated. For its ability to transform the normative 
into the strange, art was conceived of as a capital way to make the necessary transition 
back from immobility into mobility.  
Much like Sentimentalism, which in its faithful relationship to Lockean 
epistemology uncritically takes the individual as a microcosmic sample of larger 
humanity, ostranenie presumes the existence of a universal ego—since the universal ego 
has been automatized in the same way and in the same domains, Shklovsky assumes that 
the vision of reality being altered is also universal. “An idealized theory like 
Shklovsky’s,” reasons Robinson in his work Somatics of Literature, “depends cognitively 
on the assumption that everyone experiences precisely the same proprioceptive boundary 
between the familiar and the strange, the own and the alien, and that any given literary 
estrangement device will therefore have precisely the same de-alienating effect on every 
reader.”31 There is a tribal simplicity to Shklovsky’s ostranenie that precludes 
subjectivity and with it cognitive diversity and multivalent textual experiences. As per 
Robinson’s interpretation, the “de-alienating effect” of ostranenie on the individual ends 
up counter-Marxist since it assumes the individual has been through cultural 
assimilation.32 This contradictory relationship between the individual and the collective is 
fundamental to both Sentimentalism and Formalism and thus creates their most striking 
                                                 
30 Jacques Derrida and Peggy Kamuf, “Biodegradables: Seven Diary Fragments,” Critical Inquiry 15.4 
(Summer, 1989), 812-873. 
31 Douglas Robinson, Estrangement and the Somatics of Literature: Tolstoy, Shklovsky, Brecht (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 111. 
32 Robinson here appropriates the Marxist theory of alienation (Entfremdung, literally “estrangement”), by 
which the individual is absorbed by the collective, “estranged” from his own individuality by the 
demands/strains of a capitalist economy. 
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similarity. Both in its day and beyond, the same charge was leveled against 
Sentimentalism as a uniform human space where all sentimental acts are calls for 
revelation in order to unveil human emotions. In this case, literature in both 
Sentimentalism and Formalism is taken as a phenomenal event, where both author and 
reader enter into a genetic contract with the text—the piece of writing and the act of 
writing itself have existential consequences.  
In light of the strong connection between Shklovsky’s cognitive aesthetics and 
Sentimentalism, it comes as no surprise that he often invokes Sentimentalism—its tropes, 
devices, freedoms, and forms—in his critical and fictional pursuits. His forays into 
Sentimentalism are typically linked to Sterne, whose Tristram Shandy was a central text 
for the development of ostranenie as an example of a formal response to the 
automatization of the novel in the eighteenth century, and whose Sentimental Journey 
informs Shklovsky’s own idiosyncratic travelogue by the same name. Emily Finer, in her 
monograph, Turning into Sterne, outlines the specific attributes that Shklovsky identified 
as “Sternian,” which, she argues, are both formal and thematic, including the device of 
the “found manuscript,” the overabundance of non-sequiturs, and the neo-baroque, jittery 
prose.33 While immensely insightful, Finer’s analysis remains technical and does not do 
much in the way of exploring why Shklovsky, as well as other leading formalists, calls 
upon sentimental prose and its forms, a line of inquiry that is made all the more crucial by 
Shklovsky’s notoriously ambiguous treatment of the sentimentalist school. As Finer 
acknowledges, Shklovsky maintained a complicated relationship with Sentimentalism 
throughout his career, both employing and disavowing it in a single moment. For 
instance, in his essay on Sterne, “Sterne’s Tristram Shandy and a Theory of the Novel” 
                                                 
33 Emily Finer, Turning Into Sterne: Viktor Shklovskii and Literary Reception (Leeds: Legenda, 2010). 
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(“Tristram Shendi Sterna i teoriia romana” 1921), Shklovsky argues that Sentimentalism, 
while a literary school, can hardly be understood as a proper “art form”:  
It would be interesting to take up for a moment the subject of 
sentimentality in general. Sentimentality cannot constitute the content of 
art, if only for the reason that art does not have a separate content. The 
depiction of things from a “sentimental point of view” is a special method 
of depiction, very much, for example, as these things might be from the 
point of view of a horse (Tolstoi’s “Kholstomer”) or of a giant (Swift). By 
its very essence, art is without emotion…art is pitiless or rather without 
pity, apart from those cases where the feeling of sympathy forms the 
material for the artistic structure. But even in that case, we must consider 
it from the point of view of the composition. Similarly, if we want to 
understand how a certain machine works, we examine its drive belt first. 
That is, we consider this detail from the standpoint of a machinist and not, 
for instance, from the standpoint of a vegetarian. (Theory of Prose, 159) 
 
Art may restore perception to the reader; for Shklovsky, however, art’s engagement of 
the senses does not necessarily imply that it should also generate an emotional response. 
After all, “art is without emotion” or “beyond sympathy,” and must be 
“consider[ed]…from the point of view of the composition.” If the aim of literary studies 
is to examine how a work is made and not of what it is made, then Sentimentalism, in its 
traditional capacity, sets up a false relationship between literature and sentiment, 
institutionalizing the connection between them as a basis for artistic creation. To take 
emotion as a subject for literary expression and to view the text from the emotional 
perspective of the author is to admit that emotions maintain a central transformational 
role within a given work of literature. Shklovsky and the Formalists declare the opposite: 
sentiment is nothing more than the means of building a structural apparatus. 
To a certain extent, Shklovsky is right to separate the qualities of Sentimentalism 
from what Sterne accomplishes in his novels. What Sterne considered “sentimental 
literature” is not causally related to the devices he employed, and, similarly, what 
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Shklovsky defines as sternianstvo is not necessarily synched with what he may think of 
as Sentimentalism. Therefore, while Sterne appears to be Shklovsky’s greatest influence 
from within the sentimentalist school, Sentimentalism itself registers in the formalist’s 
mind as a literary category that both persists and takes cues from beyond the limited 
world of Sterne’s oeuvre. However, clues from Shklovsky’s own “sentimental” works of 
fiction are no more revealing about his relationship to the eighteenth-century literary 
tradition than is his criticism. Throughout his memoirs, Sentimental Journey and Zoo, the 
terms sentimentalizm, sentimental'nyi, sentimentalnost’ are used too infrequently and, 
moreover, ambivalently to be taken as clues regarding Shklovsky’s understanding of the 
“sentimental” model. Examples from Zoo include: “He had begun to weep in Prague not 
out of sentimentality, but the way windows weep in a room heated for the first time in 
many weeks” (А заплакал он не из сентиментальности, а так как плачет стекло в 
комнате, которую затопили после долгого промежутка)34; “And I might ask the steam 
shovel to say to me: ‘Look you sentimental pup, at the iron standing on its hind legs. It’s 
no good, this whining and sniveling; if you can’t go on living, then stick your head in an 
iron coal bucket to be bitten off’” (И чтобы сказал мне паровой кран: 'Смотри, 
сентиментальный щенок, на железо, поднятое дымом. Не хорошо ныть и плакать, а 
если не можешь жить, то всунь свою голову в железный угольный черпак, чтобы ее 
откусило’) (65); and “I’m very sentimental, Alya. That’s because I take life seriously. 
Maybe the whole world is sentimental” (Я очень сентиментален, Аля. Это потому, что 
я живу всерьез. Может быть, весь мир сентиментален) (124). In each instance, 
Shklovsky maintains distance from the term “sentimental,” and with a cold irony throws 
                                                 
34 Viktor Shklovsky, Zoo, or Letters Not about Love, trans. Richard Sheldon (Normal, IL: Dalkey Archive 
Press, 2001), 43. 
  
26 
the word about ambivalently; even in the final instance, “sentimentality” is condemned as 
a handicap. Simultaneously engaging and demeaning sentimentality, Shklovsky presents 
an inconsistent understanding of the sentimental school—he mocks its traditional, clichéd 
application while also relying on its forms and the stereotypes it engenders. Bearing in 
mind this blatant contradiction, the following pressing inquiries remain: what exactly was 
Sentimentalism for Shklovsky? At a time of such modernist literary innovation, why was 
this antiquated model evoked? What solace did it provide? Which gaps did it fill?  
I attempt a limited response to these questions by way of an alternative view of 
Shklovsky’s work with Sentimentalism from the perspective of Rousseau. In so doing, it 
tries to reach a broader understanding of Shklovsky’s relationship to Sentimentalism that 
reaches beyond the text’s surface, beyond the tools of expression, to an ontological depth 
that unites author and form. In Zoo, Shklovsky is overt in his tribute to Rousseau, whose 
Julie, ou la Nouvelle Héloïse serves as both the inspiration for the subtitle, “The Third 
Eloise,” and for the epistolary form of Shklovsky’s non-romance novel. Apart from these 
direct references to Rousseau, there is arguably little that suggests a deeper connection 
between the two.35 While I choose to explore the connection to Rousseau over Sterne as 
the more fruitful exercise—or the road less traveled—I neither deny nor discount the 
influence of Sterne, and thus part of my goal here is to assess the role of Sentimentalism 
                                                 
35 While Richardson’s Pamela and Clarissa were original sources of the “polylogic” epistolary novel (in 
which there are several pairs of correspondents and love letters are punctuated with other “confidential” 
letters [Maarten Fraanje, Epistolary Novel in the 18th Century (München: Sagner, 2001), 17]), here 
Rousseau’s Julie appears to be the more influential novel. While Finer admits that Rousseau’s Julie is the 
inspiration for Shklovsky’s title, she argues that Richardson’s Clarissa is the true inspiration for the 
content. This claim seems unjustified in consideration of the remarkably minimal role the Editor plays in 
Clarissa, as opposed to his pronounced, even central role in both Rousseau and Shklovsky. When present 
in Clarissa, the Editor is purely diegetic, providing just enough commentary to keep the narrative linear. 
Julie and Zoo, in contrast, transform that which was for Richardson a structural principal into the author’s 




in general in helping Shklovsky develop a set of devices for autobiography that comprise 
his own enigmatic Sentimentalism. Sentimental form—that is, the storehouse of stylistic 
devices that play with the reader’s expectations and break tradition—undoubtedly 
Shklovsky learns if not entirely then in part from Sterne. I would argue that sentimental 
formalism, if such a distinction can be made, is above all what binds Shklovsky and 
Rousseau.  Sentimental Formalism I see as a deeper connection between form and 
genesis; the conviction that form can simultaneously mimic, adulterate, and transform 
human cognition; and form’s ability to perform the task of ordering one’s world by 
shaping and guiding it.  
Shklovsky’s late critical work, Lev Tolstoy (1963), demonstrates not only that he 
considered Rousseau and Sterne to be the main voices of eighteenth-century 
Sentimentalism, but also that he read them as entirely incompatible sentimental figures. 
While both supported the articulation of the interior world—psychological and 
domestic—Rousseau engaged the senses to ontological/epistemological ends, while 
Sterne, argues Shklovsky, manipulated rather than engaged the senses, transforming 
Sentimentalism from a literary philosophy into a set of formal exercises.  
But Sterne played with human feeling, he played with his description of it, 
deceived the reader, coquettishly displayed his superiority over the reader, 
and slowed up the action artificially, fastening attention on his description 
of feeling. He did teach people to understand feeling, but at the same time 
he taught them a disdain for action.36   
 
For Shklovsky, Sterne “defamiliarizes” in order to teach his reader something about the 
normative values that make up his/her vision of the natural world.37 The diegetic 
                                                 
36 Viktor Shklovsky, Lev Tolstoy, trans. Olga Shartse (Moscow: Raduga, 1988), 84. 
37According to Ginzburg: “Shklovsky’s interest in Sterne is not accidental. But the shifts, transfers, and 
digressions appear to him as literary devices, perhaps, to a much lesser degree than they did for Sterne; they 
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developments of the text matter less than the overarching formal strategies and critical 
outcomes. In this way, Sterne represents for Shklovsky a version of Sentimentalism that 
lies closest to the goals of ostranenie, a strategy for re-sensitizing the relationship 
between individual and world in order to renew one’s relationship to positive reality, and 
thereby come to a more appreciable understanding of the universe. In contrast, Shklovsky 
reads Rousseau (and rightfully so) as a sentimental figure focused more on the 
interrelationship between the senses and interiority and whose literary career centers on 
pronouncing his inner, subjective world. Shklovsky writes in Lev Tolstoy:   
Rousseau was a great thinker, but he was a thinker who saw the world as a 
mergence of countless human destinies, seemingly dependent on nothing 
but themselves. It was a consciousness that wanted to re-make the world 
and grieved over its impotence. It was a consciousness that was not 
ashamed of itself, it laid itself bare, and spoke out about things that had 
been passed over in silence for centuries. Rousseau thought that if 
everything were said out loud about an ignominious deed it would be 
finished and done with. Tolstoy’s talent ripened in this process of tense 
self-analysis. It is most difficult to understand how a great writer takes 
shape. (75) 
 
Shklovsky is one of many to take issue with the contradictory “individual universalism” 
found throughout Rousseau’s oeuvre; Peter Gay, in his 1954 introduction to Ernst 
Cassirer's The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, names it as the central internal 
contradiction that pervades all of Rousseau’s work: Is Rousseau an individualist or a 
collectivist?38 While Shklovsky’s ostranenine is not necessarily synched with Rousseau’s 
solipsism, whatever philosophical gripes he may have had with Rousseau, this chapter 
                                                                                                                                                 
are derived from the structure of his conceptual apparatus.” Chelovek za pis'mennym stolom: Esse, iz 
vospominanii, chetyre povestvovaniia (Leningrad: Sov. pisatelʹ, Leningradskoe otd-nie, 1989), 5. 
38 Peter Gay, introduction to The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, by Ernst Cassirer (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1963), 6. In Emile, Rousseau confirms the individualism that lies at the heart of 
his political philosophy: “Natural man is entirely for himself. He is a numerical unity, the absolute whole 
which is in relation only to itself or its kind.” Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile, in The Collected Writings of 
Rousseau, eds. Roger D. Masters and Christopher Kelly, trans. Allan Bloom (Hanover, NH: Published for 
Dartmouth College by University Press of New England, 1990), 13:39. 
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charts the significant and revealing overlaps between their versions of Sentimentalism.  
 As regards the relationship between Shklovsky and Rousseau, it is not an 
influence that I would propose, but rather an affinity. I read this affinity as a shared 
appreciation not only for form’s (as opposed to content’s) ability to alter perception, defy 
expectations, and, for Rousseau, to reverse judgments, but also for form’s malleability, 
and its capacity to stand in for the author as a replica. In its inherent structural give, form 
emerges as authentic for its ability to mimic—this is what unites Shklovsky and 
Rousseau as (proto-) formalists. It may be true that all knowledge of external reality rests 
on nothing but an accumulation and combination of sense impressions, but the inner 
world can neither be explained nor constructed in this manner. Both Shklovsky and 
Rousseau agree that sentiment is not enough to articulate an inner self. Form is the next 
best thing. Using Shklovsky’s Third Factory and Rousseau’s Dialogues, in conjunction 
with Zoo and Julie, I explore how each author seeks to build an autobiography that is at 
once structured and fractured (specifically, in three distinct parts) and thus takes a 
circuitous path towards self-representation. In true modernist fashion, Shklovsky insists 
not only on capturing autobiography, but also on showcasing the devices with which it is 
and should be made, employing in both Zoo and Third Factory an “architectonic 
tautology,” to cite from Shklovsky’s Theory of Prose, that borrows from the structural 
format of the eighteenth-century epistolary novel. With a similar strategy yet in a 
different direction, Rousseau seeks a form of self-representation that also adapts the 
epistolary form, yet simultaneously takes cues from outside the ‘insidious’ word of art 
and representation, and that demoralizes neither its reader nor its subject. Shklovsky and 
Rousseau’s shared tripartite approach to autobiography is an attempt to multi-
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dimensionalize and thus revitalize autobiography by broadening perception. In order to 
take autobiography out of the world of literary portraiture, which, in its homage to the 
two-dimensional art form, is static, ossified, and vulnerable to inaccuracy (for Rousseau), 
or to automatization (for Shklovsky), the genre is transformed from a monologic into a 
polylogic project, from subjective to inter-subjective, and thus is thrown back into 
motion.  
What is at stake in creating an authentic self-image in literature is not just self-
representation, but self-re-creation—the lexicological, or, more likely, tropological 
recasting of the self in literature. Thus, broadly speaking, the codependency between self-
creation and form found in both Rousseau and Shklovsky, in the eighteenth and twentieth 
centuries, is the focus of this chapter, which, while looking specifically at the epistolary 
form as a structural model for self-representation, seeks answers to the problem of artistic 
rendering: in the relationship between art and world, between “mirror” and “original,” 
can there ever be an equally balanced correspondence? Namely, does art represent, and 
thereby reflect, the world or does it stand on its own as an autonomous creative 
expression?  For Shklovsky, if art mirrors life, it does not passively reflect it, but rather 
actively augments it, refracts it:  
We know that art reflects life. But sometimes we think that art reflects 
happenings that actually occur in life. We are wrong there. Art reflects life 
not as in a mirror, not continuously; it reproduces life as it explores the 
world, using the experience of the previous generation to go by, and often 
exposes in the reflection things that are invisible to the eye looking 
straight at the object. (Lev Tolstoy, 492)   
 
Shklovsky here demonstrates the markedly para-Symbolist angle of the Formalist 
movement. The Symbolist school, whose main thrust was “life-creating” 
(zhiznetvorchestvo), strove for the exact opposite of what Shklovsky proposes, that is, to 
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make distinct the line between life and art.39 In many ways, Rousseau’s aestheticism 
smacks of the Symbolist doctrine; however, within the limits of eighteenth-century 
rational thought that treated aestheticism conservatively, as a model for measuring beauty 
according to reason. Rather than conflate life and art, as zhiznetvorchestvo demands, 
Rousseau, as Derrida argues, “stays convinced that the essence of art is imitation 
(mimesis). Imitation duplicates presence: it is added to the presence of the entity which it 
replaces.”40 Imitation in Rousseau is expressed as an avowed desire to compound and 
perpetuate reality through creative expression; in his work this functions as a blatant 
paradox regarding the irresolvable dissonance between a work of art and the reality it 
expresses: mimesis both is and is not successful; everyday life both can and cannot be 
simulated by its artistic forms. 
The strength of Rousseau's conviction lies in the fact that, for him as for the 
aesthetes and philosophers of his generation, art and life were at once distinct and 
indivisible, cooperative and contentious; despite their constitutional differences, they 
were held to the same moral standards. For this reason, Rousseau's aestheticism is a 
                                                 
39 Khodasevich's 1928 essay, “The End of Renata” (“Konets Renaty”), summarizes well this aesthetic 
practice: “They [Symbolists] attempted to transform art into real life and real life into art. The events of life 
were never experienced as merely and soley life's events; instead, because of the lack of clarity and the 
instability of the boundary lines that outlines reality for these people, the events of life immediately became 
a part of the internal world, a piece of creation. Conversely, something written by any member of the circle 
became real, an even of life for all.” Translated in Irina Paperno, ed. Creating Life: The Aesthetic Utopia of 
Russian Modernism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 2-3. For more on the legacy of 
zhiznetvorchestvo see Michael Wachtel, Russian Symbolism and Literary Tradition: Goethe, Novalis, and 
the Poetics of Vyacheslav Ivanov (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1994).  
Eikhenbaum on the relationship between OPOIAZ and the Russian Symbolists: “We entered into a 
fight with the Symbolists, in order to rip poetics from their hands and, having freed it from the connections 
with their subjective aesthetic and philosophical theories, return it to the path of scientific analysis of facts. 
Brought up on their work, we saw their mistakes with all the more clarity. Having established by this time 
the insurrection of the futurists (Khlebnikov, Kruchenykh, Mayakovsky) against the poetic system of 
symbolism was buttress for the formalists, for it gave their fight an even more pressing nature” (B. M. 
Eikhenbaum, “Teoriia ‘formal’nogo metoda,’” in Literatura: Teoriia, Kritika, Polemika (Leningrad: Priboi, 
1927).  
40 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1997), 289-90. 
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likely counterpart to Shklovsky's estrangement, which attempts, among many things, to 
destroy any given notions of the relationship between art and life, iskusstvo and byt, so 
that they may be better valued; to restructure how they are connected so that both may be 
experienced anew. For Shklovsky, one way to break the binary between art and life and 
to fathom this artistic dilemma is to enact ostranenie—that is, to solve the problem of 
representation as mere reflection through a process of refraction. As he concludes in 
Bowstring: “People can be reflected in art, but the course of perception is transformed as 
a ray of light is refracted in a prism. The optics of art deflects the rays in order to make 
them visible in a different way—to make them palpable” (440). Shklovsky here provides 
his 1970s reader with a variation on an old theme, redefining ostranenie to fit the genre 
of autobiography. The new mode of artistic representation that Shklovsky proposes 
employs the cognitive connection between art and sight, using the process of prelomlenie, 
“refraction,” as away of complicating and thereby ameliorating the deceitful analogy 
between reality and representation.  
Refraction, decidedly an abstract concept, is given formal bearings in the 
epistolary novel. With letters between two individuals compiled and critiqued by a third, 
“the Editor,” the epistolary novel is literary evidence of a representation relationship that 
is triangulated rather than confined to a tight binary, refracted rather than reflected. This 
said, I intend to demonstrate how the internal architecture of the epistolary novel set the 
standards not only for representation, but also for self-representation for both Rousseau 
and Shklovsky. Residing in the background, yet also mediating the conversation, the 
Editor becomes a role model for the author in moments of self-representation. He 
provides the “much needed differential impression” (Theory of Prose, 25) necessitated by 
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Shklovsky’s ostranenie and Rousseau’s sentimentalism, and thereby returns authenticity 
to autobiography. In this interpretation I am inspired by a host of critical scholarship, 
from literary to theological, that addresses the contentious relationship between original 
and representation and charts the controversy of authenticity in artistic creation.41 The 
mimetic crisis here, however, reaches far beyond the dispute between the empirical and 
the fictional self, that is, the ‘double-faced’ self; rather, it is concerned with the epistolary 
novel and autobiography as literary systems with stable rules and regulations that govern 
the means of representation and also how their systems, while distinct, overlap through 
the compositional devices that unite them. 
Much of the following analysis looks at the making of “others”—the making of 
alternative perspectives: binaries where traditionally there is singularity, triads where 
there are binaries. The difference between what Shklovsky and Rousseau propose as 
answers to this aesthetic dilemma is essentially ideological and specific to their respective 
periods: Shklovsky is inspired more by the Russian modernist, Nietzschean impulse 
towards artistic self-creation and less, as is Rousseau, by a higher calling to remain 
faithful to the natural world (of which, arguably, most Modernists harbored an intense 
distrust). While both writers handle main quandaries such as impossibility, incapability, 
loss of information, and lack of information, the difference between them is that 
Shklovsky, representing the modernist camp, accepts that he is inherently not the master 
of everything; he applies the same Enlightenment-motivated, systemic perspective to 
literature, yet from a godless, “de-centered” (Derrida), point of view. Rousseau, on the 
other hand, fully accepts his position as Author-God, as he who is most equipped to 
                                                 
41 Some prominent examples: Aristotle (Poetics), Plato (Republic), Auerbach (Mimesis), Adorno, (Aesthetic 




narrativize his subject (himself), even if a fully-fledged narrative of the self can never be 
achieved. Despite this fundamental difference, their literary systems match on the 
question of autonomy, a central focus that undoes the very systems Rousseau and 
Shklovsky are trying to maintain. As I will show, autobiography is meticulously oriented 
to get at the opposite—that is, to find and give form to an authentic self, an entity that 
ultimately cannot be structured or articulated.  
While Julie and Zoo are not works of autobiography (they can be called 
autobiographies only in the loosest sense), I include them here because there appears to 
be a structural symmetry between these sentimental novels and the tripartite 
autobiography. For Rousseau, love, like autobiography, is a triangulated affair: both 
require an interlocutor to be an authentic experience, and the works Julie and Dialogues 
explore with equal fervor the relationship between polylogism and authenticity as it 
develops through the use of three distinct participants—in Julie, love letters between 
Julie and Saint-Preux are collected, evaluated, and judged by the “Editor,” who 
“discovers” their letters;42 in Dialogues, “Jean-Jacques” is the subject of and thus silent 
partner in a dialogue between “Rousseau” and “The Frenchman.” While in Julie, first-
person narrative is used to simulate the inner psychological world and to help resolve the 
dissonance between fiction and improbability, in Dialogues, Rousseau designs an 
eviscerated autobiography in which the ego lingers on the periphery, demoted to 
marginalia, his voice appears in the form of commentary; and yet, it is the ego’s absence, 
for Rousseau, that confirms its authenticity. In both the epistolary and autobiographical 
forms, the “I” is at risk of being mistaken for (or recognized as) a fictitious invention or 
                                                 
42 Although Julie also consists of letters from other secondary characters—cousin Claire, Milord Edward, 
Wolmar—I am taking the epistolary novel’s original title, Lettres de deux amans habitans d'une petite ville 
au pied des Alpes, at face value to justify centralizing only the letters between Julie and Saint-Preux. 
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conceit of each genre, and this threat of misconception motivates Rousseau’s Dialogues 
to de-center the ego in what is traditionally a monologic project. Composed entirely in 
dialogue, Rousseau’s Dialogues does away with autobiography’s—and Sentimentalism’s, 
for that matter—first-person crutch and attempts self-representation from outside the 
solitary world of the ego.  
As in his Confessions, in Dialogues Rousseau presents une âme déchirée (the 
torn/fractured soul/mind), which Trilling reads as an early literary manifestation of the 
Romantic “disintegrated consciousness.”43 However, Rousseau’s broken ego is not a 
formal demonstration of what Goethe referred to as the “ineffability” of the personality, 
but rather a formal exercise in reconciling and uniting competing notions of the self—
joining self-proclamations (“le mien”) with rumors (“le leur”). As in Julie and 
Confessions, authenticity in Dialogues consists in being perceived and judged by an 
outside viewer—whether it is a judge built into the structural framework of the novel—as 
in Julie and Dialogues—or a judge that is situated outside the text—as in Confessions. 
“Jean-Jacques cannot elucidate his nature, his character, and the principle of his unity in a 
single word,” argues Starobinski, “he must rely on witnesses; it is up to them to construct 
his image and judge it.” 44 Dialogues is a formal demonstration of this ontological 
process. The “I”, the ego, Jean-Jacques himself is absent from the textual world 
demonstrating in no uncertain terms a shift from egotistical to communal 
anthropocentrism, such that the ego is comprised of multiple voices, is both individual 
and community, parole and langue. Much like Rousseau’s political theory of alienation—
in which the individual makes sacrifices in personal freedom for a greater freedom—
                                                 
43 Lionel Trilling, Sincerity and Authenticity (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1972), 59.  
44 Jean Starobinski, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Transparency and Obstruction, trans. Arthur Goldhammer 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988), 182. 
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Dialogues shows the construction of the self in these negative terms: Rousseau self-
abnegates in order to self-realize.  
In Dialogues, self-denial is achieved on both a formal and contextual level. Paul 
de Man, in his famous rebuttal of Derrida, “The Rhetoric of Blindness,” describes the 
drive to confirm existence through negation as symptomatic of Rousseau’s era, and refers 
to it as a quintessential Rousseauian moment, wherein “Rousseau’s theory of 
representation is not directed toward meaning as presence and plentitude but toward 
meaning as void.” De Man argues that Rousseau’s autobiographical works, when taken as 
a whole, “postulates the necessity of its own misreading. It knows and asserts that it will 
be misunderstood.”45 To employ negativity as a means of positive epistemological 
reinforcement presages the powerful negativity that is fundamental to Shklovsky’s 
theory, since it assumes that paradox and revolution are characteristic of literary life. For 
this reason, Shklovsky’s theoretical work is often characterized as bearing the mark of 
Hegel, who, according to Trilling, “envisioned the developing hegemony of the 
disintegrated consciousness and consigned the honest soul to the contempt of history” 
(Sincerity and Authenticity, 54). While the relationship between Shklovsky’s formalism 
and Hegelianism is a subject too great to be dealt with here,46 it serves as inspiration for 
the following apophatic reading of autobiography as an exercise in negative poetics, in 
which one arrives at the proof of existence not through presence but through absence.   
                                                 
45 Paul de Man, Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism, (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 136. 
46 For more on the relationship between Hegel and Shklovsky see Robinson, “Shklovsky’s Hegelianism,” 
Estrangement and the Somatics of Literature. Whereas Robinson argues for the Hegelian genealogy of 
Shklovsky’s formalist poetics, Svetlana Boym provocatively argues the opposite: “Hence, such an 
understanding of estrangement is different from both Hegelian and Marxist notions of alienation. Artistic 
estrangement is not to be cured by incorporation, synthesis, or belonging.” Svetlana Boym, “Poetics and 




The notion of negative poetics in Shklovsky, Karamzin, and Rousseau will be 
covered in more depth in the next chapter (“Love and Negative Poetics: Karamzin’s Self-
reading”); however, for now it leads us to another concern that lies at the center of the 
epistolary and triolet forms—the search for a “much needed differential impression” 
(Shklovsky), or the “contre-pied” (Rousseau), that is built into the structure of each 
genre. The reader of any literary portrait thinks he has seen a totality, whereas much more 
could be disclosed by seeing “the other side,” by considering multiple perspectives, and 
by thus relocating the boundaries of the frame. As with love in Julie, autobiography for 
Rousseau is the point of intersection between multiple perspectives, consisting of 
naysayers and proponents; as part of an ongoing conversation, it is never static but 
always in flux. Shklovsky brings this operational relationship between the epistolary 
novel and autobiography to a hyper-realized level in Zoo, bearing the devices of 
polylogism and multi-dimensionality in a faktographic, or texturized recasting of 
Rousseau’s roman à thèse. Shklovsky’s Zoo simulates the device of the “found 
manuscript,” and thereby retains the structure of Rousseau’s Julie; however, there is no 
pretense of authenticity or sincerity. “I built the book on a dispute between people of two 
cultures,” admits Shklovsky, “the events mentioned in the text serve only as material for 
metaphors” (4). The woman, “The Third Eloise,” is “a certain configuration” (4) and 
even the author himself is denied agency: “the book began to write itself” (3).  In other 
words, Zoo is an exercise in estrangement; it transforms life into device, de-familiarizes 
the real, and thereby “decelerates” the reading process.  
A cogent example of this transformation is Elsa Triolet, whom Richard Sheldon 
calls a “realized metaphor”; however, I would argue that she is more than that—she is life 
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made device, ‘reality metaphorized.’47 Elsa Triolet, sister of Osip Brik’s wife, Lili is the 
inspiration for the character Alya, to whom the narrator-Shklovsky writes his letters. 
Shklovsky fell in love with Elsa Triolet while living abroad in Berlin, and Zoo, which 
features actual letters from Elsa to Shklovsky (one of which started her literary career; 
encouraged by Maksim Gorkii, Triolet developed her letter from Tahiti [Letter 21, 76-8] 
into the 1925 Russian novella, In Tahiti [Na Taiti]), to a certain extent traces their love 
affair. However, while Zoo is inspired by real life, Shklovsky’s choice of Elsa Triolet as 
Alya was also motivated by what she represents. The novel’s original preface (Berlin 
1923) warns readers that, despite appearances, Zoo is not the traditional epistolary love 
story. It runs counter to the “usual motivation” for love stories: “since the basic material 
of the book had nothing to do with love,” Shklovsky writes, “I introduced a prohibition 
against writing about love” (3) Furthermore, Shklovsky admits, “the events mentioned in 
the text serve only as material for the metaphors” (4). These stipulations in mind, one 
cannot ignore, as I assume Shklovsky did not ignore, the correspondence between Triolet 
and her poetic namesake—an eight-line stanza in which the first line is repeated in the 
fourth and seventh, and the second line is repeated in the eighth—which Shklovsky 
covers in some detail in Theory of Prose. Drawing from A.N. Veselovsky’s extensive 
work with psychological parallelism (Poetics of Plots [Poetika siuzheta] 1897-1906)48 
                                                 
47 Richard Sheldon, introduction to Zoo, xxviii.  
48 The degree to which Shklovsky and the Formalists drew from the psychological work of Veselovsky and 
Potebnia is charted in Victor Erlich’s Russian Formalism: History, Doctrine (The Hague: Mouton, 1965). 
While in 1948, Shklovsky admits that the school of Russian literary criticism is founded on Veselovsky’s 
findings, which are “crystallized” in the critical work in the early twentieth century (“Aleksandr 
Veselovskii—istorik i teoretik,” Oktyabr' 12 [1947], 174), in his earlier works, Theory of Prose and Third 
Factory, Shklovsky argues that the Veselovsky school is not responsible for Russian Formalism. From 
Third Factory: “The distinction between the school of Opoyaz and the school of Aleksandr Veselovsky lies 
in the fact that Veselovsky views literary evolution as an imperceptible accumulation of slowly changing 
phenomena. If Veselovsky sees that two moments in the history of a plot differ from one another rather 
sharply, he will, if unable to locate the transitional moment, assume the existence of a missing link. I 
  
39 
Shklovsky uses the triolet as a poetic example of how “form creates for itself its own 
content” (Theory of Prose, 24) insofar as the parallel structure generates meaning within 
the poem. More importantly, however, the triolet is a poetic model of estrangement-at-
work. As “a phenomenon that is very close to a tautological parallelism,” the effect of the 
triolet, Shklovsky argues, “lies partly in the fact that one and the same line of verse lands 
in different contexts, a fact which produces a much needed differential impression” (25). 
Estrangement arises from the coexistence of three parallel situations, each of which re-
contextualizes, “transfer[ring] […] an object from its customary sphere of perception to a 
new one” (12), and thereby redefines the original—all conflicting, and yet, by nature of 
the triolet’s tautological structure, all equally true.   
The configuration of the triolet mimics (or is mimicked by) the internal 
architecture of the epistolary form, in which three figures provide three distinct, yet 
equally viable perspectives on love. A bout-rimé which captures predetermined and often 
sentimental subjects like love, the triolet shares with the epistolary novel several 
structural qualities, and the possible causal relationship between these two modes of 
narrativizing love is something yet unexplored and significant to the thesis at hand. In 
their strict organization, the triolet and the epistolary novel take the Enlightenment’s 
categorization of the sentiments to a heightened level, lending structure to an otherwise 
                                                                                                                                                 
assume that a plot develops dialectically, spurning its original form and sort of parodying itself. Veselovsky 
now and then comes close to the truth when he asserts that a certain artistic device might reflect an actual 
social custom, but such a solution to the problem strikes me as inadequate” (57-58). The distance between 
the Formalists and Veseloveky is an assertion that Boris Maslov, in his yet unpublished article, 
“Comparative Literature and Revolution, or the Many Arts of (Mis)reading Alexander Veselovsky,” finds 
“conspiratorial” and part of the mythic “self-proclaimed originality” of Russian Formalism. Even the term, 
“poetics” as it is employed throughout Formalist criticism, argues Maslov, owes its significance to 
Veselovsky’s Historical Poetics, which is responsible for the modern resurrection of the Aristotelian 
meaning of the word as a “scholarly investigation into literature.” Boris Maslov, “Comparative Literature 
and Revolution, or the Many Arts of (Mis)reading Alexander Veselovsky,” Compar(a)ison: An 
International Journal of Comparative Literature (forthcoming): 3.   
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amorphous love, formalizing sentiment, subjecting it to an organizing principle, and 
transforming subjective experience into an ontological process. This matching of system 
and sentiment is one of the particulars that characterize the transition between 
Neoclassicism and Sentimentalism in the late eighteenth century, and that form the 
interesting overlap between the developments in creative expression in the late eighteenth 
and early twentieth centuries.  
The triolet and the epistolary novel also follow a similar historical trajectory, both 
coming back into fashion after a long hiatus during the nineteenth century. Tynianov 
explains the revival of the epistolary novel as a return to byt. In his work Archaists and 
Innovators (Archaisty i novatory 1929), Tynianov argues that the epistolary form marked 
the shift in ustanovka (“orientation”) brought on by literary salons in the late eighteenth 
century (in the move from Neoclassicism to Sentimentalism) and became its optimal 
form. In the twentieth century the letter was again a fact of byt, and thus became re-
automatized. 49  Like the epistolary novel, the triolet was very popular in eighteenth-
century France and mildly popular in Russia at the same time (most examples within the 
Russian canon issued from the collected works of Karamzin and P.A. Pel’skii, a minor 
sentimentalist poet and Karamzin’s friend and collaborator). While in the nineteenth 
century lyrical repetition had all but disappeared,50 fixed poetic forms of Romance origin 
were later revived in the Russian modernist literary canon, particularly among Symbolists 
                                                 
49 Iurii Tynianov, Arkhaisty i Novatory; Statʹi (Leningrad: Priboi, 1929). For the fate of the epistolary form, 
see N. Stepanov, “The Familiar Letter of the Early Nineteenth Century,” in Russian Prose, eds. Boris 
Eikhenbaum and Yuri Tynianov, trans. Ray Parrott (Ann Arbor, MI: Ardis, 1985).  
50 V. M. Zhirmunsky provides the following statistics regarding the number of poems with compositional 
repetition: Pushkin 43/558, Baratynsky 12/222, Lermontov 27/377. Rifma, ee istoriia i teoriia, (Peterburg: 
Academia, 1923), 123, n93. 
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Balmont, Sologub, Briusov, and Rukavishnikov, who were imitating the lyrical repetition 
distinctive of the French symbolist style.51  
As was previously mentioned, Formalism evolved somewhat in opposition to the 
aesthetic practices of Symbolism, finding the philosophical melding of life and art 
offensive to the Formalists’ more puritanical study of literature and the “literary fact.” 
However, Formalism’s codification of a text’s working parts and structural elements as 
scientific evidence was in homage to the Silver Age poets, who radically altered the 
common perception of form by emulating it and conceiving of it as the most perceivable 
part of a work of art. In fact, it was the Symbolists’ strict division of form from content 
(form as essential and artistic; content as external to art) that informed Formalism’s own 
idiosyncratic relationship to form; recognizing content and form as distinct and 
independently functioning parts, the Formalists were inspired to consider not only the 
separate behaviors of form and content, but also the ways in which their behaviors 
influenced, inspired, and revised each other: where they overlapped, and to what extent 
they were one and the same. In this way, the Formalists stood in stark contrast not only to 
the Symbolists, but also to other modernist, avant-garde groups who were captivated by a 
Marxist reading of the text as a battle between content and form. Formalism, in 
contradistinction, presented a more harmonious alternative to modernist literary studies.  
The anomalous reading of the relationship between content and form articulated 
by the Formalists adds yet another significant dimension to the twentieth-century revival 
                                                 
51 Deservedly, the Symbolists valued the artistic capacity of the triolet. Examples of its popularity are 1) 
three volumes of Iosif Kalinnikov, published between 1915 and 1918, which contained triolets; 2) articles 
on “bout-rimés” in Literaturnoi entsiklopedii in 1925 by the Symbolist poet, Ivan Rukavishnikov. See 
Literaturnaia entsiklopediia: slovar' literaturnykh terminov v dvukh tomakh, ed. N. Brodskii et al., 2 vols. 




of love’s two main literary forms.  Specifically, Shklovsky’s invocation of Elsa Triolet in 
Zoo may be read as an example of content’s (Elsa Triolet) meeting, or rather blending, 
with form (triolet). T/triolet is a space where form and content, no longer distinguishable, 
work in tandem to complete the process of signification: where poetic form intersects 
with real-life through double-entendre. Thus, in Zoo, the notions of “threes,” polylogism, 
and love all cohere around the allusive Elsa Triolet. Like lines 1, 4, and 7 of the 8-line 
stanza, the intersection of these three parallel contexts—Shklovsky, Elsa, and the Editor 
(the meta-Shklovsky)—collide and intersect (this collision of voices often manifested 
visually with a large “X” plastered across a “censored” letter), all exerting equal power in 
the novel, resulting in an estranged love story that simultaneously is and is not about 
love. Shklovsky takes the format of the canonized epistolary novel and morphs it into a 
device. He removes its traditional content—“letters not about love”—and thus 
concentrates only on the form, manipulating it to an estranged end. As Finer argues, the 
epistolary form for Shklovsky was an “ideal form with which to explore ironic 
relationships between different formal conventions and their proponents. Shklovsky’s 
novel in letters conveys an understanding of the meta-fictional possibilities of the 
epistolary novel…” (107). More than just social commentary, Zoo is a laboratory in 
which Shklovsky experiments with matching form and real-life, and where love serves as 
the backdrop for developing a means of literary self-discourse.  
The effort to triangulate representations of love and autobiography is bound up 
with the complications surrounding the issues of artistic representation and authenticity. 
As was mentioned at the outset of this chapter, my reading of the autobiographical works 
of Rousseau and Shklovsky handles the notion of refraction as opposed to reflection. 
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Julie, as has been argued by a number of scholars, is an unorthodox approach to 
autobiography insofar as each character within the novel bears Rousseau’s imprint and 
can be taken as a literary manifestation of the author. The relationship between author 
and work, maker and made, which lies at the forefront of Julie, asks whether love, the 
subject of much derision, parody, manipulation, and, above all, trivialization, actually 
carries ontological weight. Certainly, the most well-known triadic creative relationship is 
bound inextricably to the subject of love: that is, the creative relationship between 
creator-Pygmalion, creation-Galatea, and interlocutor-Venus. As the myth dictates, 
although Pygmalion sculpts Galatea with his bare hands, it is Venus who ultimately 
brings her to life, taking pity on the sculptor in love with his creation. In Rousseau’s 
retelling of Ovid’s myth, however, Venus is replaced with an alternative third party, a 
slab of marble, an aide-mémoire of the sculptor’s generative power. The “Pygmalion 
effect,” the relationship between creator and creation, in Rousseau’s re-telling comes to 
life in the interaction between Pygmalion and Galatea and the sculpting material. In 
Rousseau’s Julie, the “Pygmalion effect” is enacted through the relationship between 
Julie and Wolmar. Wolmar, as both a landowner and husband, poses as Rousseau’s 
Pygmalion, who, through will alone, molds his immediate world to fit his ideal. Although 
not carved from stone, Julie emerges from Wolmar’s moral teachings a reformed woman, 
no longer a Julie d’Etange, but a Julie de Wolmar, a “Julie of Wolmar.” And, as with 
Pygmalion and his Galatea, the motivating force is love.  
Correlated arrangements that match love and structure in order to emphasize the 
relationships between maker and made, such as the epistolary novel, the triolet, and “the 
Pygmalion effect,” are repeated throughout Rousseau’s oeuvre and reinforce his literary 
  
44 
system. Even a cursory look at the relationships between Pygmalion and Galatea, 
Wolmar and Julie reveals a resemblance between Rousseau’s conception of artistic 
activity and the experience of love, and his two versions of Pygmalion ask whether, under 
the “Pygmalion effect,” self-expression can be properly executed outside of love’s 
literary domain. Starobinski notes the correspondence between self-expression and love 
in developing pygmalionism, an alternative, deferred and deflected version of narcissism 
where love of self is experienced first as love for one’s creation:  
The undivided narcissism of self-involvement is followed by another 
antithetical form of narcissism: self-projection. It would be better perhaps 
to call this attitude not narcissism but pygmalionism. Instead of falling 
back immediately upon itself, love alienates itself in the form of a work. 
Through the work, however, it still seeks union of self with self. Love 
abandons the ego only to pave the way for a happy return. “I adore myself 
in what I have made.52 
 
Starobinski’s pygmalionism highlights well a particular type of creative relationship in 
which the desire to create is motivated above all by a surreptitious impulse to self-love. 
The creator’s likeness is remade in his creation, and, looking at his creation, which is 
identical with his own self, allows him a referred understanding of his identity. When 
abstracted, pygmalionism as a psychological condition demonstrates in metaphorical 
terms the system operative in the epistolary novel for valuing and understanding the self: 
it is always a mediated process in which the self is arrived at through a series of 
evaluative tasks—gazing, judging, assessing, appreciating, and, above all, loving. The 
self is not a concept that is bound to the individual alone, but rather is a constellation of 
its refracted images: whom it loves, who loves it; what it creates, who creates it.   
                                                 




For Shklovsky’s Eloise, however, the desired effect is inverted. To transform life 
into device (Elsa Triolet into T/triolet) is to enact a Pygmalion moment in reverse—to 
take life and make it marble, to make stone once again stony. In de-animating life, 
Shklovsky reconfigures the link between the creative process and self-discovery. This is 
the Sentimentalism made strange that lies at the core of his work: an aesthetic imperative 
to retrograde Pygmalion’s creative process, to proceed from life to material, and to break 
the alleged ties between creator and his creation in order to underline the autonomous, 
autogenetic spirit of artistic material. When in Third Factory Shklovsky writes “wet clay 
taught me how to properly understand art,” he insists that art be understood as process, as 
material that is manipulated, and in so doing, insists that the critic unpack, understand, 
and evaluate the creative process staring from art’s beginning rather than its final stages 
(45). Shklovsky’s Formalism takes a radically critical view of the role of the 
author/creator, suggesting at one time that the creator both does and does not exist, and 
thereby ameliorates the contentious yet also interdependent relationship between creator 
and creation wherein self-identity, that is, identity as distinct and extricable from another, 
is at stake—creator and creation, Shklovsky insists, exist independently of each other. In 
fact, Shklovsky takes this genetic separation one step further. The link between creation 
and creator, he insists, is “nonfunctional”: “With regard to the writer, art has three 
freedoms: 1) the freedom to ignore his personality, 2) the freedom to choose from his 
personality, 3) the freedom to choose from any other material whatsoever. One must 
study not the problematical connection, but the facts” (Third Factory, 61). What exactly 
is meant by this declaration is unclear; in true modernist form, a good amount of Third 
Factory reads as a series of utterances without much of what Shklovsky often refers to as 
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tkan’ (connective tissue). However, the implication is that Shklovsky values art as an 
autogenetic entity endowed with a certain set of “freedoms,” most important of which is 
the right to declare independence from traditional notions of the creative process.  
In a sense, Shklovsky’s campaign for art’s autonomy is a way to rescue literature 
from its role as a tool for social approval and to return it to the world of creative praxis. 
He treats literature as integrated material that melds art and byt, device and life.  In this 
respect, Third Factory, Shklovsky’s third effort in life-writing (alongside Zoo and 
Sentimental Journey), may be read as an attempt to match life and device in his own 
world by applying the epistolary-triolet template—a three-part, “architectonic 
tautology”—to autobiography.  A “de-novelized,” de-centered self-portrait, Third 
Factory finds affinity with Rousseau’s negative approach to self-representation; however, 
Shklovsky takes Rousseau’s effort a step further. “I have no desire to construct a plot,” he 
writes in the preface, “I am going to write about things and thoughts. To compile 
quotations” (3).  Rousseau’s Dialogues, while equally fractured, is composed with more 
systematic organization. Although it is presented as a non-linear narration of the self, its 
ultimate endgame is comprehension—not only a comprehensive image of the author, but 
a dialogue between author and reader, and between opposing viewpoints, that results in a 
comprehensive understanding at least of what exactly constitutes “Rousseau.” 
Shklovsky’s Third Factory, in contradistinction, asserts neither a comprehensive image 
of the author, nor a plan to construct one. The impulse to build a non-linear narrative 
stems from the desire to de-automatize and ultimately to destroy the reader’s 
expectations, and, in so doing, to commit to a more authentic image of the author in 
formalist terms.  
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In Dialogues, Rousseau takes the notion of self-fragmentation to a capital level by 
claiming that “notre plus douce existence est relative et collective et notre vrai moi n’est 
pas tout entier en nous.” 53 Totality is a mere illusion, however, to which art should 
aspire. While the search for a holistic literary rendering of the self defines the process of 
self-representation, totality is not the endgame. As Rousseau writes in his 
autobiographical fragment, Mon portrait (1764-5[?]), “I throw my scattered and 
disconnected thoughts on scraps of paper, afterward I stitch it all together somehow or 
other and that is how I write a book” (fragment 35).54  For Rousseau, the only type of 
portrait that approaches authenticity is the literary portrait, which, in its hermeneutical 
dependence on the reader, is itself intrinsically incomplete.  Without relying too heavily 
on the Romantic notion of l’âme dechirée, I support the general opinion that the reliable 
portrait for Rousseau is a fractured one—broken not because of its ineffability, but 
because it is the artistic yield of a system in place that involves a complicated process of 
interpretation, misinterpretation and re-interpretation; for de Man, an explicitly three-part 
process: 
In the more complicated case of the non-blinded author, as we have 
claimed Rousseau to be, the system has to be triadic: the blindness is 
transferred from the writer to his first readers, the “traditional” disciples or 
commentators. These blinded first readers…then need, in turn, a critical 
reader who reverses the tradition and momentarily takes us closer to the 
original insight. The existence of a particularly rich aberrant tradition in 
the case of the writers who can legitimately be called the most 
enlightened, is therefore no accident, but a constitutive part of all 
literature, the basis, in fact, of literary history.  And since interpretation is 
nothing but the possibility of error, by claiming that a certain degree of 
blindness is part of the specificity of all literature we also reaffirm the 
                                                 
53 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Dialogues de Rousseau juge de Jean-Jacques  ; suivis de Le Lévite d’Ephraïm 
(Paris: Flammarion, 1999), 227. 
54 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Autobiographical, Scientific, Religious, Moral, and Literary Writings, in The 
Collected Writings of Rousseau, ed. and trans. Christopher Kelly (Hanover, NH: Published for Dartmouth 
College by University Press of New England, 2006), 12:43.  
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absolute dependence of the interpretation on the text and of the text on the 
interpretation. (Blindness and Insight, 141)  
 
Motivated in two directions, Rousseau avoids and celebrates error; he preempts 
misinterpretation by employing its mistakes. The self that is reproduced in autobiography 
must be seen at several removes, refracted rather than reflected, and for this reason 
mistakes become the undeniable underbelly of any attempt at life-writing. The idea that 
the personality is best represented not only as a composite of parts (which allude to, yet 
do not form a complete image), but also as not entirely factual is a notion that finds 
affinity with Russian Formalism. For instance, Lev Yakubinsky, in his work on dialogic 
speech, emphasizes the value of error in his presentation of apperception—the process 
through which self-discovery merges with dialogue. He explores speech automatism, a 
speech act that one produces without thought, which is encouraged more in dialogue than 
in monologue, and which renders dialogue more “progressive” than monologue. 
Linguistic creativity, he argues, arises from the automatism of dialogue. When one is 
engrossed in an automatic act, errors are committed and neologisms are made: “we may 
conclude that dialogue promotes speech as a simple, volitional, and unconscious 
activity.” 55 In this sense, dialogue is innovative in its errors; its significance depends on 
pre-conceived notions, for it relies on the listener at times to infer what is meant despite 
what is said. This correspondence between two conversation partners, a practice in which 
one must take into account “others,” the Formalists apply to the text, recognizing that 
within the text’s linguistic system meaning changes and evolves with each and every 
reader. A thumbprint of Yakubinsky’s work on dialogic speech is found in the theoretical 
makeup of estrangement, a strategy for transforming life into art which insists that 
                                                 
55 Lev Iakubinsky and Michael Eskin, “On Dialogic Speech,” PMLA 112, no. 2 (March 1997): 255. 
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automatic behavior be looked at critically in order to give new life to old art forms.56 
Misconceptions, misconstructions, essentially all alternative viewpoints that may or may 
not be true to fact make estrangement effective. Estrangement gives aesthetic weight to 
the value of error, which is then valorized and heightened to the level of empirical fact 
particularly in Shklovsky’s autobiography. Within this process of (mis)interpretation and 
reinterpretation, mistakes are inevitable, which, as in dialogue, is a necessary part of any 
portrait, whether literary or otherwise.  
As in Zoo, the only element that unites the material in Third Factory is the work’s 
architecture—in Zoo, the presence of the Editor; in Third Factory, the division of the 
work into three formative “factories” which make up Shklovsky’s sentimental education. 
Shklovsky’s goal in creating a “bezfabul’nyi” (plotless) autobiography is two-fold. First, 
to project a new (modernist) image of the personality that can be represented as “organic” 
(Theory of Prose, 209), even if it “lies outside the scope of the plotted genre” (206), 
which, as Shklovsky tells his reader in Third Factory, has been “consigned to the attic” 
(4). For this reason, Shklovsky employs the anecdote, a condensed genre that may be 
understood as an “organic” representation of the personality (as an unadulterated speech 
act, it can conceivably be taken as one’s “essence” as it is, and not as it is shaped). 
Furthermore, the anecdote is essentially a dialogic genre, derived from the oral tradition, 
which, in light of Yakubinsky’s study, in which dialogue, categorized as “estestvennaia 
rech’” (natural speech), is set against the more tyrannical and “artificial” (iskustvennyi) 
monologue, only increases the anecdote’s organic potential. To turn towards anecdotal 
material as opposed to traditional narrative means to accept non-conservative forms of 
                                                 
56 Aleksandr Galushkin’s authoritative study of OPOIAZ reveals that Shklovsky’s professor and mentor 
Baudoin de Courtenay introduced Shklovsky to Iakubinsky in the second half of 1914 (Shklovsky confirms 
their meeting in Third Factory); see Galushkin, ed., Literaturnaia zhizn’ Rossii 1920-kh godov.  
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representation as effective for realigning the artificial and the real. Third Factory 
emblematizes the movement in the formalist camp towards melding form and life in an 
attempt to reinstate the real, natural world within literature, one that prioritizes the 
immediacy of language and breaks the habits of the automatized reader.  
The second motive, causally related to the first, is to include others, as does 
Rousseau, in the representation process, and thus to demonstrate how art can function as 
a de-automatizing force.  The multiplicity of anecdotal detail unloaded on the reader 
compels him to reassemble the story, to make a whole out of disparate parts, and, in this 
way, teaches him to be an active participant in the mimetic process—to “see” and not to 
“recognize” (Resurrection of the Word). As with epistolary narratives, Shklovsky’s quasi-
autobiography has a particular way of playing with the reader’s pleasure in coordinating 
fragments. While, to a certain extent, the ego is the subject of Third Factory, art as device 
is the focal point; it is the ego that is at stake of ossification, the ego that Shklovsky 
wishes to set in motion—to change, transform, and evolve. If, as Starobinski argues, 
Rousseau’s Dialogues is a declaration of vitam impendere sibi (to risk one’s life for the 
self), then Shklovsky’s Third Factory takes the same risk, however, in support of art.57 
Describing the work of the "second" of three "factories" operative in his 
life, Shklovsky calls attention to the systemic approach that comprises the early 
work of the OPOIAZ Formalists. 
The important thing is that we approached art systematically. We spoke 
about art as such. We refused to view it as a reflection. We located the 
distinctive features of the genus [rod]. We began defining the basic 
tendencies of form. We understood that, in fact, you can distill from works 
of literature the homogenous laws that determine their shape. In short, 
science is possible. (Third Factory, 38) 
                                                 
57 Note that letter thirty-one of Zoo admits to the same secret project: “Even so, I’m not going to write 




In conceiving of literature as a “machine,” or aesthetic “system,” the Formalists, 
according to Shklovsky, were able to isolate the defining features that made a work of 
literature “literary,” and thus were able to build a “scientific” discipline out of literary 
studies. In a radical step beyond late nineteenth-century literary criticism, the Formalists 
did away with empiricism as influential for the study of literature in order to let the 
artistic creation stand “autonomously.” As P. N. Medvedev phrases it: “European 
Formalism [Russian Formalism—A. A.] developed equally hostile to the positivism of 
the previous epoch and to the idealist philosophical aesthetics, with its gross 
generalizations and disinterested view in the concrete phenomena of art.”58 Unlike 
biographical material, diary entries, and sociological influences, the “autonomous” 
literary system was for the Formalists the only legitimate object for literary studies. With 
external influences held at bay, the autonomous work of art could be taken as a 
“machine,” or “system”: self-standing, self-regulating, and virtually autogenetic. 
In Shklovsky’s criticism as well as his (quasi-) fiction, the notion that literature is 
a self-governing system of parts, movable in their own right, and yet also part and parcel 
of the greater literary “machine” is a metaphor upon which Shklovsky relies heavily. 
Peter Steiner, in his seminal work, Formalism: a Metapoetics, outlines the machine 
metaphor as it is used throughout the development of Formalism, arguing that the 
Formalists—particularly Shklovsky and Eikhenbaum—developed their literary science as 
a means of tabulating a counter-positivistic ‘will to system,’ a modernist reformulation of 
the Enlightenment’s spirit of systematization. For example, Shklovsky’s assessment of a 
                                                 
58 P. N. Medvedev, The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship: a Critical Introduction to Sociological 
Poetics. Trans. Albert J. Wehrle. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1978. Rev. Ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
UP, 1985, 5.  
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literary work as the "sum-total of devices" gave rise to the notion of literary form as an 
enclosure of individual parts. This view was then significantly modified, and Shklovsky’s 
“sum-total of devices” was replaced by the concept of an aesthetic system, in which each 
device had a certain function to perform. The notion of the machine later transformed 
into a “system” (namely, the “systemo-functional” model), which first appeared in 
Jakobson and Tynianov’s 1928 article, “Problems in the Study of Literature and 
Language” (“Voprosy izucheniia iazyka i literatury”), published in Novyi Lef. They write: 
Literary history is closely bound up with other historic ‘series.’ Each of 
the series is characterized by peculiar structural laws. Without an inquiry 
into these laws, it is impossible to establish a connection between the 
literary ‘series’ and other sets of cultural phenomena. To study the system 
of systems, while ignoring the internal laws of each individual system, is a 
grave methodological error. 59 
 
The progression from Shklovsky’s “set of devices,” to the more structuralist, or “systemic 
Formalism” (Steiner 99) of Tynianov and Jakobson demonstrates the move within 
Russian Formalism towards sociological poetics, a method of analysis that seeks 
structural parallels between literary and other cultural systems. “The role of systemic 
Formalism," writes Steiner, "was…to describe the relationship between art and byt and to 
provide an account of literary history capable of explaining the dynamic interplay 
between these two domains” (99). For the most part, byt, or the categorically 
“sociological,” is missing from Shklovsky’s theoretical contributions until 1927. Possibly 
the least Marxist of all the OPOIAZ Formalists (despite his official endorsement of the 
sociological method [see his “In Defense of the Sociological Method,” 1928]), Shklovsky 
remained convinced of the fundamental specificity of the literary text throughout his 
career.  
                                                 
59 Quoted in Victor Erlich, Russian Formalism: History, Doctrine (The Hague: Mouton, 1965), 134. 
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For the most part, Rousseau’s systemic approach is not anomalous but rather 
symptomatic of his era, the late Enlightenment, which fostered what Cassirer, in his work 
on the Enlightenment era, terms an “esprit systématique” (The Philosophy of the 
Enlightenment). However, what sets Rousseau apart from the elite group of eighteenth-
century Enlightenment thinkers is precisely the emotionality (coupled with a fierce, yet 
surreptitious religiousness) that so often bleeds into his work. Unlike his more rationalist 
contemporaries, Rousseau was not convinced that the sentiments, when applied to the 
basic epistemology of the self, were accurate sources for deductive reasoning; 
sentimental about sentimentality, Rousseau contested the notion that the subjective 
experience could be systematized and employed as an instrument for self-discovery. As 
Cassirer notes, it is on this point that Rousseau breaks ties with eighteenth-century 
conservative positivism and begins his main opposition with the Parisian philosophes 
(The Problem of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 114).  
Sentimentalism, for Rousseau, was more a soft science intended only for 
knowledge of the external world. For this reason, he devised a second tier to his “système 
d’étude,” what he refers to in Dialogues as “le vrai système du cœur humain” (99). In an 
early letter to his father, Isaac Rousseau, Rousseau outlines the two camps that make up 
his organization of the world: “D'abord, je me suis fait un système d'étude que j'ai divisé 
en deux chefs principaux: le premier comprend tout ce qui sert à éclairer l'esprit et à 
l'orner de connaissances utiles et agréables, et l'autre renferme les moyens de former le 
cœur à la sagesse et à la vertu” (À [Isaac Rousseau à Nyon], Chambéry, 1735).  The first 
system, dedicated to enlightening of the spirit (“éclairer l'esprit”), categorizes knowledge 
pertaining to the concrete, material world. The second system, which conditions/trains 
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(former) the heart, explores the categories of the subjective world. When matched 
together, these two systems comprise a comprehensive approach to general epistemology.  
On the subject of the systematization of art, Rousseau was also convinced that 
literature must rely on a system—his “système d’étude”—in order to be productive and 
not fall prey to the illicit motives of entertainment literature.60 However, Rousseau’s 
system, unlike that of Shklovsky and the Formalists, was for the most part moralistic and 
not aesthetic: while literature must act according to a system, it itself was not a self-
regulating system. Although Rousseau does not address literature as an isolated system, 
like Shklovsky, he does emphasize “autonomy” as the basis of creative work. In his 
personal letters, Rousseau defends creative genius by advocating its equality, dignity, and 
naturalness. Exterior controls—whether patronage or the salon’s socio-aesthetic code—
are deemed to be stifling and sterilizing; in essence, antithetical to creative work. This 
relationship between autonomous freedom and naturalness is seen again in Rousseau’s 
defense of savage man, who was a capital example of a perfect autonomy of 
consciousness. “The savage lives within himself,” he writes in his Second Discourse, “the 
sociable man knows how to live only in the opinion of others and it is from their 
judgment alone that he draws the sentiment of his own being.”61 Rousseau is dedicated to 
fostering a creative and human type whose defining characteristic is autonomy, and this 
idealized primitive simplicity is reminiscent of how Shklovsky believes art should be 
perceived.62  
                                                 
60 See James Hamilton, Rousseau’s Theory of Literature: The Poetics of Art and Nature (York, S.C.: 
French Literature Publications Co., 1979). 
61 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings, ed. and trans. Victor 
Gourevitch (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 59. 
62 The pronounced primitivism behind Shklovsky’s ostranenie as it relates to Rousseau’s “savage nation,” 




Much like Rousseau’s binary “système d’étude,” the Formalist method depends 
on a diametric opposition, dividing the world (of art) into two axiomatic groups—form 
and content; art and byt. The binary between art and byt plays out in literature much like 
the polemic between form and content—as a symbiotic “dynamism,” to borrow from 
Tynianov: art makes byt perceptible, just as form gives shape to content. The art/byt 
polemic central to Formalism suggests that the world of artistic creation stands at the 
border of two mutually competing systems—one, socio-cultural (byt), which sets the 
standards and expectations of our everyday behavior; the other, aesthetic (art), which is 
derived from the very socio-cultural system that it is also designed to counteract in order 
to make byt “palpable,” “perceptible,” “phenomenal,” and thereby delay, if not stifle 
completely, its automatizing effects. Much like the dynamic between content and form—
in which one system is designed to disempower the other while also informing the other’s 
development—art is set against byt yet is also charged with giving it shape.  
Within Rousseau’s systemic worldview, there exists an analogous dichotomy 
between nature and society, in which society sets our standards for normative behavior 
yet also acts aggressively against our “natural” and thereby decidedly more moral 
inclinations. On a general level, Rousseau’s “système d’étude,” structured to maintain 
and perpetuate authenticity and sincerity, is an effort to apply the “système universel des 
choses”63 to the literary universe and to thereby reinstate the power of the natural world 
                                                 
63 In the following excerpt from a letter to Malesherbes, Rousseau recounts the “système universel”: 
Bientôt de la surface de la terre, j'élevais mes idées à tous les êtres de la nature, 
au système universel des choses, à l'Être incompréhensible qui embrasse tout. Alors, 
l'esprit perdu dans cette immensité, je ne pensais pas, je ne raisonnais pas, je ne 
philosophais pas: je me sentais, avec une sorte de volupté, accablé du poids de cet 
univers, je me livrais avec ravissement à la confusion de ces grandes idées, j'aimais à me 
perdre en imagination dans l'espace ; mon cœur resserré dans les bornes des êtres s'y 
trouvait trop à l'étroit, j'étouffais dans l'univers, j'aurais voulu m'élancer dans l'infini. Je 
crois que, si j'eusse dévoilé tous les mystères de la nature, je me serais senti dans une 
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within the artistic domain. Those who have strayed from the “système universel” (“un 
Système vrai mais affligeant”), argues Rousseau in his letter to Lyon academician 
Charles Bordes (written in response to Bordes criticism of Rousseau’s First Discourse), 
“[have] degenerated from their primitive goodness, [and] have lapsed into all the errors 
that blind them and the miseries that oppress them” (Discourse, 109). In this way, the 
society that contaminates is the very same that creates the system holding everything 
together. This diametric, yet symbiotic correspondence between polarities is what makes 
up the most striking overlap between Rousseau and Shklovsky, between one’s 
Sentimentalism and the other’s Formalism. And the source of their respective inquiries 
into this correspondence between polarities is essentially the same: the autonomous work 
of art, like the autonomous consciousness, are the objects of study—to see how they 
operate when suspended without connection to the civilized world, when they are de-
acculturated, or, in a way, de-systematized. This would mean that for Shklovsky a work 
of art represents, like Rousseau’s “savage nation” (Second Discourse), a happy medium 
between two worlds.  
 I elucidate here the relationship between the systemic perspectives of Shklovsky 
and Rousseau since it applies directly to the subject (and/or crisis) of self-knowledge and 
self-representation; for Shklovsky, specifically, isolating the paradoxical relationship 
between the genre of autobiography, which naturally points to the existence of the author, 
and the supposition that literature is self-standing, autogenetic, and ostensibly authorless. 
For Rousseau, however, the question of the autonomous text was not a concern and thus 
                                                                                                                                                 
situation moins délicieuse que cette étourdissante extase, à laquelle mon esprit se livrait 
sans retenue, et qui, dans l'agitation de mes transports, me faisait écrier quelquefois : O 
grand Être ! ô grand Être ! sans pouvoir dire ni penser rien de plus (À Montmorency, le 




the paradox lies in his desire to realize himself in autobiography, a task he knows is 
impossible to achieve. The system as it is recounted by Rousseau and Shklovsky is at one 
time cohesive and fragmented, consisting of parts that operate according to universal 
laws and yet that function independently of the system. The unfortunate paradox for 
Rousseau and Shklovsky is that the system, like self-knowledge, seeks comprehension—
to see all, speak all, know all, and be all—in vain. The power of any system, it seems, lies 
ironically in its incompleteness and instability. As Shklovsky contends, “the most vital 
genres in contemporary art are the collection of articles and the variety show, which 
depends for its interest on the individual components, not on the connective tissue 
[tkan']” (Zoo, 81). Gary Saul Morson insists that Shklovsky’s take on the journal or 
encyclopedic form can be extracted and applied to his perspective on the function of art 
as a whole (Boundaries of Genre). So doing reveals that Shklovsky links artistic 
importance to art’s ability to portray thematic connections between parts that could 
simultaneously stand on their own. In his theoretical and applied work, he seeks to build 
literary systems—however, systems that are not stable, and this is what makes the 
campaign for the autonomy of art at once a catalyst for and an act of sabotage against the 
systemic sensibility. By making autonomy the purpose of the literary system, Shklovsky 
renders the system no longer a system. 
Like the literary system, affinity without coherence is also how self-representation 
for both authors functions: all parts of the whole are suspended in correspondence with 
one another without ever coming together to form a static image. For instance, in the 
preface to the Neuchâtel manuscript of his Confessions, Rousseau insists that there has 
been no such thing as an authentic portrait (literary or otherwise) since it captures only 
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one moment in time along the axis of a person’s life. Confessions precedes Dialogues by 
ten years and is thus the beginning of Rousseau’s final steps towards revitalizing the life-
writing genre and remaking it according to the late eighteenth century’s parameters of 
authenticity and full disclosure. Dialogues is one concluding move in this process, a 
means of turning the camera obscura into a formal method by treating the three-part 
dialogue as a real-life “sketch” of the author; a literary act of admission that no self-
portrait is static or final but rather is always rough and in the process of development.64 
Any work of autobiography, admit both Shklovsky and Rousseau, by virtue of being 
written is thus mediated. There are missing pieces, some of which are locatable, residing 
either in the reader or in the author, even though he himself is unable to express them. 
Also significant, however, are the pieces whose whereabouts are unknown—the secret 
rumors, preconceived notions, unspoken judgments that produce anxiety, yet that 
nonetheless are pieces of the portrait’s puzzle. As “Rousseau” informs “The Frenchman” 
of Dialogues, in order to know on a comprehensive level the “Jean-Jacques” on trial, “I 
had to begin by seeing everything, hearing everything, taking note of everything before 
reaching a verdict about anything, until I had assembled enough material on which to 
base a solid judgment… ” (Dialogues, 204). However, a complete picture is impossible 
by virtue of the fact that “Rousseau is unable to say all that he knows about him [Jean-
Jacques]” (210). Like unknown rumors floating about, the effort yet ultimate inability to 
express oneself is one of many undeniable lacunas that make up the personality and that 
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recherché, sans gene, sans m’embrasser de la bigarrure. En me livrant à la fois au souvenir de l’impression 
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therefore must be acknowledged in any attempt at self-representation.  
Much of the dispute over which type of self-portrait is most faithful to real-life 
arises from issues surrounding time and evolution. As for Rousseau, for Shklovsky the 
authentic portrait is one that stands out in relief against the backdrop of history 
(context).65 If a unified portrait exists, it exists as a succession of facts, without much 
“connective tissue” between them. Both Rousseau and Shklovsky are troubled by time as 
a harbinger of life’s end and seek ways through art to circumvent the issue of historicity. 
Their separate efforts produce remarkable affinities between what Starobinski terms 
Rousseau’s “theory of unveiling” and Shklovsky’s effort to “lay bare the device,” two 
concepts that tackle the problem of writing as an act of historical anxiety and that strive 
to detain the text in present-time (turning the text into a “writerly” text [Barthes], in 
which the reader takes an active role in bringing the text out of the past into the present 
moment). In developing his “theory of unveiling,” Starobinski discovered that, for 
Rousseau, “language is emotion immediately expressed” (Transparency, 196). Taking 
Starobinski’s assessment into account, it seems that, for Rousseau, language, like 
estrangement for Shklovsky, bridges the historical gap between the artwork as an artifact 
of the past and the viewer as situated in the present. If, for Shklovsky, “form exists only 
insofar as we feel it,” then estrangement becomes a process in which multiple historical 
dimensions meet, in which the old automatized forms of the past serve as a backdrop to 
the new, present perception.  
For this reason, formal innovations in autobiography that prioritize the immediacy 
of language and break the habits of the automatized reader help the author overcome the 
                                                 
65 As Shklovsky writes: “We must extricate a thing from the cluster of associations in which it is found” 




limitations of time-linear, which ultimately raises the question: can autobiography, as a 
form of literary portraiture, behave like estrangement? Can autobiography, like 
estrangement, be a possible means for ameliorating the perpetual problems of 
representation and authenticity? In terms of duplicity and ‘double faces,’ correspondence 
and fragmentation, these two processes of assessing, organizing, and synthesizing 
aesthetic information attack the problem of habituation (what Shklovsky condemns “the 
greatest econom[izing] of perceptual effort” [Theory of Prose, 5]) using the same 
approach. This chapter has looked at love and self-discovery as real-life exercises in 
defamiliarization (for Shklovsky, particularly, when they develop in tandem—when love 
leads to self-discovery, or when self-discovery leads to love—which, incidentally, is the 
central theme of Zoo), and assesses how and why these psychological experiences are 
transformed into device, mapped onto the literary stage. While the amount of literature on 
autobiography is paltry from within Formalism’s critical canon (certainly, Rousseau’s 
provides a wealth of writing on the subject), it seems that estrangement for Shklovsky 
operates much like the Rousseauian process of self-discovery: when one relaxes and 
suspends preconceived notions—begins “to see” and not “to recognize”—this is where 
the true epistemology (of the self) is found. As Rousseau writes, “It is in the familiarity of 
intimate commerce in the continuity of private life that a man eventually lets himself be 
seen as he really is, when the incentive for self-awareness relaxes [le ressort de l’attention 
sur soi se relâche]” (Dialogues, 206). In his effort to recuperate a moral, natural, and 
primitive self, Rousseau seeks out ways to reinstate autonomy by de-automatizing, and 
even de-systematizing the process through which one arrives at self-knowledge. As with 
Shklovsky’s estrangement, Rousseau’s “method” is perceptual and assumes that while 
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sight is the main means through which a greater, more authentic version of the self can be 
attained, visual acuity is unfortunately what leads to automatism. True self-knowledge 
comes about through refractive error. One way in which this “method” can be applied to 
the world of literary representation—autobiography—is, as I have shown, by 
reconfiguring it as a multi-dimensional project. If portraiture is at its most authentic when 
it is broken, then the epistolary novel is an ideal modality for self-representation for its 
ability to capture the spirit of communalism and dialogism that lies at the heart of 
authenticity for both Shklovsky and Rousseau. In this way, love is reconceived of as a 
model sentiment whose literary forms are most adequate for attempts at self-
representation.  
“Love probably doesn’t exist,” Shklovsky writes in Third Factory, “it is not a 
thing, but a landscape, consisting of a series of objects unconnected to each other, but 
seen as a whole” (33). This excerpt represents well the structural connection between 
representations of love and self that I find at work in both Dialogues and Third Factory. 
In joining love and self, epistolary and autobiography, Shklovsky demonstrates the 
particular way in which he seeks counsel from Sentimentalism for transforming life into 
device. Matching these two literary systems, Shklovsky can make metaphor out of real-
life material, and thus ease the pain of distance by filling the gap through artistic 
expression—the gap between man and the object of his unrequited affection, between 
theoretician and the artistic environment that is growing stagnant around him as the 
fluidity of modernist forms began to become ossified under political pressures.66 
                                                 
66 I refer here to the encroaching, highly-politicized aesthetic of early Bolshevik art that took aim at 
Formalism’s a-historical, a-teleological, a-political, “anti-Marxist” literary program (see Trotsky’s 
Literature and Revolution, 1924) and that eventually, in 1925, brought down the avant-garde group LEF, of 
which Shklovsky was a central member.  
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Sentimentalism, that is literary emotionality, not only teaches Shklovsky the tricks of the 
trade, but also lingers in his formalist discourse as a coping mechanism, a sanction of 
release from the constraints of a life made too comprehensible and too unbearably 
ordinary.  
To be sure, there is something remarkably ‘revolutionary’ about Shklovsky’s 
attempt (not) to write about love. As recorded in his diary, published in 1939, “the theme 
of love has returned to our literature…but it returned in a completely new way.”67 What 
was particularly new about the return of love to literature in the early revolutionary era is 
that sentiment becomes device, an organizing principle for structuring self-discourse and 
for securing a place for the individual experience within the greater socialist narrative. 
Mayakovsky, argues Shklovsky, is a prime example of this correspondance between love 
and revolution: “Mayakovsky was a poet and told about love. Telling about love, he 
became a revolutionary” (Dnevnik, 117). Similarly, Rousseau is emancipated by the late 
eighteenth century’s turn to sentiment. Surrounded by the persecuting thoughts of his 
philosophe peers, Rousseau seeks refuge in his oeuvre, which becomes a perpetual search 
for freedom from scrutiny and judgment. Rousseau, Starobinski reasons, is a fatalist, 
albeit a redeemable one: “freedom preserves one refuge, however: feeling (and the act of 
writing itself)” (Transparency, 194). Recording sentiment becomes a chronic assertion of 
his autonomy since feeling provides the means to dramatize the self—at its most 
authentic—in literature. 
So why is love, as opposed to other sentiments, or even other themes like work, 
war, or travel, the essential thing to dramatize as a model for self-representation? One 
reason may be love’s literary history. In his work Fragments of a Lover’s Discourse  
                                                 
67 Viktor Shklovskii, Dnevnik (Moscow: Sovetskii pisatelʹ, 1939), 117. 
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(Fragments d’un discours amoureux, 1977), Barthes argues that within literature “the 
lover” is one who resides on the outskirts of society and for whom the real is an illusion, 
while love, itself an illusion, constitutes for him the real. While he does not refer directly 
to Rousseau, Barthes outlines the ontological dilemma that lies at the core of Rousseau’s 
experiments with the “lover’s discourse,” which in Julie is as much a means of 
unraveling and divulging the characters within as it is a method of self-representation for 
the author. Similar to Shklovsky’s presenting love as landscape, the “Editor” in Julie 
argues that, “love is but illusion; it fashions for itself, so to speak, another Universe; it 
surrounds itself with objects that do not exist, or to which it alone has given being; and as 
it renders all its sentiments by images, its language is always figurative [comme il rend 
tous ses sentiments en images, son langage est toujours figuré]” (10). It seems that, for 
both Shklovsky and Rousseau, love is the ultimate form of estrangement; it creates a 
“differential impression” of life and the illusion of a possible world that, while not 
immediately perceivable, with a bit of artistic labor, may be made such.   
In a more literal, less literary way, when Mayakovsky in his notorious final 
verses, composed just before his suicide in 1930, writes, “The love boat has crashed up 
against the everyday [byt],” he illustrates quite well the differential, and, especially, 
hostile relationship between love and life, referring possibly to his own torrid affair with 
Lili Brik. And while there is some ambiguity as to who is the victim here—whether the 
love boat is prematurely brought ashore by the everyday, or whether the shore of the 
everyday is violently smashed by the love boat—it is clear the meeting of the two 
victimizes one, if not both parties. Diametrically opposed, in no possible scenario might 
these two worlds—love and life, liubov’ and byt—coexist. Shklovsky was well aware of 
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Mayakovsky’s romantic crisis; his relationship with the Briks (Osip and Lili [née Kagan]) 
joined him to Shklovsky through the latter’s unrequited affections for Lili Brik’s sister, 
Elsa Triolet (a.k.a. Alya), who, in 1918, married French officer André Triolet. Both 
entangled in a love triangle with a Kagan sister and another man, Mayakovsky and 
Shklovsky might be considered each other’s “differential impressions,” each other’s 
possible worlds, the exact expression of love only in another context. In other words, 
lines two and eight of the very same triolet. 
And yet, while love and estrangement are both intended to rescue the individual 
from ordinary life, the fact that this other possible world, this “differential impression,” 
could morph into reality is, for Shklovsky if not also for Rousseau, a source of anxiety for 
it suggests that life’s estranged version, like reality itself, is fated for automatization. On 
the subject of love as destiny, Shklovsky writes: 
Love has its own methods, its own logic—set moves established without 
consulting either me or us. I pronounced the word ‘love’ and set the whole 
thing in motion. The game began. And I no longer know where love ends 
and the book begins. The game is underway. After a hundred pages or so, 
I will be checkmated. The beginning is already played out. No one can 
change the denouement. (Zoo, 64) 
 
In composing an epistolary novel, and choosing (not) to write about love, Shklovsky 
fears he may have consigned his work to fate; that Zoo, regardless of its own autonomous 
inclinations, is subject to love’s literary history. Contrary to the freedoms imparted by 
love’s tripartite literary form, love is a fatalist system: it is an act of genesis that is 
ultimately self-degenerative.   
In the next chapter, I will look at another incarnation of this theme of love as 
estrangement as it appears in Karamzin’s sentimental prose, which, while engaging 
Rousseau’s sentimentalism directly, also takes aim at the literary suppositions of his 
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French mentor and counterpart. Love in Karamzin sets the stage for an entirely new 
series of tasks. As part of his trial at sentimental prose, Karamzin turns literary self-
expression into literary self-reading; reading about love, taking voyeuristic pleasure in the 







Love and Negative Poetics:  
Karamzin’s Self-reading 
“Tel est le neant des choses humaines qu’hors l’Etre existant par lui-meme, il n’y a rien 
de beau que ce qui n’est pas.” 
Rousseau 
 
“Пустота всасывает. Дайте скорость.”  
Shklovsky 
 
In the forward to the second volume of his collection of poetry, Aonides  (Aonidy, 
ili sobranie raznykh, novykh stikhkhotvorenii, 1797), Karamzin writes:  
One must not think that only lofty subjects can excite a poet and serve to 
demonstrate his gifts: on the contrary, the true poet finds the poetic side in 
the most ordinary [обыкновенных] things; it is his business to present 
everything in living colors, to attach to everything a witty thought, a 
delicate feeling, or to adorn the ordinary thought, the ordinary feeling, 
with an expression that shows the nuances hidden from other people’s 
eyes, to find the imperceptible analogies, similarities [обыкновенное 
чувство украшать выражением, показывать оттенки, которые 
укрываются от глаз других людей, находить неприметные аналогии, 
сходства]… 68  
 
Composed at the height of Karamzin’s sentimentalism, this excerpt represents well the 
author’s perspective on what it means to write sentimentally, which, for Karamzin, is to 
embellish the ordinary, “to adorn” (ukrashat’) or dress reality to look ‘literary’, attaching 
witty thoughts, colors, and expressions, and heightening reality to the level of literature. 
His exposition of the writing process in Aonides expresses the pleasure of poetic play, 
which runs rampant throughout Karamzin’s prose. However, much of Karamzin’s literary 
legacy lies in his contribution to developing a more sober sentimental style that was 
“good,” “pleasant,” “moralistic,” and easily transmittable. He represents “the climax of 
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the [Russian] sentimental movement,”69 writes Neuhäuser, a movement that the scholar 
defines in the following way: 
In later sentimentalism, particularly from the 1790s on under strong 
masonic and preromantic influences, emotions were no longer directly 
related to actions as an indicator of their moral essence, but were viewed 
as an expression of the self, the only valid self-expression, in fact. 
Emotions became a value and end in themselves. In an extreme, view, 
their cultivation became the aim of civilized existence (74).  
 
Karamzin’s oeuvre, Neuhäuser writes, “indicate[s] the victory of this attitude” (74); 
however, Karamzin also successfully distinguishes himself from contemporary 
sentimental practitioners, such as Murav’ev and Kutuzov who make up a large part of 
Neuhäuser’s analysis, and whose work breeds on a more global level a balanced mix of 
morality and self-expression. In teasing out the definitive qualities of this period between 
neoclassical stagnancy and romantic chaos wherein Karamzin composed the majority of 
his prose, Neuhäuser seeks answers in Nikolai Polevoi’s essay “Sochineniia I. I. 
Dmitieva.” Polevoi understood the shift between literary periods as wholly attributed to 
Karamzin’s debut as a prose writer in the late 1780s. Polevoi writes: “Karamzin…was 
born with a tender, fiery, genuinely poetic soul; he renounced the world and its illusions, 
thirsting for enlightenment, he gave himself completely to literature, he lived a poet’s life 
and with his person gave the first example in Russia of a man who made literature the 
aim of his life.”70  
Polevoi’s reading casts Karamzin as a sentimentalist who, though possessing a 
“tender soul,” seeks only answers and enlightenment from literature, and neither the 
“embellishment” nor “adornment” that Karamzin himself in 1797 claims is significant to 
                                                 
69 Rudolf Neuhäuser, Towards the Romantic Age: Essays on Sentimental and Preromantic Literature in 
Russia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), 72. 
70 N. Polevoi, “Sochineniia I.I. Dmitrieva,” Ocherki russkoi literatury (St. Petersburg, 1839), II, 464. 
Quoted in Neuhäuser, Towards the Romantic Age, 3. 
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the writing process. To take Karamzin as a sentimental writer who “renounced the world 
and its illusions” precludes readings that revel in the author’s ambiguity, his guile, and 
his idiosyncrasy. Acute analyses of Karamzin’s prose by scholars such as V. V Sipovskii 
(N. M. Karamzin, avtor ‘Pisem russkogo puteshestvennika’), Yu. M. Lotman (Sotvorenie 
Karamzina), Gitta Hammarberg (From the Idyll to the Novel: Karamzin’s Sentimentalist 
Prose), and Andreas Schönle (“Karamzin’s Journey and the Taste of Fiction,” in 
Authenticity and Fiction) are so well executed that contemporary readers of Karamzin are 
liable, if only tempted, to take them as confirmed fact. They reveal Karamzin’s primary 
distinction to be that, while he adheres staunchly to Sentimentalism’s marriage of self and 
sentiment, the authorial voice that arises in Karamzin’s sentimental prose is, almost 
inadvertently, more fictional than factual. Karamzin’s fiction reveals itself at once as an 
act of storytelling and self-creation, performing double-duty as a means of rectifying on a 
narrative level the constellation of cultural impulses and demands that were active in his 
life—to perpetuate European behavioral codes and narrative forms, and to promulgate 
accessible linguistic reform, but also (with much ambivalence and timidity) to self-
express. He charges his literature with a series of tasks, the heavy weight of which is felt 
in a narrative voice that ultimately takes on far too much within such a small amount of 
narrative space.  
This chapter builds on the immense scholarship that precedes me and contributes 
to this trend in Karamzin criticism, which takes his approach to Sentimentalism as 
ambiguous and broadly counterintuitive in the way that he manipulates the forms of his 
European predecessors and contemporaries (here explicitly Rousseau). What follows will 
not dispel these qualifications of Karamzin’s work but will rather perpetuate and 
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compound them with another look at Karamzin’s sentimentalism that not only accepts his 
narrative voice as simultaneously fictional and authentic, but also looks at the processes 
through which authorship in Karamzin is formed. As the opening epigraphs of this 
chapter suggest, my reading of Karamzin will situate him between Rousseau and 
Shklovsky; it will examine how he manipulates the sentimental system of the former and, 
in so doing, comes closer to the latter in developing a process of writing built on 
interpretation.  
 “We want to live, act, and think through a transparent glass [v prozrachnom 
stekle],” writes Karamzin about members of his generation. This assertion, taken from his 
“quasi-autobiographical” (Hammarberg) work My Confession (Moia ispoved’, 1802), is 
the author’s personal contribution to this era of openness. Andreas Schönle points to this 
moment in Karamzin’s prose as a glaring example of the fundamental contradiction 
between the Russian sentimentalist’s lifestyle and his literary practice, a dissimulation of 
quotidian life coupled with a compulsive, no-holds-barred divulgence of the “private” 
self in literature. Transparent though the glass may be, it still stands to distinguish the 
world of the author from the world of the reader; if sentimental “transparency” exists, it 
has its limitations, a contradiction Schönle attributes to the late eighteenth-century “scare 
of the self.” 71  
 Building on the theories set forth in Lotman’s “The Poetics of Everyday Behavior 
in the Eighteenth Century,” Schönle asserts that the literary class of the late eighteenth 
century was particularly responsible for establishing and perpetuating dress codes and 
speech acts, and for setting the standards of taste within the realm of literature. Schönle, 
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however, argues that the Russian social reality of the late eighteenth century gave rise to 
a new sentimentalism, one that was concerned not with articulating an intimate self, but 
with codifying behavioral norms. Owing to conflicts between the noble class and the state 
during the reign of Catherine the Great, the nobility was compelled to distance itself from 
the powers that be and seek autonomy. According to Schönle, “in the absence or 
weakness of formally implemented rights and definitions, the nobility developed 
customary practices aimed at defining and organizing itself” (729). The compulsion to 
define itself as a group separate from the state left the nobility anxious about any 
behavioral norms that would “discourage individuals from fashioning themselves in too 
idiosyncratic a fashion” (730). The nobility looked towards literature, journalism, and 
other print media to codify and perpetuate these behavioral norms. Schönle refers to this 
compulsion, or this “discourse spread,” as “a scare of the self,” defined as “a strong 
reluctance to heed the desire for psychological and moral autonomy and to explore the 
interiority and subjectivity of one’s self” (746).  
 This paradoxical tension between external and internal worlds, between behavior 
and creative practice, is presumed to be elemental to Russian Sentimentalism and to be 
the primary characteristic that distinguishes it from its Western European counterpart. 
Within the bounds of literature, Sentimentalism functioned as a literary method in which 
form was a space to mediate and ideally to amend the contentious relationship between 
life and creation. This dissertation is particularly interested in Rousseau’s legacy with 
respect to the development of Russian Sentimentalism; it examines how his oeuvre 
becomes a pedagogical tool, an enclosed system of poetic figures, emblems, and motifs 
that helped to shape the “sentimental” empiricism guiding Karamzin’s own literary 
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methodology. The power of literary form to replicate reality, a power aggrandized by 
Rousseau, is both renewed and challenged in the creative modalities of Karamzin, and 
more than a century later, of Shklovsky’s Formalism. Both Karamzin and Shklovsky 
perpetuate and, at the same time, question the notion proposed by the Enlightenment: if it 
can be formalized—that is, organized, structured, canonized—it can be known. 
 Karamzin’s prose fiction could be qualified as “texts of behavior,” for they were 
the central avenues through which culturally normative practices were perpetuated and 
through which the nobility’s public persona was fashioned. This was accomplished intra-
textually on both the level of form and rhetoric. Using high-society jargon and a 
colloquial register along with elliptical syntax to mimic the art of conversation, authors 
like Karamzin, I.I. Dmitriev, P.A. Pel’skii, among others, worked and manipulated 
language and form in order to capture the essence of social discourse. Literary language 
was replaced with what William Mills Todd refers to as “talk,” a high-society vernacular 
that  
[F]ostered a lexicon free of technical and chancellery terminology…a less 
convoluted, shorter sentence than the one cultivated in the ecclesiastical 
literature of earlier ages; and a carefully studied casual manner—the style 
of a person of fashion and culture of the sort that flourished in the French 
salons of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 72 
 
At the end of the eighteenth century, “talk” became the basis for literary language, and 
speech genres like the anecdote became viable genres for creative expression. The thrust 
of Karamzin’s project lies in simplifying language to make it publically accessible, and, 
in so doing, to narrow the gap between author and reader. Karamzin was a staunch 
supporter of this “new style” and spent a substantial portion of his career advocating for a 
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merging of literary and colloquial lexicons.73 As he claims in “Some thoughts…,” 
Karamzin saw life and literature as inextricably linked and thus sought ways for words to 
“perform” the cultural affectations of the eighteenth century’s day-to-day. Schönle notes 
that Karamzin was “keenly aware of and genuinely committed to the performative 
function of language.”74 His prose is motivated by a curiosity to see how far he might 
stretch language to perform multiple tasks simultaneously—can words carry meaning as 
well as don contemporary fashion? Might they be figuratively “cloaked in” (or, “adorned 
with”) the cultural affects of the eighteenth-century belletrist? His essay “On Love of 
One’s Country and National Pride” (“O liubvi k otechestvu i narodnoi gordosti,” 1802), 
first published in Messenger of Europe (Vestnik Evropy, 1802-1830) confirms that words 
can perform a multiplicity of functions and that using “salon talk” as a way to appeal to 
society women, whose speech is emotive, is an effective means of capturing life’s “tender 
simplicity” (nezhnaia prostota). Lotman notes that while Karamzin’s transparent 
approach pleased the general reader, his contemporaries and critics were irritated by his 
appeal to “ladies’ language”:  
Readers were convinced that all the tender declarations, which abound in 
the pages of Karamzin's texts, seemed as if they had been taken right from 
literature to the sphere of reality. This simultaneously generated success 
for Karamzin among young female readers as well as irritated the literati 
and critics as an immodest breach of propriety.75  
 
Karamzin, according to Lotman, considered literature a sphere of moral education where 
ideas could be easily transmitted to the reading public (208). The “harshness” of the 
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Russian language, according to Karamzin, congested what should be a fluid transference 
of ideas.  
 Collected works like Karamzin's two-volume My Trifles (Moi bezdelki, 1791-92) 
or his Aglaia (1794-95) demonstrate well the potential of language to be reformed to 
fulfill Karamzin’s needs.  An anthology of anecdotal tales, My Trifles transforms 
aristocratic “talk” into a bona fide literary genre. As reality merged with fiction in the late 
eighteenth century (what Lotman sees as an “approach to personal life as plot” 76), Gitta 
Hammarberg claims that “what were previously regarded as facts of life, trivial from a 
literary point of view, became sanctioned as literary facts.”77 These “literary facts” were 
elevated to the level of speech genres, which Hammarberg labels “quasi-literary” and 
“extra-literary” (93). They included anecdotes, letters, and other salon trifles, which, 
when “cross-fertilized” with traditional literary genres, result in what Hammarberg terms 
the “salon chronotope.”  The salon chronotope, she writes, “reinvigorate[d] literature,” 
and, most importantly, established “a narrator/narratee framework of intimacy” (94). 
Each a creative reinvention of the anecdotal model, the sentimental prose pieces from 
Aglaia and My Trifles accomplishes the late eighteenth century’s artistic task to codify 
everyday behavior through poetics. The anecdotal narrative frame establishes a 
“framework of intimacy” between author and reader by placing them in direct dialogue 
(sharing anecdotes). Moreover, anecdotes, as examples of oral exchange and cultural 
happenings, when placed in literary field, help in the overall project to fashion life out of 
literature, and vice versa.  
                                                 
76 Iurii Lotman, “The Poetics of Everyday Behavior in Eighteenth Century Russian Culture,” The Semiotics 
of Russian Cultural History: Essays, ed. Alexander D. Nakhimovsky and Alice Stone Nakhimovsky 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 94. 
77 Gitta Hammarberg, From the Idyll to the Novel: Karamzin’s Sentimentalist Prose (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), 93. 
  
74 
To interrelate life and form is a method Karamzin develops early on in his Letters 
of a Russian Traveler (Pis’ma russkogo puteshestvennika, 1791-92) and perfects 
throughout the remainder of his writing career (culminating in his History of the Russian 
State [Istoriia gosudarstva Rossiiskogo, 1816-26]); however, in Karamzin, the anecdotal 
frame sets not only the stage for a performance of the everyday, but also, to build on 
Hammarberg’s analysis, for enacting the power dynamics of storytelling, and thereby the 
shifting trends in authorship. Composed during a thirteen-month journey abroad to 
Western Europe, Letters of a Russian Traveler depicts Karamzin’s gentleman’s journey 
to France, Germany, and Switzerland in a series of letters, published originally in the 
Moscow Journal (Moskovskii Zhurnal, 1791-92). The traveler in Letters punctuates his 
“non-fictional,” albeit highly subjective, narrative with anecdotal pauses, in which he 
recounts pieces of local lore, or what the narrator calls “anecdotes” (anekdoty). The 
tradition of the anecdote was already firmly in place at the time of Karamzin’s Letters.  
Throughout Europe, and especially England, anecdotes—a piece of oral folklore that 
became canonized as literary genre most strongly in the eighteenth century—were 
gathered into collections, published as miniature “biographies” of authors, cultural 
sketches, or as exposés. In the eighteenth century the anecdote was made most famous in 
journalism, for instance in Addison and Steele’s Spectator (1711-12), which served as a 
model for the Russian satirical periodicals of the eighteenth century (namely the 
Empress’ Every Trifle [Vsiakaia vsiachina, 1769-70] and Nikolai Novikov's The Drone 
[Truten', 1769-70]), which made use of the anecdote as a source of journalistic evidence 
and cultural truisms.  Karamzin might have been inspired by this tradition when writing 
his Letters, not only because it helped him to formulate a comprehensive picture of the 
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culture in which he was situated while abroad (whether French, German, or Swiss), but 
also because it helped the writer, in the role of traveler, to become a reader.  Anecdotes to 
the narrator were ways he could  “read” the given culture (its histoire, its “story”).  In 
Letters, Karamzin uses the anecdote not only to convey intimate relations between 
narrator and reader, but also to prove the narrator to be an intimate reader of a culture that 
has taken him into confidence. 
 Whether as a bridge between author and reader, or between author and subject, 
the anecdote facilitates an intimate relationship.  As Karamzin turns towards sentimental 
fiction, however, the anecdote takes on a new function.  Like the majority of anecdotes 
from his travelogue, the anecdote of Karamzin's sentimental prose is centered around the 
topic of ill-fated love, what Lotman terms zabluzhdeniia serdtsa (delusions of the heart) 
(Sotvorenie Karamzina, 207)—the tales of unhappy love and subsequent suicide (Poor 
Liza, [“Bednaia Liza,” 1792), unrealized incestuous love (Eugene and Julia, a true 
Russian tale [“Evgenii i Iuliia, russkaia istinnaia povest',” 1789]), and realized, yet 
punished, incestuous love (“Island of Bornholm” [“Ostrov Borngol'm,” 1793]).  The 
anecdotal frame that is the underlying architecture of these love stories allows for a clear 
demonstration of the links between author and reader: when they are joined in dialogue 
and equalized by the anecdotal frame; when they are once again separated by a boundary. 
According to Lotman, Karamzin saw literary progress as directly proportional to the 
writer's development as an independent and individual personality (Sotvorenie, 208). 
Karamzin’s sentimental prose both confirms Lotman’s argument and tells a different 
story. The following analysis will study the two imperatives that dictate his writing: to 
develop an independent author, but an author that is cast more often than not as a reader: 
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either a reader of culture (as in Letters), or a reader of his own fiction, that is, a reader of 
love.  
I must therefore frame my inquiry with the assumption that, unlike poetry, 
sentimental prose is the preeminent discursive genre of the eighteenth century to 
acknowledge form itself as a divulgence of the self, or as constituting the self in its fullest 
disclosure (the textual body taken as an approximate recovery of the author’s “body” in 
literature). As was argued in the previous chapter, love was a partial answer to the 
question of how to represent the self insofar as the epistolary novel, the triolet, among 
other popular romance genres, best captured the sentiment of love and thereby could most 
likely do the same for self-representation, the two subjects being, as I argued, intimately 
interlinked. The underlying architecture of the epistolary novel—fractured, polylogic, 
partially rendered—was valued as authentic particularly for its inadequacies, and thus 
Rousseau constructed his autobiographical works with the epistolary form in mind, seen 
most explicitly in the structural mirroring between Julie and Dialogues. However, despite 
attempts at formal innovations, whether structural manipulations or twists in perceptions, 
all attempts at self-representation are exhaustive efforts towards an unattainable end. 
Rousseau had little hope of reaching true authenticity in art—any self-portrait, literary or 
otherwise, was an exercise in futility. Perfect mimesis is an impossible ideal, and the 
writer must come to terms with art’s shortcomings (while remaining staunchly committed 
to finding ways around them).  
 As with Rousseau’s fractured Dialogues, the form of Karamzin’s narratives to be 
sure also have their self-creative energy at the level of ruptured prose, ellipses, and abrupt 
transitions. Lotman informs us that, for Karamzin, writing, whether autobiographical or 
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not, is a self-generative act and that Karamzin’s Letters marks the beginning of an 
authorial voice that is at once fictional and self-expressive (Sotvorenie, 28-9).78 In 
contradistinction to Rousseau, Karamzin does not view the process of articulating the self 
in literature as potentially artificial, and, arguably, would not have seen an inherent 
conflict in what de Man calls the “double-faced self.” In fact, I would argue that the 
central point of contention between Karamzin and Rousseau is their divergent views on 
art as a “natural” extension of our everyday world. In his Discourse on the Sciences and 
Arts (Discours sur les sciences et les arts, 1750), or First Discourse, Rousseau famously 
argues against the institutionalization of the arts and sciences as no more than a breeding 
ground for competition, or amour-propre.79 Karamzin, on the other hand, in his essay, 
“Some thoughts on the sciences, arts, and the Enlightenment” (Nechto o naukakh, 
isskustvakh i prosveshchenii, 1794), argues that arts are necessary because they are “the 
fruit of natural inclinations and the gifts of man and joined with his existence.”80 Within 
Karamzin’s world, writing is valued as more than a voluntary, creative impulse, 
superfluous to our everyday needs; it is an instinct, a search for sustenance, as embedded 
in our survival memory as is the desire for food, drink, or sleep.  
                                                 
78 A likely rationale for Karamzin’s sentimental style can be found in the “Second Preface” of Rousseau’s 
Julie: “[A] letter really dictated by love; a letter from a truly passionate Lover, will be desultory, diffuse, 
full of verbose, disconnected, repetitious passages. His heart, filled with an overflowing sentiment, ever 
repeats the same thing, and is never done, like a running spring that flows endlessly and never runs dry. 
Nothing salient, nothing remarkable; neither the words, nor the turns, nor the sentences are memorable; 
there is nothing in it to admire or to be struck by” (10). 
79 “[T]he Art of writing was joined by the Art of thinking; a sequence which appears  strange but is perhaps 
only too natural; and the major advantage of commerce with the muses began to be felt, namely of 
rendering men more sociable by inspiring in them the desire to please one another with works worthy of 
their mutual approbation.” Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Collected Writings of Rousseau: Discourse on the 
Sciences and Arts, trans. Christopher Kelly and Roger D. Masters (Hanover: Dartmouth College by 
University Press of New England, 1990), vol. 2, 6. 




Undoubtedly, however, Karamzin’s attitude towards the arts must be read within 
the context of what Schönle defines as the “scare of the self.” If the self that Karamzin 
designs is a performance for cultural consumption, a text for behavior, he would see no 
problem with articulating an (artificial) self by using artificial means—logically, artificial 
means reach an artificial end. Confident of art’s capacity to embody our most natural 
urges, Karamzin employs love to a different end than Rousseau. Love’s literary forms 
(for Karamzin the conte as well as the epistolary novel) serve not as apparatuses for 
presenting or writing the self in literature; rather, they provide the sentimental barriers 
within which reading, judging, and interpreting love become acts of self-representation—
self-writing becomes self-reading. If, in Rousseau, the authorial self is cast as a stylized 
arrangement of locutions, a recitation to be united and restored to status quo in the mind 
of the reader, in Karamzin, the authorial self is presented intra-textually as a reader, as an 
entity that reveals itself through its own hermeneutic processes—it self-creates through 
reading about love, not experiencing it, dialoguing about it, or narrativizing it. 
Karamzin’s textual world transforms Sentimentalism’s phenomenology (the cognitive 
processing of one’s environment) into a modality of passive self-expression, what I have 
referred to as self-reading. To view it another way, what makes Karamzin distinct from 
Rousseau is his autobiographical project that seeks restoration not in the mind of the 
reader, but rather in the mind of the narrator, who, in an impossible feat of being present 
for both the moment narrative is created and read, simulates dual existential processes.  
Lotman terms his work The Creation of Karamzin (Sotvorenie Karamzina) a 
“roman-rekonstruktsia,” (“novel of rebuilding”) which, much like Rousseau’s Dialogues, 
attempts to “turn the fragments back into a whole,” and to “recreat[e] a lost, reconstructed 
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identity through documents, always incomplete, ambiguous, always bearing the 
subjective position of its creator” (12).  In the role of rekonstruktor (“rebuilder”), 
Lotman, in his own words, “does not invent—he seeks, correlates [sopostavliaet]” (13). 
In this way, the critic bears resemblance to his subject, to Karamzin, who in a similar 
vein positions neither himself as an “inventor,” nor his literature as “invented” material, 
but rather accomplishes quite the opposite. His sentimental tales, most especially, feel 
self-generated, which is due in large part to the disjointed prose, frequent apostrophe to a 
reader, and an overall writer’s anxiety that punctuates nearly all of his tales, manifesting 
as either complete abandonment of the creative principle—“Listen—I will tell you a 
story—I will tell you a true story, not a figment of my imagination” (“Island of 
Bornholm,” 118); “Let us see what will happen” (“Natalie, the Boyar’s Daughter” 
[“Natal’ia, boiarskaia doch’,” 1792], 89); “The reader can imagine all the consequences” 
(“Natalie,” 115); “Aris will not deceive Julia; but Julia—we shall see!” (“Julia” [“Iuliia,” 
1796], 141)—or failure to fulfill his role as author—“which I do not know how to 
describe” (“Island of Bornholm,” 127); “Here I could depict a terrifying picture to the 
eyes of the readers…I could depict all these events as probable…but in such a case I 
would have departed from historical truth” (“Natalie,” 97-8). More often than not 
Karamzin’s narrator reveals himself as a storyteller at a meeting of friends, with present-
tense outcries that imply that he too is watching the story unfold before his eyes: “Be 
fearful, giddy Prince!” he cries out to Julia’s Aris as if he seated at a performance (137). 
In an impossible feat of being present for both the moment narrative is created and read, 
Karamzin’s narrator-author simultaneously creates and reanimates his material, as would 
Lotman’s rekonstruktor, by “giv[ing] them meaning, mak[ing] them talk” (13). This basic 
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distinction—between a self that is actively created and a self that is passively developed 
or ripened, uncovered or discovered—is what divides Karamzin and Rousseau, and 
consequently, what unites Karamzin with Shklovsky as a proto-Formalist (to which I will 
come later) in an exercise in Sentimentalism made strange.81   
Guided by Schönle’s understanding of Russian Sentimentalism (or that which he 
“broadly and somewhat arbitrarily” names Sentimentalism [723]), as an era of 
contradiction between intimacy and publicity, I investigate the distinct qualities that 
constitute Karamzin’s narratives of love and self with his 1793 sentimental tale, “Island 
of Bornholm.” “Island of Bornholm” illustrates well the evolution, or possibly 
devolution, of the author into reader, a process that appears also as a clash of neoclassical 
to sentimental standardized imperatives: on the one hand, to simulate self-activity and 
self-expression (arguably, a sentimentalist project), and, on the other, to render that “self” 
supra-personal, meta-textual, untraceable to an actual Karamzinian self; to join narrator 
and author in such a way that author, as a literary category, is stripped of its power. I 
believe “Island of Bornholm” is a fossilized account of this shift. Framed as an anecdote, 
Karamzin’s tale works to fabricate an intimate connection between reader and author in a 
decreasingly intimate, yet increasingly personalized (or rather, personality-ized) textual 
world. The result is a Barthean prose piece on the death of the author, a creative suicide 
                                                 
81 Interestingly, Shklovsky never wrote one piece of theory on the topic of Karamzin. In fact, his 
investigation into Russia’s eighteenth century stops at Matvei Komarov (Matvei Komarov—zhitel’ goroda 
Moskvy. Leningrad, 1929). Eikhenbaum, on the other hand, picked up Karamzin, among other authors from 
the eighteenth to the twentieth century (including Derzhavin, Tiutchev, Tolstoy, Pushkin, and Blok) for his 
early essays (1916-17) as one of several fruitful exercises through which to explore the philosophical 
underpinnings of Formalism; particularly to discover how “general conclusions serve philosophy: generally 
their aspiration towards the epistemological foundation of aesthetics.” “Predislovie,” Skvoz’ literaturu: 
Sbornik statei (‘s-Gravenhage: Mouton, 1962), 3. 
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that is touted as creative occupation, in which the story is sought out and competed for, 
yet is not necessarily created.  
“Island of Bornholm” is about the exchange of stories within an intricate network 
of narrators (some who are willing to share a story, and others who are not), and narratees 
(all of whom are willing and eager to listen). Hammarberg describes “Island of 
Bornholm” as a “trivocal utterance”: “[I]t is the account of the narrator’s personal 
experience as a narratee…framed by two narrators, primary (present) and secondary 
(past)” (128). With three narrators, comes also three narratives: (1) the salon gathering of 
narrator and “friends”; (2) the narrator’s journey in pursuit of the anecdote; and (3) the 
anecdote itself. The role of the narrator changes in each narrative: in the first narrative, 
the narrator represents what Hammarberg terms the “transparent” narrator who is joined 
with his reader in a “framework of intimacy” (94); in the second narrative, the narrator is 
the solipsistic sentimentalist; and in the third narrative, the narrator is narratee. The 
fluidity of function within the narrative frame captures well the spirit of iconoclasm that 
lies at the heart of Karamzin’s self-reading project. The idea that the author is he who 
creates the story is, in Karamzin, challenged at the level of self-reading, which becomes 
the primary way in which Karamzin seeks out an alternative form of Sentimentalism’s 
solipsism.  
“Island of Bornholm” begins with the apostrophe, “Friends!” (“Druz’ia!”); at this 
point, the narrator invites the reader into his narrative space, which is not his, but theirs 
together: he shares with his reader a study (“let us take shelter in our quiet study!” [117]), 
and a fireplace (“in our hearth” [117]).  He invites his reader to share stories in order to 
stave off boredom (“we know a remedy for boredom…Let us sit around the crimson fire 
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and tell one another fairytales, stories, and all sorts of true happenings” [117-118]).  With 
the line “we will tell stories to each other” (будем рассказывать друг другу), the 
narrator welcomes the possibility of trading places with the reader. This first frame 
narrative captures the dialogism of the “transparent” narrative. Concerned with bridging 
the gap between himself and his reader, the “transparent” author includes his reader in the 
aesthetic process by framing the narrative as a casual conversation among “friends.”  The 
reader comes to trust the narrator as both a “friend,” but most importantly, as a raconteur, 
as someone who will deliver an entertaining and truthful story (or, at the very least, a 
complete story). As Henry Nebel argues: “[T]he intimate relation between narrator and 
reader would preclude any deviation from the truth, since the reader has entered the circle 
of beloved friends to whom all falsehood is repugnant.”82  
As the narrative progresses into its second frame—the narrator in pursuit of the 
anecdote—the narrator’s fidelity with respect to his reader is called into question. The 
second narrative begins much like Karamzin's Letters; the second frame is a first-person 
travel account told from the perspective of the sentimental observer. However, in “Island 
of Bornholm” the traveler of Letters is transformed into a wanderer, a strannik, the 
aimless sentimental persona made famous by Rousseau’s Reveries of a Solitary Walker 
(Les Rêveries du promeneur solitaire, 1776-78). Much like the narrator of Letters, who 
both reads and retells cultural narratives, the narrator of “Island of Bornholm” is both 
reader and narrator of this anecdote. In the third narrative, the ‘narrator in pursuit of the 
anecdote’ becomes the ‘reader in pursuit of the narrative.’  As Hammarberg argues, the 
narrator’s pursuit is made all the more difficult by the lack of communication.  All verbal 
exchange between the narrator and other narrating agents (Lila, the old and the young 
                                                 
82 Henry Nebel, N. M. Karamzin: A Russian Sentimentalist (Paris: Mouton, 1967), 151. 
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man) is never completed.  The search for the story begins with the young man who tells 
the narrator his tale in the form of a Danish song. From the song, the narrator discovers 
that the young man was exiled from the island of Bornholm. The elegy, recited in a 
foreign language and in the metaphoric language of poetry, confounds the narrator and 
provokes him to seek out the tale: “The sad sounds of the words of his song echoed in my 
ear. ‘They contain the secret of his heart,’ I thought; ‘but who is he? What laws condemn 
the love of the unfortunate? What oath forced him to leave the shores of Bornholm, so 
sweet to him? Shall I, sometime, find out his story?” (122). Neither the old man nor Lila 
(who pleads with the narrator not to mention her story: “You, perhaps, know my story, 
but if you do not, then do not ask me—for God’s sake, do not ask!” [129]) wishes to 
reveal the story.  However, according to Hammarberg, once they understand that the 
narrator knows “too much” (Idyll, 190) they decide to take him into confidence. At this 
moment of diegetic exchange, the narrator is transformed back from a naive reader into 
an omnipotent narrator.  
At the end of “Island of Bornholm,” the narrator wins possession of the story; yet 
in an interesting turn of events, he decides not to share his story with his reader: “the old 
man told me a most horrible story—a story which you will not hear now, my friends; it 
will wait until another time” (131). Hammarberg, Lotman, and Anderson83 claim that the 
narrator refuses to share because he cannot share.  The topic of incest is too risqué for the 
likes of sentimental literature.  I am more interested, however, in the narrator’s choice to 
begin a story he knew he could not complete. How is the reader meant to reconcile the 
narrator of the beginning with the narrator of the end of the story?  Although a narrator of 
                                                 




the same frame—both the opening and closing narrator are of the salon variety—the 
narrator of the beginning promises to share while the narrator of the end decides to 
withhold, transforming the act of storytelling from a meeting with friends into a power 
struggle between narrator and reader (both intra- and extra-textual readers). In this regard, 
the anecdote of “Island of Bornholm” reveals the categorical divide between reader and 
narrator: the narrator is in the know, and the reader is not.  
In “Island of Bornholm,” Karamzin outlines the power dynamics of storytelling 
that is found throughout his sentimental prose and yet which receive more fluid treatment 
in his other prose pieces, inspiring play with the story’s reins and allowing author to 
relinquish power and become reader. As the line dividing categories slackens, the 
primary tasks of the author-cum-narrator are subverted as are the traditional modalities of 
self-writing; and Karamzin’s autobiographic voice, which is forged within his fiction, 
finds itself most poignantly in moments of experiencing the very text he is writing. 
Works like Karamzin's “Natalie, the Boyar’s Daughter” and “Julia” are primary accounts 
of this movement towards self-reading, wherein for author and characters alike, identity 
arises from evaluating literature. Both sentimental prose pieces chart the progress of a 
love relationship from the main perspective of its female character as she comes to terms 
with who she is, as well as explores major themes of morality, verisimilitude, all via a 
sentimental journey. “Natalie,” first published in Moscow Journal, traces the heroine’s 
love affair with Aleksei, whom she follows into war. The tale culminates in what Nebel 
reads as positively Sternian “sentimental irony” where Karamzin “pokes fun at the 
irrationality of intuitive love” and “parod[ies]…sentimental conventions” (40). “Julia,” to 
the contrary, is neither ironic nor humorous (though Nebel reads it as a “balance between 
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spoof and seriousness” [41]), and yet all the same matches “Natalie’s” play with the 
tropes, devices, and systems of sentimentalism in its treatment of the affair of marriage 
between Julia and Aris.  While Karamzin intended to publish “Julia” in Aglaia (the same 
collection in which “Island of Bornholm” was published) in 1794, Nebel informs us that 
it was instead published on its own in 1796. Possibly due in part to its absence from 
Karamzin’s two major collections of prose (Aglaia and My Trifles), “Julia” remains one 
of Karamzin’s least treated works, unlike “Natalie,” which, like “Poor Liza” (Karamzin’s 
most tragic tale of love), is one of the author’s most popular.  
“Natalie, the Boyar’s Daughter” is a work of sentimental prose that seems intent 
on cruelly punishing its heroine for misunderstandings due not just to improper reading, 
but to overall illiteracy: “Natalie took the letter and, although she did not know how to 
read, nonetheless looked at it [smotrela na nego], and tears poured from her eyes” (95). 
To compensate for her illiteracy, Natalie enacts moments of ‘visual’ reading within the 
text, moved either through perception (moved by the words she sees before her, 
regardless of how unintelligible they are), or through performance (cued by what she 
sees—the love letter—to perform the act of being moved to tears).  Throughout the 
narrative, Natalie, owing to improper reading (both literal and figurative), never gets 
born, so to speak, as a full-fledged character. When she escapes with Aleksei and her 
nurse to Aleksei’s home, they encounter a stranger in the forest, which brings her nurse to 
cry out in fear, “Alas! We are lost! We are in the hands—of brigands!” (97). The narrator 
informs us that “Natalie is not among brigands!” and that the stranger is in fact “good 
people” who bows to Aleksei “as to the master of the house” (98). Natalie is unable to 
read the situation that her nurse at best misreads, miscued by “seeing the wild, solitary 
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dwelling…seeing these armed servants and observing in their faces something sullen and 
ferocious…” (97). In response, Natalie clings to Aleksei and searches his eyes for an 
answer to the question: where are we? Animated by her heart alone (“Love, inspired by 
hope, crimsoned at this moment the cheeks of our sweet beauty, love shone in her 
glances, love beat in her heart, love raised her hand when she crossed herself” [88]), 
Natalie knows not how to read situations or herself, but can masterfully read Aleksei and 
respond accurately to his cues, in the end even swapping her identity for a “handsome” 
young man in order to follow Aleksei to war. The ultimate consequence of her 
misreading situations and her inability to read herself is that Natalie, despite significant 
triumphs in life and in battle, meets her end as nothing more than Aleksei’s spouse, 
forever marked by her grave’s following inscription: “Aleksei Liuboslavskii and his 
spouse are buried here” (116). 
For the narrator, however, the relationship between reading and self-knowledge is 
more nuanced. The narrator begins his tale as if he were an amateur storyteller anxious of 
the consequences he will inevitably suffer due to his inability to retell his great-
grandmother’s tale. Here, the classical muse is domesticated, brought down from the high 
heavens into the interior world of the writer in the figure of his great-grandmother. In an 
absurd display of feverish writer’s frenzy (“a rapture”), she appears to the narrator as a 
fiery light that illuminates his dark corner of the world (“I see fiery circles, which revolve 
glittering and crackling and finally—Oh miracle!—they reveal your image, an image of 
indescribable beauty, of indescribable majesty!” [75]). He fears that his “худое 
риторствo,” thin rhetoric, will “disfigure,” or “deface” her tale (“Only I am terrified to 
distort her tale” [74]), which establishes a crucial link between storyteller and story—in 
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Karamzin’s world, we are the stories we tell, a profound commitment to the tale that 
Polevoi reads as the significant shift in late eighteenth-century Russian prose, and as 
Karamzin’s most significant contribution to the Russian literary canon. The deep-seated 
anxiety that guides Karamzin’s storytelling process suggests that, for the narrator, to 
mutilate his great-grandmother’s story would be to mutilate his great-grandmother. 
And yet, the narrator seems also content not to tell the story to its fullest extent 
and burdens his reader with a multiplicity of excuses as to why he cannot tell his tale 
properly; for instance, when describing Natalie, he writes: “I hesitate to continue the 
comparison in order not to bore the reader by repeating the obvious because in our 
affluent times the store of poetic similes for beauty had been quite exhausted and many 
writers chew their pens in vexation, seeking but not finding new ones” (77). Unable to 
shake the impulses of a sentimental writer, in an ironic shift, the narrator begins to 
describe Natalie using these same “exhausted” similes: “[Natalie] was as tender as a 
turtledove, innocent as a lamb, sweet as the month of May [имела прелестную душу, 
была нежна, как горлица, невинна, как агнец, мила, как май месяц]”(78). Despite 
attempts to confirm the accuracy of his historically minded eye, the narrator shows 
himself to be no more than an amateur writer, with nearly every moment of precise prose 
muddied by his highly ornate and extravagant style.  
Like “Island of Bornholm,” “Natalie” is framed as a historical tale that takes cues 
from the oral tradition. The collision of these two lyrical perspectives—sentimental and 
historical—result in collisions on other significant diegetic levels—narrative time, ethos 
and quality—and leads to improper storytelling as per the narrator’s own demands and 
expectations. Most significantly, this meeting of sentimental and historical has a strong 
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effect on how love relates to self. In “Natalie,” love, in order to be fully experienced by 
all of the story’s participants, must be read. Natalie’s most overwhelming moments of 
infatuation compels the narrator to drop his pen, to not write, but to read: “Fate, fate! Will 
you not really take pity on her? Do you really want these bright eyes to grow dull with 
tears?—Let us see what will happen” (89). As readers, in this moment, we are catapulted 
into the present alongside the narrator who employs the perfect future with “посмотрим, 
что будет,” (“we will see what will be”) but then transports us back to a historic past 
with the immediately following transitional phrase, “odnazhdy” (“once,” or “one time”). 
In general, time takes on a particular relevance in “Natalie.” The strength of this 
particular sentimental tale lies in its attempt to reconcile the pastoral past with an 
immediate sentimental present often captured in moments where the author comes to the 
fore as the narrator expresses doubt as to his ability to render true to fact: either to 
anticipate the skepticism of his readers (“At dinner she did not eat, a custom of all those 
who are in love—but why not tell us directly and simply that she had fallen in love with 
the stranger? ‘In one minute?’ the reader will say” [86]), or to share his reading/viewing 
experience (“The young consort returned to his beloved—helped her undress—their 
hearts were beating—he took her by the white hand…But my modest muse covers her 
face with a white handkerchief—not a word! The sacred curtain descends, sacred and 
impenetrable to curious eyes!” [104]). However, these moments of ‘faulty authorship’ are 
more than just self-creative strategy. Eikhenbaum has argued that Karamzin in his prose 
employs the poetics of a historian and in his History of the Russian State employs the 
poetics of a fiction writer as a way of handling, negotiating, and overcoming the limits of 
reason (Skvoz’ literaturu, 39). In History, Karamzin suggests the very same when 
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asserting his position and philosophy in writing history to be that of a bytopisatel’ 
(“writer of the everyday”84), an artistic stance that is explored in early terms in Natalie.  
Just as “history…with righteous judgment, orients the soul towards correctness,” 
(History, I: xi)85 so too do love stories demand judgment as a means of self-activity. The 
opening of “Julia”—“[w]omen complain about men, men about women: who is innocent? 
who is guilty? who can decide this litigation?” (133)—speaks to this as Karamzin turns 
Rousseau’s epistolary project into a self-reading project—don't write the self; judge the 
self, read the self. In fact, what sets “Natalie” apart from “Julia” is the role that judgment 
plays in forging the narrator’s identity. “Julia” is framed as evidence that might help 
resolve the “litigation” (tiazhbu) or competition between men and women, with a 
conclusion that seems to resolve the case in no one’s favor. Much like Shklovsky and 
Rousseau’s Héloïse, Karamzin’s Julia, Natalie, and Liza, among others, are more device 
than character, serving as catalyst for the development of the narrator-cum-author; 
through his central heroine, building her, interpreting her, he comes closer to 
understanding himself. Natalie is in the strictest terms devoid of human qualities since 
she cannot read, which, in Karamzin’s world of hermeneutics, is equal to non-existence.   
Ostensibly, the same task—to produce meaning through reading and not 
writing—is at issue in “Julia.” Herself more concept than character, Julia is referred to as 
“ornament,” “ukrashenie,” and taken to the level of absurdity: for instance, the narrator 
remarks, “Julia shone as the sun; envy sought dark spots in it, did not find them…” (134). 
In contrast to Aris, who is arguably more life-like than literary (“Who was Aris?” [“Kto 
                                                 
84 Nikolai Mikhailovich Karamzin, “Predislovie,” Istoriia Gosudarstva Rossiiskago. Izd. 4-e (St. 
Petersburg: V tipografīi vdovy Pli u shar s synom, 1833), vol. 1, xi. 
85As to why Karamzin sees historiography as necessary, he writes: “Вот польза: сколько же 
удовольствий для сердца и разума [Here is the purpose: so much pleasure for the heart and mind]” (vol. 
1, xii).  
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byl Aris?”] asks the narrator [135]), Julia is introduced with the markedly less 
humanizing inquiry: “What is Julia?” (“Chto zhe Iuliia?” [134]). The narrative progresses 
as Julia seeks out her identity in a series of interpretative events, ultimately, in an attempt 
to ascertain to which text she belongs: what book is she reading? Her interactions with 
Prince N*, an attractive suitor from the town (“a favorite of Nature and fortune, which 
lavished all their glittering gifts on him” [136]), who, like the text itself, is a phenomenal 
event (“a phenomenon [fenomen] appeared suddenly on the horizon of society” [136]), 
together read as a movement through love’s literary history, with the narrator noting the 
transitions between paradigms (a reading that rewards readers): Julia is described as 
“some” (“nekotoraia”) Lydia, “some” Arethea, Petrarch’s Laura, new Dido, and (avoids 
becoming) a “new” Aspasia and a “new” Laïs; Prince N* is described as a new Alcides, 
Antinous, Cicero, Petrarch, and Narcissus. Even beyond these literary qualifiers, the 
actions of Julia and Prince N* are guided by the hand of ‘literature’s fate.’ After the 
Prince’s near affair with Julia, when his character reaches the end of his literary trajectory 
and just before the tale transitions back to the pastoral, the Prince devolves into a 
“motionless statue,” with an abrupt exit from the narrative to the theatre, almost 
asphyxiated, as a fish out of water, by the narrative’s threat of leaving the urban 
environment (146). When Julia gives birth to her son, Erast, she takes up the script of 
Emile. When Aris leaves and it seems the “Julia” narrative has reached its end, Julia, 
alone in the country, gives birth to a son, metaphorically to the text of Emile (“Now Julia 
hurried to show her small darling all Nature” [149]), and in so doing swiftly swaps 
novels—no longer the heroine of one (Rousseau’s Julie), she becomes the heroine of 
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another (Rousseau’s Sophie): “I am a mother, she thought, and walked through the 
meadow at a brisker pace” (149).  
Ironically, when Julia does come across her actual text, that is, Rousseau’s Julie, 
she is humorously unaware and profoundly skeptical: “It would be good if things were 
so; but are they really like that?” (142)—an approximation of the criticism voiced by “N” 
in the preface to Rousseau’s Julie, in which he cries out “Oh! If only she had existed!” 
(Julie, 7), as well as Karamzin’s own exclamation in Letters when wandering Lausanne: 
“Ah, friends! And yet in fact there was no Julie!” (“Ах, друзья мои! для чего в самом 
деле не было Юлии!”).86 Self-reading in this moment finds its apotheosis as Julia 
engages critically with the text she both lives and reads; and it is her textual 
interpretation, her unpacking of Rousseau’s idyll, that ultimately leads to “the fog” being 
lifted, behind which her identity is revealed.87 After reading Aris’ final letter, in which he 
forsakes his wife and, in the hyperbolic style of Rousseau’s Saint-Preux, declares his 
departure for “parts unknown,” Julia is afforded a moment of self-reflection: “O women! 
You complain of the treachery of men: your frivolity, your inconstancy, serve to justify 
them” (146). Literal reading here meets literary self-reading wherein Julia’s epiphany 
comes about not through live action, that is, not in the moment of Aris’ actual departure 
                                                 
86 Nikolai Karamzin, Letters of a Russian Traveller, trans. Andrew Kahn (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 
2003), 182. 
87 Essentially the same moment occurs in Julie when Saint-Preux reminds Julie of the time they read 
together (as pupil and teacher) the letters of Abelard and Heloise. “I have always pitied Heloise; she had a 
heart made for love: but Abelard has never seemed to me anything but a wretch deserving of his fate, and 
as little acquainted with love as with virtue. Having judged him, must I imitate him?...But such is not the 
case, my Julie, with two lovers of the same age, in love both with an equal flame, when they are joined by a 
mutual attachment, unconstrained by any particular bond, both in the prime of their freedom, and no law 
prohibits their mutual engagement” (70).  Saint-Preux believes that Abelard sacrificed his honor for 
Heloise, which Saint-Preux claims he would never do; however, although he identifies the links between 
their situations, he cannot see the irony of his own.  
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(at which point, the narrator remarks, she “sits silently” [145]); comprehension is delayed 
until she can properly reflect back on the event by way of reading his letter.  
And yet, while Julia seems to reach the proper conclusions, in the end Aris blames 
Julia’s “injudicious upbringing” (151) for their brief separation—it appears she was a bad 
reader.  While bad reading does not necessarily make a bad person—Julia’s literary 
journey concludes more happily than that of her predecessor, content in the arms of her 
sentimental educator—it could possibly make for a bad author, who, throughout the 
narrative, makes himself known through frequent outbursts of joy or displeasure, 
judgment and narrative analysis. Overall, the author takes pleasure in recounting Julia’s 
tale, weaving his personal impressions (“what a glance!...what a meeting!” [137]) and 
judgments (“women complain about men, men about women: who is innocent? Who is 
guilty? Who can decide this litigation [tiazhbu]?”[133]) into the narrative fabric.  If, for 
Julia, self-representation comes about in the form of locating the most appropriately 
fitting text, for Karamzin, as author-cum-narrator, self-representation arises 
hermeneutically, that is, in his ability to interpret, judge, and assess Julia’s path towards 
love (or, in other words, to be the most appropriate reader). When Aris remarks, “the 
outcome has proved the justice of my system” (152) (here system, sistema, is a weighted 
term that most likely refers to Rousseau’s système), Karamzin confirms and justifies the 
interpretive steps that he as author and narrator took along the way: his acquittal of 
women which opens the story (“I, without a hearing or an investigation, shall acquit…the 
women” [133]), and his subsequent testimony (“Justice must be rendered to you, dear 
women…” [147]). In the end, the outcome of Julia’s story must prove the efficacy of his 
text: that he has done right by her as a proper reader, not as a proper writer. In this way, 
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the authorial voice is forged not in moments of writing but in moments of reading. Note, 
again, the disjointed locutions (“Imagine yourself in poor Aris’ place!...What was to be 
done? Slay both with one dagger…and then,…kill himself as well…No!” [145]), ellipses, 
and general withholding of information on the part of the narrator in moments where he 
squanders opportunities for great embellishment (“I realize the weakness of my pen and, 
therefore, shall not say another word of this rare event” [151]). Writer in this sense is 
valued most literally as the sum of his parts. As rekonstruktor, Karamzin designs his 
writing process not as one that builds new and possible worlds by means of invention (he 
is not concerned with what he might do with the material he has uncovered) but rather, 
through presentation, a performative demonstration of parts that he revivifies, and, like 
Lotman’s rekonstruktor, “makes them talk,” “gives them life.” (13). 
In his essay, “What Does the Writer Need?” (“Chto nuzhno avtoru,” 1794), 
written in the same year as “Julia,” Karamzin proposes that a writer, should he hope to be 
successful, must possess “a good, tender heart” (161) This equation, that a good writer 
must possess a good heart, seems simple enough as Karamzin establishes a logical link 
between inherent goodness and good writing (might this mean that all good men are good 
authors?). Writing talent, he argues, is inherent, unchanging, and correlates directly to 
‘goodness’: “In a word: I am convinced that a bad man cannot be a good author” (163) 
For this reason, Karamzin writes, “if you want to paint your portrait, then look first into 
the faithful (vernoe) mirror: Can your face be a subject of art, which must be concerned 
with the beautiful, depict beauty, harmony, and diffuse pleasant impressions in the area of 
the emotional?” (162). Karamzin demands that potential authors look inside and consider 
whether they are good people before embarking on a writing career. It is unclear exactly 
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why, whether it is because it makes for “high quality” writing or popular writing, or 
whether these two qualities are actually one in the same. Rousseau, he argues, is popular, 
or “pleasing,” despite the internal contradictions within his writing simply because the 
reader remains convinced of the fact that Rousseau “loves” humanity and possesses a 
“natural goodness” (163). “You want to be a good author,” Karamzin concludes, “[r]ead 
the history of the misfortunes of the human race—and if you heart is not suffused with 
blood, forsake your pen—or it will depict the cold gloom of your soul” (162).  Most 
striking in this passage is not just the strict protocol for becoming a good author (which 
one either is or is not, and essentially cannot “become”), but also the presumed link 
between pen and person, writing and self, that Karamzin sets forth. Two associations 
arise: a good person is a good author; a person is what he writes.  
This logical formulation—a good person must be a good writer—both aligns 
Karamzin with Rousseau and sets him apart. In Julie, Rousseau applies the very same 
logic to love—those in love cannot be debauched; those in love must be happy: “[T]rue 
love is the most chaste of all bonds…” Julie tells Saint-Preux, “Believe me, my friend, 
debauchery and love are incapable of dwelling together, and cannot even compensate for 
each other. The heart affords the true happiness of those who love each other, and 
nothing can take its place the moment they no longer do” (113). In this moment, Saint-
Preux accuses Julie of abandoning “love” in favor of the convenience—social 
assimilation—afforded by a life with Wolmar. Julie justifies her decision citing her 
renewed understanding of love, of which she now sees there can be only one form—love 
is non-sensual, unchanging, and chaste. Redefining “love” is her only means for self-
redemption, for compensating for sins committed, and most especially, for justifying her 
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choices (imposed upon her by society’s restrictions). For Julie, Saint-Preux becomes a 
dangerous example of ambiguity, “l’obstacle,” to borrow from Starobinski (Transparency 
and Obstruction), and the world in chaos, in which declarations of “love” can mean 
unhappiness, ecstasy, and debauchery. He introduces ambiguity to meaning, something 
that he suffers for throughout the epistolary novel. In order to live peacefully, fully 
accepting her fate designed by the Protestant faith, Julie must come to the conclusion, 
like Karamzin, that goodness is directly correlated to “good” actions—good loving, for 
Julie; good writing, for Karamzin.88 
However, while Karamzin and Rousseau’s heroine may share an axiomatic mind, 
Rousseau’s approach to writing as an art form is entirely distinct from Karamzin’s. For 
instance, in Essay on the Origin of Languages (Essai sur l'origine des langues, published 
posthumously in 1781), Rousseau argues that writing bears the heavy hand of 
civilization. Passions are more organized and structured than expressed, and thus writing 
is more artificial than speech:   
Writing, which seems as if it should fix language, is precisely what alters 
it; it changes not its words but its genius; it substitutes precision for 
expressiveness. Feelings are conveyed when one speaks and ideas when 
one writes. In writing, one is forced to take all the words according to 
common acceptation; but he who speaks varies the meanings by the tone 
of his voice, he determines them as he pleases; less constrained to be clear, 
he grants more to forcefulness, and it is not possible for a language one 
writes to keep for long the liveliness of one that is only spoken. Words are 
written and not sounds: now, in an accented language it is the sounds, the 
accents, the inflections of every sort that constitute the greatest energy of 
the language; and that make a turn of phrase, even a common one, belong 
only in the place it is found. The means taken up to compensate for this 
quality diffuse, elongate written language and, passing from books into 
                                                 
88 It would be interesting to consider the extent to which Rousseau celebrates the sentiments and senses as 
agents of epistemology, given that debauchery appears to be the breaking point of his phenomenology. 
Rousseau’s Protestantism implies that there should be limits to how intensely one uses the senses to know 
the self.  
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discourse, enervate speech itself. To say everything as one would write it 
is to do no more than read while speaking.89  
 
To begin, I should note that this passage, like Rousseau’s Dialogues (as I briefly noted in 
Chapter One), anticipates early twentieth-century cognitive linguistics, specifically what 
early Formalist Lev Yakubinksky will refer to as the “apperceptive mass,”90 the 
storehouse of information, associations, implications that serve as a backdrop against 
which meaning is determined and produced in dialogue.  In much the same way that 
Rousseau emphasizes spoken as opposed to written language as more organic and more 
reflective of one’s personality, Yakubinsky prefers dialogic to monologic speech for what 
he decides is its lack of artifice (he explicitly calls dialogue neiskustvennyi iazyk, 
“inartificial language”). In contradistinction to Yakubinsky, however, Rousseau devalues 
writing precisely for its conservatism and imposed formality—writing “fixes” and 
“makes precise” our “feelings” (sentimens) and for this reason lacks the ability to capture 
a prolonged sense of “liveliness.”  To put this in linguistic terms, one might argue that, 
for Rousseau, writing is paradigmatic while speech is syntagmatic—it expresses and 
confirms time as linear since it changes and evolves in accordance with it.  
 In line with Rousseau’s totalitarian système, which insists that the underlying 
thrust of his oeuvre remains logically consistent, his argument in favor of oral speech as 
an organic mode of expression must and therefore does reflect his notions regarding self-
portraiture, a genre that both can and cannot express or capture reality. Again, for 
Rousseau, there is no real way to capture the self in literature; the best attempts are those 
that foreground this impossibility, the “impossibility of totalization,” according to de 
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Man,91 hence, the explicit brokenness of Dialogues, or the abstruse first line of 
Confessions: “Je forme une entreprise qui n’eut jamais d’exemple….” De Man argues 
that autobiography since the eighteenth century had become demonstrably incomplete 
and unreliable, a genre in which the author is “defaced.” Most significantly, 
autobiography, he argues, is realized not through a process of writing, but through a 
process of reading: “Autobiography, then, is not a genre or a mode, but a figure of 
reading or of understanding that occurs, to some degree, in all texts. The autobiographical 
moment happens as an alignment between two subjects involved in the process of reading 
in which they determine each other by mutual reflexive substitution” (921). In other 
words, the reader accepts the text as substitute for the author, and the author accepts the 
reader as the necessary cumulative end to his process of building his portrait. 
However, while for de Man composing an autobiography may be an inter-
subjective (between author and reader) process, the process he describes does not ask that 
both parties read simultaneously. If reading is the means through which autobiography is 
made, for de Man this act is unilateral—the author writes, while the reader reads. 
Karamzin’s self-writing, on the other hand, comes about as a radical form of defacement 
in the sense that reading, as his sentimental prose demonstrates, is synchronized 
activity—we read Julia’s tale simultaneously along with the author who vocalizes his 
reading experience with repeated present tense exclamations (most often “Ah”). As I 
mentioned, Rousseau emphasizes first-hand experience with a distinct stress on an 
organicism that seeks out forms of artistic expression that least impede the connection 
between individual and world. This explains why, in Essay on the Origins of Language, 
he prefers oral speech; why, as I demonstrated in Chapter One, he wishes to capture in 
                                                 
91 Paul de Man, “Autobiography as De-facement,” MLN 94, no. 5 (Dec 1972), 922. 
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writing the camera obscura, a modality for portraying life as a projected sketch without 
artifice; why, in Confessions, he justifies stealing as a means of restoring organic 
relations between man and the object he desires “because between money and the 
possession of the desired object there is always an intermediary, whereas between the 
thing itself and the enjoyment of it there is none”(39); and why, as Starobinski attests, 
Rousseau seeks a “de-veiled” (Transparency, 73-80) world without socially instituted 
arbitration. Karamzin’s processes, on the other hand, are notably more inorganic and 
artificial, more dependent upon reading than writing, reading about life rather than 
recording it first-hand. His phenomenology, one might say, is limited to the text, with the 
a posteriori knowledge of his sentimental persona derived exclusively from reading. This 
explains why Rousseau’s Julie guides foremost Karamzin’s journey through Switzerland; 
why in his essay “What Does a Writer Need?” he instructs the nascent writer to test his 
sensibilities by “read[ing] the history of the misfortunes of the human race” rather than 
venturing outside to see it for himself (162); and why, as recent studies have 
hypothesized, Karamzin did not in fact make it to many of the places to which he claimed 
to have visited on his sentimental journey (one unvisited yet described place being 
Strasbourg, Alsace), choosing instead to paraphrase—without citation—the accounts of 
other travelers.92 Even if his travelogue is a demonstration, or, as Schönle might argue, a 
performance of the sentimental act, the necessary final step towards realizing his 
personhood through live-action is never brought to term. In this sense, I am inclined to 
accept Terras’ interpretation of Karamzin’s My Trifles, as a testament to the 
                                                 
92 See: Rodolphe Baudin, Nikolaï Karamzine à Strasbourg : un écrivain-voyageur russe dans l'Alsace 
révolutionnaire, 1789; see also Lotman and Uspensky, “‘Pis’ma russkogo puteshestvennika’ Karamzina i 
ikh mesto v razvitii russkoi kultury,”. Pis’ma russkogo puteshestvennika (Leningrad: “Nauka,” 
Leningradskoe otd-nie, 1984). 
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Sentimentalist’s self-abasement, as a proper way to describe Karamzin’s overall 
sentimental project—to transform the philosophical and aesthetic immensity of 
Sentimentalism into bezdelushka, or “trifle.”93 When Thomas Barran writes, “[Karamzin] 
reads Rousseau as only a Russian could,”94 one could argue that this “Russian” way is to 
imitate or perform Sentimentalism rather than exercise it in earnest. 
Barran, however, argues that Karamzin spent his travels abroad investigating 
feverishly the metaphysical links between person and experience laid out by 
Sentimentalism, and wrote a great deal of “meta-literature” on the subject of reading—
how to properly do it and to what end (195). Barran brings our attention to a moment in 
the travelogue in which Karamzin puts the meta-narrative to good use and describes in 
great detail what it means to be in the very places where Rousseau drew inspiration for 
Julie. For instance, while in Lausanne, he writes in apostrophe to an unnamed Vy (You): 
As you know how much I love Rousseau, you will have an idea of the 
feelings that these objects produced in me, and with what pleasure we read 
his Héloïse!  Although this novel contains much that is unnatural, much 
that is exaggerated—in a word, much that is romantic—still, no-one in the 
French language has painted love in such bright, vivid colours as it is 
described in Héloïse: in the Héloïse without which the German Werther 
would not exist. The beauty of the local area must have made a deep 
impression on Rousseau’s soul; all his descriptions are so lively, and for 
that matter so true! It seemed to me that with my eyes I had found the very 
ravine (esplanade) that was so attractive for the unfortunate Saint-Preux. 
Ah, my friends! And yet in fact there was no Julie! Why does Rousseau 
tell us not to seek any traces of her? Cruel man! First you described for us 
such a wonderful being, and afterwards you say: ‘She doesn’t exist!’ You 
remember the place in his Confessions: ‘I will tell all those who have taste, 
all who have sensitivity: journey to Vevey, survey the surroundings, walk 
about the lake—and you will agree that these beautiful places are worthy 
of Julie, Clara and Saint-Preux; but do not look for them there.’ Coxe, the 
well-known English traveller, writes that Rousseau composed Héloïse 
while he was living in the village of Meillerie; but this is not correct. 
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Monsieur de L*, about whom you have heard, knew Rousseau and assures 
me that he wrote this novel when he was living in the Hermitage, three or 
four miles from Paris. (182)  
 
This moment in Lausanne is a capital example of how Karamzin enacts his own moment 
of self-reading. Having seen Rousseau’s famed loci first-hand, Karamzin concludes 
unambiguously that there is a distinct separation between life and text and that 
Rousseau’s world, which he describes as “unnatural,” “grandiose,” and “romantic,” or, 
possibly, “novelistic,” nevertheless captures well, as it should, Karamzin’s present 
positive reality (“these places here,” [zdeshnikh mest]).   Rousseau, Karamzin gathers, did 
not write the world of Clarens, but painted it with his prose, with “vivid,” “bright” paints. 
His reaction at first reads as just viewer’s euphoria, but on a deeper level Karamzin’s 
proclamation reveals his expectations for literature. Why should Julie exist in real life? 
Why should it matter where exactly Rousseau wrote Julie? For Karamzin, neither the 
character of Julie, nor Rousseau’s imaginary world is too “grandiose” to exist—in fact, 
he laments their non-existence and does not recognize the imaginary world as a step 
beyond positive reality. The mind of the author tries to reconcile, collate, and amalgamate 
the two—real and fantasy—to produce a supra-reality, confirming that, while the literary 
world might be a performance, it is a performance that provides more guidance or insight 
than reality is capable of offering.  
As I noted earlier, critical works by Lotman, Hammarberg, and Schönle have 
conditioned our understanding of Russia’s late eighteenth century as a period of 
compulsive perpetuation—perpetuating codes, dress, speech, and taste within and without 
the world of literature. By repeating forms and personalities, these “texts of behavior” 
help to fashion a public persona, which is achieved both formally and rhetorically, and 
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also to propagate a culture of reading, from which it seems the desire to self-read rather 
than self-re-create in literature is born. Karamzin’s well-crafted implied reader is not just 
an example of the intimate connection between author and reader, but moreover, an 
existential melding of the two, whereby author is diminished to device, as much a 
“literary fact” as we might understand a narrator to be. By narrowing the gap between 
them, Karamzin not only forges a new reader, but also forges a new author—one who 
reads as he writes, and is because he reads. However, Karamzin’s reflections on 
Rousseau and the Enlightenment confirms his views of art as an extension of life not in 
the sense that they are both organic, but more likely inorganic—always mediated, always 
artificial. This is why he commits to self-reading, since the world for him has always 
been to a certain extent a book, an open tableau of tropes, devices, and figures. 
Karamzin’s dedication to reading exceeds the eccentricities of a bibliophile and reaches 
the level of a Don Quixotian epistemic delusion (however, hopeful and endearing). 
Foucault’s reading of Don Quixote as “the book in flesh and blood”95 (similarly, when 
Shklovsky reads Don Quixote, he sees “an insane man read[ing] a story about himself”96) 
in a subtle way applies as well to Karamzin, who, possibly due to his relationship with 
Swiss physiognomist Lavater, viewed positive reality as a visual narrative from which we 
may glean definitive notions about our interior worlds—simply put, reading the world is 
reading ourselves.97 In fact, Schönle, in his critical look at Karamzin’s Letters, took 
                                                 
95 Michel Foucault, Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, (New York: Vintage Books, 
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96 Viktor Shklovsky, “Regarding Psychological Footlights,” Knight’s Move, trans. Richard Sheldon 
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notice of a moment in which Karamzin calls himself the “knight of the jolly 
countenance,” an innovation of Cervantes’ “knight of woeful countenance.” As Schönle 
notes: “He seems to announce a tale not of disillusionment but of illusions, of the 
realization of fantasies” (Authenticity and Fiction, 43).98 As Schönle argues in his 
endnotes, in presenting himself as a Quixotian inverse, Karamzin is most likely 
borrowing from Sterne, who makes the same claim in his own fictional travelogue. 
Schönle argues that, in so doing, Karamzin links his project to Sterne’s, not only in terms 
of execution, but also in endgame—both seek, according to Schönle, “to ascertain the 
existence of the soul” (230, n56). 
Despite its origins, within this world of literary living, Karamzin’s narrator-cum-
author becomes a very real defacement as the heavy hand of the author slowly recedes 
into the background. While in Rousseau, love and self inform and confirm each other, 
both in how they encourage personal growth and how they together create the structural 
forms through which each might be expressed, in Karamzin, love and self, while 
mutually dependent, seem to negate each other. Particularly in “Julia,” reading about love 
triggers a destructive streak within the text, which devastates the authorial voice in 
moments of extreme sentimentalism (he drops his pen). For instance, compare with a 
moment in Rousseau’s Emile, where the narrator (meta-Rousseau) admits he would like 
to “paint…the beginning of their [Emile and Sophie’s] conjugal love” but is exhausted by 
                                                                                                                                                 
the relationship between Karamzin and Lavater, see Edmund Heier’s Studies on Johan Caspar Lavater 
(1741-1801) in Russia (New York: P. Lang, 1991).  
98 In addition, it is interesting to note that Schönle’s reading of Karamzin’s journey runs perfectly counter 
to what Rousseau takes as the educational value (and thus primary purpose) of travel: “I am quite 
convinced that in matters of observation of every kind one must not read, one must see…To observe, it is 
necessary to have eyes and to turn them toward the object one wants to know. There are many persons who 
are informed still less by travel than by books, because they are ignorant of the art of thinking; because 
when they read, their minds are at least guided by the author; and because when then travel, they do not 
know how to see anything on their own” (Emile 451-52). 
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his subject—“I am too weak for works requiring so much endurance”—as is his pen—“I 
also feel that my pen is weary”—but, in contrast to Karamzin, Rousseau decides not to 
drop his pen “[i]n order not to leave [the work] imperfect” (475). Rousseau feels a moral 
imperative driving his work, and this is what defines his role as author. Karamzin, on the 
other hand, feels an emotional imperative, an allegiance to his experience as a reader 
rather than an author and, for this reason, prioritizes narrativizing his reading experience 
(non-diegetic) over developing the plot (diegetic). Readers in effect know less about 
Julia, Natalie, and Liza (though she is regretfully left out of this analysis) than they do 
about their supposed author, and his hedonism counterintuitively renders the author in the 
negative, lying somewhere in the void. By his own testimony, Karamzin’s narrator is not 
a writer, knows not how to describe events (“not a word of the eloquent silence […] not a 
word of the tears of joy and bliss!” [“Julia,” 151]; “I do not dare describe it—but it was 
touching” [“Natalie,” 92]), remembers not the names of certain individuals (“One great 
psychologist, whose name I do not really remember” [“Natalie,” 78]), forgets facts, is 
neither a good writer nor a good historian. In essence, he is null and void.  
In the previous chapter I mentioned a distinct negative poetics that runs 
throughout the works of Shklovsky, Karamzin, and Rousseau. In Rousseau this manifests 
as an inverse image—in Dialogues, in particular, ‘scriptor’ Rousseau is the inverse image 
of ‘interlocutor’ Rousseau, as are “le pour et le contre,” the proponents and naysayers, 
that make up “Rousseau’s” persona.99 In Shklovsky and Karamzin, however, Rousseau’s 
negative poetics manifest as a literal absence, a cancelling out of the author. As I 
remarked earlier, the negativity in Shklovsky’s prose might be due to the anti-psychology 
                                                 
99 Even in Emile, a child’s education should “be purely negative. It consists not at all in teaching virtue or 
truth but in securing the heart from vice and the mind from error…Take the opposite of the practiced path, 
and you will almost always do well….” (93-94). 
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imposed by the Hegelian-Formalist perspective, the desire to sever ties between the 
author and the creative process.100 One can easily detect throughout Shklovsky’s oeuvre a 
tremendous appreciation for the creative potential of negative space, which is at once 
abysmal and fertile, destructive and productive. “We think through negation in art [мы в 
искусстве мыслим отвергая]” writes Shklovsky in Bowstring, “we still use religious 
terms to say something anti-religious…[t]he rhetoric of the Russian Revolution 
incorporated biblical phrases in their antithetical forms…The Bible, Homer, and Tolstoy 
all co-exist in Russian Literature” (66, 77). The most effective way to isolate the 
properties of one thing is to use the lexicon of its opposite—to use fire to describe water, 
for example. The interrelationship/codependence of opposites is the basis of the book 
Bowstring. So it seems highly appropriate for Shklovsky to use not love to talk about 
love. As he writes in Zoo, “You gave me two assignments. 1) Not to call you 2) Not to 
see you. So now I am a busy man” (32). Zoo is an epistolary novel about the potential of 
negativity and negative space, which at times is rendered literally with the use of “X” 
mimicking the mark of censorship: what should be letters between lovers, is instead the 
letters of one lover; what should be a novel about love, is instead a novel about 
unrequited love.101  
                                                 
100 However, in his essay on the theatre, Shklovsky recognizes the need for “spectators,” acknowledging 
that in a way they provide the necessary backdrop against which a certain side of a character’s psychology 
comes to life—this is the theatricality that lies at the heart of theatre, which Shklovsky transforms into 
literary device (“Regarding Psychological Footlights,” Knight’s Move, 48). 
101 “The poet’s forceful, imageless, and as if unfinished address to the woman is an example of a unique 
negative form, which in this instance becomes especially powerful” (294). This quote from Bowstring is 
telling for the value of uniting love and negativity for autobiography; Victor Erlich writes: “The insistent 
motif of a love that dares not speak its name is clearly reminiscent of V. Mayakovsky’s lyrical masterpiece 
‘About That,’ most notably of its prologue, a powerful emotional crescendo which keeps insisting on the 
centrality, the inescapability, and the explosiveness of ‘this theme’ while seemingly refusing to identify it” 
(Modernism and Revolution [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994], 226).  
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Negative space is most profitable for its capacity to invert the universe, inspiring a 
necessary reorganization that ushers in change and staves off automatization. For 
instance, Shklovsky’s collection of essays, Knight’s Move (Khod konia 1923), documents 
the ambivalence of negativity—both destructive and productive—most poignantly in the 
essay “Pounding Nails with a Samovar” (“Samovarom po gvozdiam”), a title that 
expresses in humorous terms a world where objects are repurposed to an absurd end: 
“War—privation—reorganizes things in its own way, which is terrible but honest. 
However, to change the meaning of things, to bore through a door with a spoon, to shave 
oneself with an awl and, at the same time, give assurances that everything is going well—
that’s not honest” (25). Despite hardships, war is also fertile ground for estrangement, 
where “making do,” so to speak, compels society to reassess, to innovate, and to 
complete everyday activities with more awareness—in so doing, these activities quickly 
turn from everyday (bytovye) to artistic, or artificial (iskusstvennye).102 However, as 
Shklovsky admits, the other side of the coin is dishonesty and discontentment (or a 
society-in-negative that is dishonest about its contentment), the end result being an 
inversed world that wants only to return to normal. Or, to use Shklovsky’s barefaced 
prose, “[t]he void sucks, give speed.”103 This is the internal contradiction that lies at the 
heart of Shklovsky’s estrangement—that living in negativity (war) and creating in 
                                                 
102 For more on the political implications/dimensions of estrangement, see articles by Svetlana Boym, 
“Poetics and Politics of Estrangement: Victor Shklovsky and Hannah Arendt,” Poetics Today 26, no. 4 
(Winter 2005): 581–611; Galin Tihanov, “The Politics of Estrangement: The Case of the Early Shklovsky,” 
Poetics Today 26, no. 4 (Winter 2005): 665-696. See also Victor Erlich, who writes: “As for Shklovskij, 
presumably the main exponent of Formalist ‘escapism,’ his attitude towards revolutionary politics was 
more complex than some of his extravagantly ‘a-social’ utterances would imply. In the Civil War period he 
oscillated intermittently between the pose of an ironic spectator, or passive victim, of the revolutionary 
upheaval and inconclusive attempts at political action.” Russian Formalism: History, Doctrine (The Hague: 
Mouton, 1965), 59.  
103 Viktor Shklovsky, “Tret’ia fabrika,” Gamburgskii schet : stati, vospominaniia, esse (1914-1933) 
 (Moscow: Sov. pisatel’, 1990), 310. 
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negativity (estrangement) are fundamentally at odds—which never reaches a resolution, 
and yet which always yields creative results. For example, Shklovsky’s earliest prose 
piece, “In a Void” (“V pustote”) composed most likely in 1921, depicts a reality of 
reorganization, where the world stands “in a void” as the result of war. Narrated in first-
person, “In a Void,” follows Shklovsky’s journey during the Russian Civil War, and 
explores the theme of negative space in the form of an adventure novella.104  
 There are several striking theoretical overlaps between Shklovsky’s “void” and 
Tynianov’s “interval,” a concept that was born of the latter’s theory of cultural evolution. 
Tynianov argues that cultural history does not progress self-aware as a sequence of 
intellectual ‘periods’, but rather is interrupted by “intervals,” or promezhutki, that 
encourage artistic innovation.105 Like Shklovsky’s “void,” Tynianov’s “interval” is 
responsible for the formal and thematic changes that take place within the arts and 
accounts for the development of new trends, genres, and styles. The sense of being in an 
interval between cultures seems to describe Shklovsky’s condition in “Pounding Nails 
with a Samovar” quite accurately: in time of war something has ended, but, as a result, 
something new might take form. While the void/interval means that life will be 
temporarily impractical—samovars will be used as hammers—the void’s abundant 
artistic yield makes up for the inconvenience, however extreme it may be.  
                                                 
104 By 1921, Shklovsky had joined the Petrograd House of Arts managed by the Serapion Brothers, a group 
of avant-garde authors, named for E.T.A. Hoffman’s character of the same name, who promulgated 
freedom of creative expression. For this reason, their influence might explain the generic melding of 
theoretical prose and adventure novella. 
105 Tynianov, “Interval” (“Promezhutok,” 1924). For a comprehensive look at Tynianov’s “Interval,” see 
Dragan Kujundžić, The Returns of History: Russian Nietzscheans After Modernity (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1997), 73-76. 
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In his essay on counter-reliefs and faktura, “Regarding Texture and Counter-
Reliefs,” (“O fakture i kontrrel’efakh” 1920), Shklovsky relays the effects negativity has 
on self-expression: 
It often behooves one to read complaints about the difficulty of expressing 
one’s thought in art…To look at the form of art, that is, at art itself, as at 
an interpreter translating the thoughts of the artist from the language of his 
soul into a language comprehensible to the spectator is commonplace. For 
those who support such a view, “the word” in literature is “a color” in the 
painting—a regrettable necessity. From these “means” available to artists 
have been demanded, above all else, transparency and 
intelligibility…What makes art enchanting (очаровение)? The outside 
world does not exist. Equally nonexistent, and equally imperceptible, are 
things replaced by words, and non-existent are words which are hardly 
used, hardly pronounced. The outside world is outside of art. Art is 
perceived as a series of hints, a series of algebraic signs, as a collection of 
things having volume, but no substance—texture (фактура). 106  
 
Here, Shklovsky considers the risks of mimesis, which attempts to render real life as 
word or material. For this reason, Shklovsky presents an avant-garde artist, Vladimir 
Tatlin, as a perfect strategist for issues of representation, and the artist’s counter-reliefs, 
or “sketches,” as one possible answer to the problem of autobiography: “A counter-relief, 
a sketch, pieces of some sort of special paradise where there are no names and no voids, 
where life is like our life today—a ‘flight in a sphere,’ from one point to another like 
traveling on an invisible road, from station to station” (68). Behaving self-sufficiently, 
dependent only on a juxtaposition of materials as the source of its communicative power, 
Tatlin’s counter-reliefs are one possible answer for how to express the self in an anti-
authorial, artistic world.  Counter-reliefs persist outside of time and space, essentially in a 
void, which is, however, of a different sort—not, as we see in “Pounding Nails with a 
Samovar,” a war-time void, cruelly divorced from time and waiting to return, but a void 
that is self- sufficient, autogenetic, liberated from the expectations of time, never to 
                                                 
106 Shklovsky, “Regarding Texture and Counter-Reliefs,” in Knight’s Move, 65. 
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return. “The new world should be a continuous world” (68), Shklovksy concludes in this 
essay—ostensibly he seeks a world without voids, without promezhutki, yet beautifully 
estranging all the same.107   
Taking cues from trends in Constructivist Art, in Zoo, through graphic 
embellishments, such as the printed “X,” coupled with the spotlighted negative particle 
“ne,” Shklovsky materializes negativity at the cutaneous level of faktura, or texture, in a 
modernist literalization of the absence of the author. As he writes in Zoo, “writing about 
love is actually writing about literature” (123), and “I am becoming part of a book” (121). 
Sharing in Shklovsky’s modality of superimposing artist and his work, Karamzin 
employs negativity to a similar end, and, in so doing, arises as a proto-Formalist. 
Karamzin took life and literature as mutually dependent—it was literature’s job to answer 
life’s questions as best it could—and thus sought ways to have words “perform” life, to 
don words in contemporary fashion, to figuratively cloak them in cultural effects. 
Karamzin’s sentimental prose demonstrates in metaphorical terms the system operative in 
Rousseau’s epistolary novel for valuing and understanding the self: it is always a 
mediated process in which the self is arrived at through a series of evaluative tasks—
gazing, judging, assessing, appreciating, and, above all, reading. As with Rousseau’s 
Dialogues, the self is not a concept that is bound to the individual alone, but rather is a 
constellation of its refracted images: whom it loves, who loves it, what it reads, and who 
reads it.  And yet, beyond Julia’s own process of self-identification, the authorial self in 
                                                 
107 In the following excerpt from Theory of Prose, Shklovsky implies a striking parallel between his 
interpretation of Tatlin’s counter-reliefs and his view of the literary system: “A literary work is pure form; 
it is neither a thing nor material but a relationship of materials. And, like any relationship, this one, too, is 
zero dimensional. Which is why the ratio of a composition is irrelevant, the mathematical value of its 
numerator or denominator doesn’t matter; what matters is their relationship.” Theory of Prose, trans. 




Julia is, in effect, artificial, a recasting of the self as logos, notably in the form of reader 
and not author, which has causal links once again with the “scare of the self.” In turning 
life into literature, life into device, Karamzin breaks Rousseau’s alleged ties between 
creator and his creation. The author is not lead creator but rather a member of the text’s 
community, allowing the illusion to persist that artistic material is autonomous in its 
autogenesis. A self-contained world, an enclosed system in which all literary 
participants—characters and author alike—are born, raised, and then die intra-textually, 
Karamzin’s sentimental prose reveals itself, cumulatively, as an effective modality for 
maintaining the ethos of Sentimentalism while generating artificial means of 
circumventing its core project—which is, to arrive at the self. In designing his Julia, 
Natalie, and Liza as more concept than character, Karamzin inevitably transforms life 
into device, and, like Shklovsky in Zoo, enacts a Pygmalion moment in reverse—taking 
life and transforming it back into marble; making stone once again stony.  
 To turn life into literary material, to make stone once again stony, leads, albeit 
circuitously, to a concern regarding the relationship between creator and creation which 
has thus far received peripheral treatment, yet which receives more critical attention in 
the following chapter. The mimetic debate that resides in the background of Rousseau’s 
oeuvre—which considers art’s ability to capture real life—is representative of 
Sentimentalism’s standardized reading of the creative process, a recouping of divine 
ability wherein creation and creator are inseparably linked. As I have argued in Chapter 
One, Shklovsky, due in part to his modernist environment, is centrally concerned not with 
the creative process, but with the creative result, which, in its autonomy, should be 
autogenerative and self-standing. Karamzin and Shklovsky challenge Rousseau’s creative 
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relationship, which links linearly creator to creation, life to literature. This is not to say 
that Karamzin was not occupied with literature’s capacity to depict reality, but, in the 
way that all of life is a text and all of life is mimesis, Karamzin’s creative process 
prioritizes literature as the “reality” that should be emulated. The following chapter to a 
certain extent aligns mimetic philosophy with literary device to look at the trends of 
primitivism that play a role in developing each author’s conception of the creative 
process. Karamzin arises as the most interesting product of this analysis. His negative 
poetics reconfigures Rousseau’s celebrated wilderness in a way that speaks to the anxiety 





Love and the Devices of Primitivism:  
 
A Portrait of Autonomy 
 
“…[W]hen they speak of the origin of commonwealths and laws, [they] relate that in the 




 In the previous two chapters I explored how Shklovsky, Karamzin, and Rousseau, 
though separated by tremendous cultural and generational divides, are intimately 
interconnected with respect to their treatment of love and self, not only on the level of 
narrative—how love’s literary forms inform the literary structuring of the self—but also 
with respect to ontology—that there is a genetic link between sentiment and self that all 
three authors explore from the rudimentary perspective of love, demonstrating in no 
uncertain terms: you are what you feel. The central focus of this chapter shifts from love 
to primitivism as another potent phenomenon that guides the development of certain 
literary conceits prevalent in sentimental and formalist fiction. For instance, I explore 
how Shklovsky, Karamzin, and Rousseau, under their respective headings of Formalism 
and Sentimentalism, develop aesthetic practices that are exacted by the presumed 
existence of an alternative reality—a-historical, a-temporal, a-systematic—that is set 
apart from the modernized world and whose borders can only be breached through the 
artistic imagination.  
 The strict rationalism fostered by the Enlightenment is useful in its ability to 
organize, or at least re-imagine the world as organized, but is flawed in its audacious, 
totalizing approach to epistemology. As we have seen in the previous two chapters with 
the design of literary system or of autobiography, totality is impossible, and for this 
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reason disintegration, to again paraphrase Lionel Trilling, is an unavoidable conceit of 
modern (that is, post-primitive) prose. Totality (or, more likely, totalitarianism), a state of 
omnipotence, omnipresence, and omniscience, does have one refuge within rationalized 
society: the literary imagination. The present chapter considers primitivism as a literary 
phenomenon charged with an impossible task: to safeguard totality from the threat of 
disintegration and to provide the tools for coping, on an artistic level, with several 
psychological conditions incurred by the onslaught of modernist ills. For Rousseau, the 
savage world, a generic space from which all modern men have involuntarily departed, is 
retained as an emblem of perfect autonomy, and he conceives of his oeuvre as a practical 
way of integrating elements of this early time into the modern cultural fabric. For 
Shklovsky, too, the savage world is valued for its autonomy yet as it applies not to the 
consciousness (as for Rousseau), but to the text—how the text might be reconceived as 
autonomous, and, as readers, how our autonomy might be reinstated by way of 
hermeneutics. Karamzin’s fiction, as I will demonstrate, presents the most complicated 
image of where these themes of love, primitivism, and autonomy collide.  
 Thus, in order to provide answers to how primitivism reveals itself in Shklovsky, 
Karamzin, and Rousseau, following an initial assessment of how the primitive is 
understood by these three authors, I will examine a moment that finds itself repeated 
across the three “Julies”—the portrait episode. Engaging with an image or representation 
of the object of one’s affection (or, in Shklovsky’s non-romance, appropriately not the 
object of his affection) opens up the possibility for extensive consideration on the ways in 
which primitive idealism works against or with notions of love; furthermore, how this 
relationship might reveal even broader notions of temporality among Shklovsky, 
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Karamzin, and Rousseau.  
Residing in the background of this chapter is a broader fascination with the role of 
primitivism and neo-primitivism in instigating and sanctioning a release from 
neoclassical standards and subsequently the shift towards disarticulation that we see in 
both sentimental and formalist fiction. For instance, the savage fetish that held sway for 
the latter part of the eighteenth century runs rampant throughout Rousseau’s 
sentimentalism as he tries to de-acculturate society and deinstitutionalize the arts and 
sciences. Rousseau’s Dialogues is a literary instantiation of this approach insofar as self-
representation is fundamentally incomplete, ineffable, and rife with mistakes and lacunas. 
The same process of de-sophistication can be said to be the guiding principles of one of 
Formalism’s major tenets—Shklovsky’s ostranenie—that takes the undoing of cultural 
mores as the jumping off point for artistic expression. Drawing from his aesthetic 
approach, Shklovsky designs his quasi-autobiographies, specifically, Zoo and Third 
Factory, as counter-intuitive, and most importantly, counter-functional insofar as they 
circumvent the ‘self’ that seeks ‘representation.’  
In her critical work, The Sleep of Reason, Frances Connelly examines the 
“aesthetic framework” of primitivism, specifically how it developed in Europe and which 
principles are its defining features. As she sets forth in the first chapter, primitivism was a 
normative aesthetic in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that developed in 
reaction to the staunch institutionalization of the arts supported by classicism: “The 
classical norm cast the ‘primitive’ as a dark mirror image of itself.”108 As a result, 
primitivism developed as a “phenomenon that highlights the relationship between the 
                                                 
108 Frances S. Connelly, The Sleep of Reason: Primitivism in Modern European Art and Aesthetics, 1725-
1907 (University Park, PA.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), 9. 
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Western and non-Western arts” (1), and came to be known as “collection of visual 
attributes that Europeans construed to be universally characteristic of early or primal 
artistic expression” (5).  
 As do many scholars of this complex and multi-faceted cultural phenomenon, 
Connelly locates the beginning of primitivism in the publication of Giambattista Vico’s 
New Science (La scienza nuova 1725) since it “first articulates, in a systematic manner, 
the essential framework of ideas through which eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
Europeans would understand ‘primitive’ expression” (5). To be sure, Vico’s look at the 
development of civilized man and the bodies of knowledge that guide his inquiry is 
formative for the study at hand, particularly for his presentation of the civilized outlook 
as directly related to the diffusion of divine knowledge into categories of institutionalized 
knowledge. New Science outlines the fundamental attributes of the primitive mind and 
makes substantial claims as to how these qualities might relate to the development of the 
humanities. In the heated debate between Vico and Descartes (1708-09), Vico contests 
Descartes’ attempt to apply mathematical principles to other natural sciences. True 
knowledge, to paraphrase Vico, can only be gained through causes (per caussas), that is, 
by testing and understanding the material with which certain knowledge is made. For this 
reason, Vico maintains, God is the sole possessor of true knowledge; as the maker of the 
universe and all its parts, God alone has intimate understanding of the processes and 
means of creation. Man, in contrast, cannot know the world that comes to him ready-
made as an unalterable fact. As Isaiah Berlin summarizes, “only the Creator looking at, or 
rather ‘within’ himself, that is, at the Universe, which is identical with his own self, can 
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be said to have knowledge.”109 As a product of God’s all-encompassing, generative 
power, man can only know to a limited extent what he himself creates; since he must 
create using materials created by another, he cannot, as per Vico’s assessment, ever fully 
know his creation.  
 This relationship between maker, made, and material is one that has been 
underlined in the previous two chapters as a means through which Shklovsky and 
Karamzin estrange Rousseau’s sentimentalism; either by literary self-reading or negative 
poetics, Shklovsky and Karamzin sever the Pygmalion-esque, ontogenetic link between 
maker and made—as the master of his material and thereby master of his creation—and 
displace the author as the sole creator of his literary universe.  In Vico we see not only 
the early understanding of this relationship as inherently flawed, but also one instance of 
philosophy’s adaptation of the Judeo-Christian divide between divine and mortal 
knowledge. New Science dictates that the world—civilized man included—is God mise 
en abyme; each small part of the universe refers back to its central point of reference, 
God, confirming his creative authority and reasserting his image, as do each microscopic 
pixel of a hologram. The relationship between God and man, and man and knowledge 
appears to be clear—God creates man; man attempts to systematize the knowledge of the 
universe by categorizing it into the natural sciences; however, full knowledge belongs 
only to God.  
The frontispiece that accompanies the 1730 and 1744 editions of New Science 
reveals yet another layer to what seems to be a straightforward relationship. In 
accordance with Vico’s layout of the universe, God, a statue representing “metaphysic,” 
                                                 
109 Isaiah Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment : Vico, Hamann, Herder, ed. Henry Hardy (Princeton, 
NJ.: Princeton University Press, 2000), 38. 
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or the sciences, and the poet Homer stand in a stratified triad—God above metaphysic, 
metaphysic above Homer. As Vico explains in the opening chapter (“Idea of the Work”), 
“through this aspect, metaphysic in the attitude of ecstasy contemplates Him [God] above 
the order of natural things through which hitherto the philosophers have contemplated 
Him.”110 A stream of light flows continuously from God, situated in the heavens, to the 
statue of metaphysic and then further down to Homer. The light’s trajectory demonstrates 
not only the path by which knowledge should be acquired and transferred—from God to 
man, diffused through the sciences—but also links together the three fundamental 
components that make up Vico’s “gentile world”:  
Metaphysic…contemplates Him above the order of natural 
things…ascending higher, she contemplates in God the world of human 
minds…in order to show His providence in the world of human 
spirits…The ray of the divine providence illuminating a convex jewel 
which adorns the breast of metaphysic…indicates that knowledge of God 
does not have its end in metaphysic taking private illumination from 
intellectual things…The same ray is reflected from the breast of 
metaphysic onto the statue of Homer…For metaphysic, directing a history 
of human ideas from the beginnings of truly human thinking of the 
gentiles, has enabled us finally to descend into the crude minds of the first 
founders of the gentile nations…This poetic wisdom, the knowledge of the 
theological poets, was unquestionably the first wisdom of the world for the 
gentiles. (5)  
 
Here and elsewhere throughout New Science, Vico strives to articulate what is inherently 
a complicated relationship between human knowledge and divine intelligence. Not 
necessarily linear, the transfer of knowledge comes about as a give and take, replete with 
the emotional nuances of sharing, divulging, and withholding. In Vico’s worldview there 
are two types of knowledge: divine, which is entirely self-generative, and self-sufficient, 
yet compelled by an internal generosity to share itself with man; and mortal, which is 
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developed in the natural sciences as a careful mixture of intellectual adventurism and 
divine benevolence. Vico’s genealogy of the natural sciences tells the following story: 
everything before the development of the natural sciences is unified under divine 
knowledge. When, through the categorization of knowledge into sciences, man decided to 
take on that knowledge for himself, he broke away from the divine unity, subsequently 
complicating the relationship between them—what was once a steady flow of light 
between God in the heavens and Homer, with the invention of human knowledge 
becomes refracted through metaphysic.  
As Connelly argues, Vico’s New Science is first in a long line of efforts during the 
Enlightenment era to reconstruct the origins of culture, most of which read the birth of 
culture as a temporal rupture, an irreparable break with God due to hubristic efforts to 
behave, command, and judge just as he does: “In fact, the notion of ‘primitivity’ as an 
infant state of development through which all cultures passed was an invention of 
Enlightenment universalism” (5). Arguably, as with Adam and Eve, the development of 
the natural sciences represents another key moment in which man’s attempt to 
appropriate God’s power ends catastrophically as he is forced to sacrifice some element 
of his “original-ness”—for Adam and Eve, their innocence, for Vico’s “gentile,” possibly 
happiness, as the endless pursuit of an unfathomable knowledge could only end 
unhappily. Thus, this extended look at Vico is significant for the study at hand because it 
helps to locate the dawn of the binary divide between notions of primitive and civilized 
that began in earnest during the eighteenth century yet permeates the cultural 
consciousness of both the eighteenth and twentieth centuries. With New Science, Vico 
canonizes in the early eighteenth century what will become a formative link between 
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autonomy and pre-civilization, a world that is self-generative, self-reliant, such that all 
notions of return—a return to a beginning, to a more natural state—become, in essence, a 
return to the unity secured and legislated by God. The Vico mapping of civilization’s 
progress gives rise not only to the notion of autonomy as, in its purest form, inherently 
primitive—or, at least, pre-civilized—but also as an unattainable, utopian vision, a 
condition (previously) inhabited only by God. Furthermore, Vico’s New Science 
illuminates the tension between material and creation that becomes formative for the 
development of the arts and the artistic sensibility, as well as the most distinguishing 
feature of civilized man—civilized man is he who is set apart from his material. Without 
drawing a direct causal link between Vico’s conclusions and the literary outlook that 
follows him, I note that much of the eighteenth century following Vico tries to emulate 
this notion of return, or regression that is counterintuitively progressive, and, particularly 
within the literary world, to recuperate this totalized self embodied only by God. 
Throughout the course of the eighteenth century, Rousseau’s writing remains one 
of the most cogent and fully developed examples of this primitive outlook, which, in his 
work, is coupled with an intense and rampant desire to recuperate elements of the state of 
nature lost in the transition to the state of society.111 Testimony in Dialogues proves that 
Rousseau’s primitivism is complicated and was often misunderstood in his day. To begin 
with, he is often falsely credited with giving rise to the idea of the “noble savage,” a term 
that not only never appears in Rousseau’s work, but moreover, finds its actual origin in 
                                                 
111 As Jeffrey Perl argues, “The first, fully self-conscious ideologies of return are, possibly, those of the 
philosophes Vico and Rousseau, Hegel and Michelet.” Jeffrey M. Perl, The Tradition of Return: The 
Implicit History of Modern Literature (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 21.   
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the seventeenth century.112 However, the origins of this expression notwithstanding, the 
paradoxical quality embodied by the notion of a noble savage, emulated for his primitive 
yet inherently more civilized qualities, has definite links to Rousseau’s underlying 
philosophy. In his Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality Among Men (Discours 
sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes 1754), or the Second 
Discourse, Rousseau’s teleology is guided by the conceit, promulgated by philosophers 
of his generation, that mankind, in its move from nature to society, primitive to civilized, 
has somehow fallen off course from its ideal trajectory. Rousseau writes: “If I have dwelt 
at such length on the assumption of this primitive condition, it is because I had to dig to 
the root, and to show in the depiction of the genuine state of Nature how far inequality, 
even natural inequality, is from having as much reality and influence in that state as our 
Writers claim” (Discourses, 157). Rousseau laments certain aspects of the movement 
from crude to civilized, while Vico reads man’s negative progression as an inevitable part 
of the human condition—we not only must, but also should progress towards civilization.  
Rousseau’s Second Discourse paints the most extended portrait of primitive man, 
who is without possessions, strong, vital, and without rivals: “Alone, idle, and always 
near danger, Savage man must like to sleep and be a light sleeper like the animals…Self-
preservation being almost his only care, his most developed faculties must be those that 
primarily serve in attack and defense, either in order to overcome his prey or guard 
against becoming another animal’s prey” (139-141). Within these parameters, the 
emotional world for savage man, who, suggests Rousseau, is more distinct from civilized 
man than man is from beast, is utilized to a concrete end for his survival. As he is 
                                                 




portrayed in Second Discourse, savage man’s most striking emotional distinction is his 
negative relationship to love. While passion is at large in the world of early man— 
“[Savage man] heeds only the temperament he received from Nature, and not a taste 
which he could not have acquired, and any woman suits him” (155)—love is unknown 
and unnecessary “since it is based on certain notions of merit or of beauty which a 
Savage is not in a position to possess” (155). Seeing that savage men can only experience 
“physical love,” that is “the general desire that moves one sex to unite with the other,” 
there are fewer quarrels among them: “It is therefore indisputable that love itself, like all 
the other passions, acquired only in society the impetuous ardor that so often causes it to 
be fatal among men…” (155-6). Falling in love is part of a destructive chain of events 
that quickly ushers man from his primitive state. He is compelled to concretize that love 
by pursuing property, setting up house, and in so doing he unwittingly falls into the traps 
of civil society that is driven by competition and greed. As Anthony Vidler notes, in 
between Rousseau’s First and Second Discourse, domestic property becomes, as we see 
with Shklovsky’s and Karamzin’s negative poetics (harnessing the creative potential of 
the void), an embodiment of both negative and positive qualities:  
This advance on the development of primitive dwellings, “had a double 
and morally contradictory effect. On the one hand, bringing husbands and 
wives, fathers and children together in a common habitation engendered 
‘the sweetest sentiments known to man, conjugal and paternal love.’ On 
the other hand, the building of huts immediately introduced ‘a kind of 
property’ from which originated quarrels and combat. Thus, while in the 
first discourse we are led to see the primitive hut as an alternative to 
civilization, in the second we find that the first hut, product of the 
inevitable process of perfectability, is morally necessary for awakening the 
best of human sentiments, but it is also the cause of the worst.113  
 
                                                 
113 Anthony Vidler, The Writing of the Walls: Architectural Theory in the Late Enlightenment (Princeton, 
N.J: Princeton Architectural Press, 1987),16. 
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Thus, like property and competition, the capacity to love becomes one of the defining 
features that set civilized man apart from primitive. While, as Vidler argues, love together 
with property leads to the “sweetest sentiments,” the primitive life also remains 
undeniably appealing for Rousseau because savage man lives inspired not by competition 
and completely free of love; living independently from these conditions of modernity, 
early man is able to maintain his autonomy.  
While Second Discourse charts the historical conditions that account for man’s 
movement from natural to unnatural, it is not until Emile that Rousseau provides his 
curious reader with a more precise picture of the possible fusing of intellectualism and 
primitivism, civility and savagery. If Rousseau’s political oeuvre conceives of modern 
development as falling off course, Emile is conceived as the modern man to put humanity 
back on track. As a roman à thèse, Emile is most celebrated as a plan for educational 
reform; however, on its rudimentary level, Emile is a portrait of possibility, hope, utopia; 
he is a beginning for a new race of man, forged in early age through proper education to 
remain civil with a sympathetic eye on the natural worlds and forces that should be given 
proper credence.  Throughout Rousseau’s oeuvre, particularly in Emile, to be savage is to 
be “free” (“Emile, who has been raised with all the freedom of young peasants and young 
savages…”114 and “self-educated” (“…an absolutely savage life, deprived of the 
enlightenment which is acquired only in commerce with men” [258]). Similarly, Emile is 
“laborious, temperate, patient, firm, and full of courage” (208). He is “rustic” (“But our 
Emile, more rustically raised…” [180]); an “experiential learner” (“No book other than 
                                                 
114 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile, in The Collected Writings of Rousseau, ed. Roger D. Masters and 
Christopher Kelly. 13 vols. (Hanover, NH: Published for Dartmouth College by University Press of New 




the world, no instruction other than the facts. The child who reads does not think, he only 
reads; he is not informing himself, he learns words” [168]); and most importantly, 
“autonomous”:  
[Emile] considers himself without regard to others and finds it good that 
others do not think of him. He demands nothing of anyone and believes he 
owes nothing to anyone. He is alone in human society; he counts on 
himself alone. More than anyone else, he had the right to count on himself, 
for he is all that one can be at his age. He has no errors, or only those that 
are inevitable to us. He has no vices, or only those against which no man 
can guarantee himself. He has a healthy body, agile limbs, a precise and 
unprejudiced mind, a heart that is free and without passions. Amour-
propre, the first and most natural of all the passions, is still hardly aroused 
in him. Without troubling the repose of anyone, he has lived satisfied, 
happy, and free insofar as nature has permitted. (208)   
 
In order to be autonomous, Emile must be uncompromising in his solitary lifestyle: 
“every attachment is a sign of insufficiency…A truly happy being is a solitary being” 
(221). However, as Rousseau concedes, complete solitude is impossible for man, who is 
“imperfect,” and whose undeniable “weakness” is his sociability since he cannot, unlike 
God, be alone and be happy (“God alone enjoys an absolute happiness”): “I do not 
conceive how someone who needs nothing can love anything. I do not conceive how 
someone who loves nothing can be happy” (221). Rousseau admits the need for love in 
life, not only for happiness, but because it balances out the ills of modernity—if modern 
man is destined to modernize, then love, even though a source of modernity (in its moral 
demands), keeps him anchored in some respect to an earlier world, wherein God 
represented a totalizing sentiment of love. In this respect, the entirety of Emile seeks to 
strike a balance on rhetorical and philosophical levels between Rousseau’s savage fetish 
and what he reads as the unstoppable force of modernity. The ills of property and love are 
thus appreciably modified to fit this ideal. For one, Emile’s room is the closest modern 
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adaptation of the primitive hut, whose only purpose is for the utility of shelter, without 
any affectations to encourage staying indoors or domestication, is as simple as the 
outdoors: “Let their quarters be fitted with course and solid furniture, no mirrors, no 
china, no objects of quality. As for my Emile, whom I am raising in the country, his room 
will have nothing which distinguishes it from a peasant’s. What is the use of decorating it 
so carefully, since he is going to stay in so little?” (93). Rooms negatively affect Emile’s 
ability to learn since he might become distracted by an oppressive sense of impending 
non-freedom. “Look at a cat entering a room for the first time,” writes Rousseau “He 
inspects, he looks around, he sniffs, he does not relax for a moment, he trusts nothing 
before he has examined everything, come to know everything. This is just what is done 
by a child who is beginning to walk and entering, so to speak, in the room of the world” 
(125). Emile’s room is a meeting of past and present, as is the love between Emile and 
Sophie a meeting of two worlds, primitive and civilized, a union of both “love” and 
“conjugal love.” Their relationship begins as “love” and develops into “conjugal love,” 
which is “love founded on esteem which lasts as long as life, on virtues which do not fade 
with beauty, on suitability of character which makes association pleasant and prolongs 
the charm of the first union into old age…” (475).115  
 If modernity is an unstoppable force that mankind cannot resist, then Emile stands 
apart from mankind and civil society for his ability to bridge savage and civilized 
consciousnesses. His journey through the text is a moderately paced acculturation 
towards “consider[ing] himself in his physical relations with other beings and in his 
moral relations with other men” (455). Raised in near-isolation in the natural 
                                                 
115 Note that, in Julie, Rousseau’s heroine is forced to compartmentalize love—love is shared with Saint-
Preux, and conjugal love with Wolmar. 
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environment, Emile can resist civilized notions of competition while maintaining and 
adhering to a civilized telos: living in fear of his ultimate death, Emile, like all civilized 
individuals, makes decisions to offset his mortality, such as acquiring knowledge beyond 
the needs of survival, seeking conjugal love, and, ultimately, procreating. In the 
eighteenth century, the primitive consciousness is conceived not necessarily as a-
temporal but rather as expressive of the idea of absolute time. Emile embodies both 
consciousnesses in that though his life culminates—as does the text, Emile—in his union 
with Sophie, family building is presented as a ‘modern’ means of conserving autonomy. 
With love, family, and then property, primitive autonomy is no longer an option for 
Emile, and yet autonomy’s central moral imperatives—freedom from competition, 
freedom from social judgment, moderate isolation—continue to govern his world as per 
usual. 
 The search for autonomy points up a striking parallel between Rousseau’s 
sentimentalism and Shklovsky’s formalism—the autonomous consciousness matches the 
autonomous text. In the first chapter, I highlighted the relationship between these two 
concepts and traced Shklovsky’s notion of textual autonomy as it develops from within 
the Formalist tradition. To briefly reiterate, the Formalists understood poetic language as 
operating synchronically and anti-psychologically, a development that Erlich, in his 
outline of the constellation of theoretical strains that gave rise of Formalism, links to the 
Russian Futurists.116 In Erlich’s view, early formalism essentially transformed Futurism’s 
‘trans-sense’ experiments into a literary science, from which the notion of the 
                                                 
116 “The Futurist’s shrill insistence on the complete autonomy of the poetic word was a wholesome, if 
extravagant, reaction against the disregard of form…The theory of the ‘self-sufficient word’ and its 
practical implementation highlighted the inadequacy of the purely thematic approach to verse.”  Erlich, 
Russian Formalism: History, Doctrine (The Hague: Mouton, 1965), 29.  
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autonomous work of art was born. Critical essays such as, Jakobson’s 1921 monograph 
on the futurist poet Khlebnikov, in which Jakobson details the “self-contained word” 
(“self-valuable word,” or “self-made word,” “samovitoe slovo”); Eikhenbaum’s 1919 
“How Gogol’s ‘Overcoat’ Was Made” (“Kak sdelena ‘Shinel’’ Gogolia”), in which he 
examines narrative devices and wordplay in the text without drawing any extra-literary, 
socio-cultural conclusions; and Shklovsky’s 1916 essay, “On Poetry and Transrational 
Language” (“O poezii i zaumnon iazyke”), in which he argues that communication is 
merely one function of language—each critical work emphasizes the autonomous, self-
referential nature of verbal art.  
The preferential treatment allotted autonomy accords with the neo-primitivism 
that was prevalent at the time Futurism was finding its bearings in Russian culture, and 
most significantly, when Russian Formalist theory was first taking shape.117 According to 
art historians John E. Bowlt and Nicoletta Missler: 
At least three interpretations of the “primitive” can be identified with the 
theory and practice of the Russian avant-garde. The first followed in the 
wake of the general European reassessment of the antique and the 
“savage,” manifesting itself in a discovery of the primitive or, rather, 
archaic arts produced by peoples or ethnic groups within the Russian 
                                                 
117 From within Russian cultural history, the most immediate precursor to Russian Modernism’s neo-
primitivism can be located at the end of the Crimean War in the nineteenth century at which point members 
of the kuptsy-metsenaty, a group of merchant art patrons, in their search for “indigenous” Russian art, 
began to buy exclusively Russian art (see John O. Norman, “Pavel Tretiakov and Merchant Art Patronage, 
1850-1900,” Between Tsar and People, eds. Edith W. Clowes, Samuel D. Kassow, and James L. West 
[Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991]). Collectors Pavel Tretiakov and Saava Mamontov were 
frontrunners in this new trend, interested mainly in collecting works of fine art that captured an 
“indigenous” Russian style (a style that was in its nascent stages, loosely defined by V. V. Stasov in his 
article, “On Dutch Art” [“O gollandskoj zhivopisi” 1856], as anti-classical and contemporary); however, it 
is Mamontov’s reaching beyond the limits of the traditional fine arts to the world of arts and crafts, 
decorative arts, amateur theatre and other expressions of Russian “indigenous” art that begins the artistic 
shift within Russian Modernism towards neo-primitivism. Mamontov’s estate, the Abramtsevo colony, 
becomes an artists’ sanctuary, where plays were staged and operettas written inspired by Russian folklore, 
and where artists often worked in-residence. The spirit of artistic revolution that Mamontov cultivated is 
said to have had a significant role in inspiring the Modernist arts, in particular the Modernist theatrical arts, 




Empire…The second interpretation came with the actual ethnographic 
rediscovery of national folklore and minor arts…In turn, their encounter 
with the “primitive” led not just to the perception and reception of new 
forms, but also to a search for the “primitive soul,” whether among the 
“barbarians” and the “Asians,” or the Russian peasants and children….118 
 
Essays such as Aleksandr Shevchenko’s “Neo-Primitivism” (“Neo-Primitizm,” 1913119), 
Kornei Chukovsky’s “The Futurists” (“Futuristy,” 1913) and Jakobson’s “Furturism” 
(“Futurizm,” 1919—in which he names futurism “the antipode of classicism”120)—are 
some of the most formative works for this period of neo-primitivism. Shevchenko writes 
that neo-primitivism centers on locating Russian culture in the East, in Asia, which ipso 
facto makes Russian art primitive, “barbaric art.”121 However, as he claims, this is not to 
say that neo-primitive art simply “re-popularizes” Eastern art, but rather incorporates it, 
innovates it, and appropriates its methods: “it is entirely original” (49). Isolating the 
totalizing aspect of the primitive aesthetic, Shevchenko writes, “We [neo-primitivists] 
demand good form…this inheres in the whole composition’s harmony of drawing and in 
the correct distribution of reliefs in accordance with the weight of individual parts and 
colored quantities” (50). In a similar vein, in Theory of Prose Shklovsky writes, “A 
literary work is pure form; it is neither a thing or material but a relationship of materials. 
And, like any relationship, this one too has little to do with length or width or any other 
                                                 
118 John E. Bowlt and Nicoletta Missler, “The ‘New Barbarians,’” Origins of the Russian Avant-garde: 
Celebrating the 300th Anniversary of St. Petersburg (St. Petersburg: State Russian Museum, 2003), 30. 
119 In her brief comparative analysis of Shklovsky’s “Resurrection of the Word” and Shevchenko’s “Neo-
primitivism,” Sarah Pratt isolates the shared religious undercurrent that unites Shklovsky and Shevchenko 
(see Sarah Pratt, “The Profane Made Sacred: The Theology of the OBERIU Declaration,” Laboratory of 
Dreams: The Russian Avant-garde and Cultural Experiment, eds. John E. Bowlt and Olga Matich 
[Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996], 176). 
120 Roman Jakobson, “Futurism,” Russian and Soviet Views of Modern Western Art: 1890s to Mid-1930s, 
ed. Ilia Dorontchenkov, trans. Charles Rougle (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 164. 
121 Aleksandr Shevchenko, “Neo-Primitivism,” in Russian Art of the Avant-garde: Theory and Criticism, 
1902-1934, trans. John E. Bowlt (London: Thames and Hudson, 1988), 48. 
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dimension. It’s the arithmetic significance of its numerator and denominator (i.e., their 
relationship) that is important” (189).   
 While a close comparative reading of Shevchenko and Shklovsky reveals several 
theoretical linkages, in contradistinction to the neo-primitivism of the Russian avant-
garde, which took inventory of lubki (“popular literature”) and attempted to index 
explicitly Russian primitivism,122 Shklovsky is occupied more with primitive notions in 
the abstract. Primitivism reveals itself in Shklovsky not as a distinctly Russian 
phenomenon, but rather, not unlike Rousseau, as expressive of a universal consciousness 
contingent on a historical model that places all of mankind at the very same point of 
departure. Shklovsky accomplishes the most innovative incarnation of the primitive 
theme with his theory of ostranenie, which in essence is a method of perception that 
demands that art be considered with the a-temporality of the primitive consciousness, and 
which makes literature, like savage man, autonomous for its lack of psychological 
conditions and historical contexts. Rousseau forges the autonomous consciousness in 
Emile and designs Emile and Sophie as plausible solutions for how to circumvent the 
modern condition, albeit only marginally. Shklovsky has art perform this very task. 
According to the terms of estrangement, art, when made properly, asks its modern 
consumer to exercise his innate primitive mind by releasing all ties to his immediate 
environment; yet, like Rousseau’s Emile, taken as an exercise in developing the 
autonomous psychology, Shklovsky’s estrangement cannot forgo modern reality entirely. 
                                                 
122 For more, see John E. Bowlt and Nicoletta Missler, “The New Barbarians”: “The response of the ‘New 
Barbarians’ to the primitive artifact was very different from that of the preceding generation, because their 
primary goals were to elevate the vulgar and demote the noble, to cancel the presumed differences between 
high and low, to explore alternative methods of perspective, proportion, anatomy, and coloring in their own 
studio paintings, ad ultimately, to contend that Russia’s artistic renaissance would come to pass not from 
France or Italy, but from her national, indigenous traditions…” (28).  
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The strength of estrangement lies in its direct correspondence with the ‘reality’ that it 
delights in setting askew. In this way, we see Rousseau realigned with Shklovsky in this 
chapter. As in Chapter One, we find their axiomatic categories once again perfectly 
matched—Shklovsky’s art, like Rousseau’s natural savage, stands apart from byt, or 
Rousseau’s “State of Society”; both of their versions of primitivism seek some 
superimposition of temporal frames—between a primitive ideal that exists in the past, 
and a civilized condition that is accepted as the present. 123 
 Primitivism in Karamzin, however, is more convoluted than the blatant 
fascination that manifests itself time and again throughout Rousseau’s oeuvre, and, 
moreover, is beyond reconciliation with Shklovsky’s outlook. Karamzin’s work neither 
idealizes a past nor wishes to estrange its reader. In fact, his motivation is quite the 
opposite; to run from the past and to ‘de-estrange’ its Russian reader, so to speak, into 
becoming Western European normative. What is deemed universal humanity in Rousseau 
is distinctly Russian in Karamzin, such that bad Russian writing is attributed to any 
remaining barbarity in Russian society. In general, savagery and barbarity, while guiding 
principles in Karamzin’s poetic consciousness, are deemed wholly negative ones. When 
Karamzin considers the primitive wilderness he conceives of it as a “desert,” as a lifeless 
void, employing the word pustynia on nearly every occasion. As a literary construct, 
primitive nature is on several accounts confirmed as ripe for sentimental reverie, deemed 
organized and tamed, refined and sweet, and, for this reason, Karamzin seeks out natural 
                                                 
123 Interestingly, Linda S. Kauffman, in her work Special Delivery: Epistolary Modes in Modern Fiction, 
argues that Shklovsky’s particular take on time bears the influence of Einstein’s theory of relativity: 
“Between 1919 and 1922, Shklovsky was already assimilating the radical transformations Einstein’s 
theories had begun to make on our consciousness of space and time. Rather than perceiving time as an 
inevitable linear progression, he saw that henceforth it would be perceived as a relative construct that could 
be variously conceptualized.” Linda S. Kauffman, Special Delivery: Epistolary Modes in Modern Fiction, 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 5-6. The influence of Einstein on Shklovsky’s work is in 
part corroborated by a brief mention of the theory of relativity (printsip otnositel’nosti) in Letter 27 of Zoo.  
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environments in his Letters. However, any ‘primitive’ focus, whether inside or out of the 
Western European canon, is unnerving, possibly reminding this once “barbaric” Russian 
of the pre-Petrine innate impulses he works to quell.  
 In Letters solitude is linked almost inseparably with pustynia, and thus also takes 
on a negative coloring in Karamzin. Solitude, in essence loneliness, is a sentiment that is 
found throughout Karamzin’s Letters, where, whether in pastoral or urban environments, 
the traveler is haunted by the thought of being alone. For example, while in Zurich, the 
traveler meets with a pastor and his wife, whose beautiful simplicity brings to mind 
verses by the English poet Thomson and inspires a momentary jubilant reflection on the 
surrounding beauty that matches its inhabitants. “If at any point,” writes Karamzin, “the 
world should come to tire me; if at some point my heart should become insensible to all 
the joys of life in society; if it should no longer find a single sympathetic heart: then I 
shall retreat to this deserted place [v etu pustiniu], which nature herself has fenced about 
with high walls impermeable to vices—and where it is possible to forget everything, 
everything except God and nature” (140). The joy of the rural couple both invigorates 
and troubles Karamzin. If he “should no longer find a single sympathetic heart,” he will 
treat his loneliness with even more loneliness and “retreat to this desert…fenced about 
with high walls.” Later in Geneva, in apostrophe to friends the traveler writes:  
I do not know what to think of your silence, my dearest friends! I await the 
post with impatience—it comes, I run, I ask—and with downcast steps 
return home, my heard lowered, looking at the ground and seeing nothing. 
I imagine everything, and the possibilities terrify me. Ah! If you are no 
longer alive then my tie with my homeland will be sundered; I shall go 
and seek some kind of retreat [pustynia] in the depths of the Alps and 
there, amidst the sad and awesome subjects of nature, will spend my life in 
eternal despondency. (221)   
 
The desert in both situations is a welcome escape however, not from a world over-
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populated, hyper-civilized, or unnatural, but rather from a world that is too isolated, 
lacking “sympathetic hearts” and “dearest friends.” To deal with his social 
disappointment, Karamzin seeks out the one coping mechanism he knows—the 
wilderness, a prophylactic he learned from Rousseau—and applies it in counterintuitive 
ways to cure loneliness by withdrawing himself even further from society. Finally, his 
sorrow at the thought of being alone reaches its narrative climax when he sees it 
institutionalized as it is in the lives of the Carthusian monks:  
Isolation is pleasant when it is rest; but constant solitude is the path to 
nothingness. Initially our soul protests against a captivity that is abhorrent 
to nature; a feeling of inadequacy (since man on his own is a fragment or 
excerpt: only with similar creatures and with nature does he make up a 
whole thing)—the feeling of inadequacy tortures him; finally all the noble 
impulses in our heart go to sleep, and man falls from the first rung of 
earthly creation into the sphere of brutes. (237) 
 
Collectively, these moments in Letters reveal that isolation runs counter to our most 
natural impulses.  
 The negative association between solitude and desert is extended to the natural 
environment as well. While sailing along the Saône river in the south of France, along 
with several other passengers, Karamzin contemplates what he sees along the river bank: 
Green plains stretch on both sides of the river; occasionally hillocks and 
knolls are visible; everywhere there are beautiful villages of a kind I did 
not find in Germany or Switzerland, gardens, summer houses of wealthy 
merchants, chateaux with tall towers; everywhere the earth is cultivated in 
the best manner; everywhere you can see the generous fruits of industry. I 
imagine the primordial state of these flowering banks. Here the Saône 
murmuring in wilderness and gloom; dark forests rustled above its waters; 
men lived like beasts, taking shelter in deep caves or under the branches of 
century old oaks—what a transformation!...How many centuries were 
required in order to efface from nature every sign of its primordial 
wilderness! (246) 
 
In a perfectly counter-Rousseauian move, Karamzin turns his boat ride into a pathetic 
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fallacy, where the environment captures his own internal fears for returning to barbaric 
times. The primordial is not inspirational; Karamzin does not wish to recapture or return 
to it for it is less natural than his current modern state since it is uncivilized and 
unpopulated. In fact, this is why he re-contextualizes the natural lexicon to suit the 
civilized world—the “cultivated” earth gives way to “fruits of industry.”  The possibility 
of return for Karamzin is devastating: “But perhaps, friends, perhaps in the course of time 
these places will once again grow deserted and wild; perhaps within a few centuries, 
instead of pretty girls sitting on the bank of the river in front of me, combing their white 
goats, ferocious beasts will appear here, howling as they do in the deserts of Africa!...A 
dreadful thought!” (246). That the image of civility will be replaced with barbarity is his 
greatest fear: “who can guarantee that France…will not one day become like the Egypt of 
today?” (246).  
 The scene along the riverbank inspires Karamzin to reflect on the course of a 
culture's history, which, he concludes, cycles between periods of  barbarity and civility. 
Here Karamzin reveals Vicovian notions of historical fatalism, which assumes that 
society cycles towards an ideal through a series of ricorso or returns (Vico, 423-24). A 
prime example for Karamzin is Greece, whose classical models serve as the fundamental 
inpiration for the Western European Enlightenment and yet whose borders had been 
invaded by the Ottoman Empire: “Where the Homers and the Platos lived, there now live 
the ignorant and the barbarians” (247). Barbarism and civility for Karamzin are cultural 
categories determined by the lineage of certain philosophical and artistic strains—those 
that continued the intellectual legacy of Ancient Greece are civilized; those that did not, 
those that perpetuate cultural practices that run counter to the Greek, such as cultural 
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invaders (the Turks), are barbaric.  Russia, which in its cultural past has shown both 
barbaric tendencies and civilized potential is, for Karamzin, in a precarious position in 
the late eighteenth century. For this reason, it seems not only telling, but also quite 
appropriate for Karamzin to conclude this letter with the proclamation: “I have run out of 
space for writing,” “bolee pisat’ negde,” literally, “there is nowhere left to write,” as if 
Karamzin feels himself being swallowed into the barbaric void that, according to 
history’s ebb and flow, will inevitably become the space he currently inhabits (247). 
“There is nowhere left to write” is a defeatist’s claim that he too is destined to become (or 
rather, return to being) a member of barbaric lands where no writing, no philosophy, no 
Enlightenment can be accomplished.  
 Karamzin’s choice of “desert” as an equivalent for Rousseau’s primitive utopia 
does not seem to have roots in Rousseau, who uses the French “désert” quite 
infrequently, and not in reference to the “darker” side of his primitive world. In the 
travelogue Karamzin criticizes a fellow traveler for being a “second Rousseau” in his 
desire to “denigrate the Enlightenment” by “prais[ing] primitives” (348). However, his 
mood slightly shifts when he reaches Ermenonville, where Rousseau spent the final days 
of his life. Upon arriving, he remarks “Ermenonville was previously darkened by thick 
forest, surrounded by swampland and deep and infertile sands; in a word it was a 
primitive wilderness [pustynia]. But a man of abundant wealth and taste bought it and 
remade it so that the wild woodland and desert were transformed into an English garden” 
(358). Deserts should be avoided for their unwieldy nature that is in need of 
transformation and refinement. As we travel deeper beyond the property’s borders, the 
traveler notes: “You will then go down along a road and fear will grip your unwilling 
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heart: the gloomy pines, sad cedar trees, wild cliffs, deep sand, all conjure up a picture of 
a Siberian landscape [pustynia]” (360). But there is a sudden inexplicable shift: “But you 
will soon be reconciled to it….” He comes across an incarnation of Laugier’s primitive 
hut on which is inscribed “A ruler is happy in his palace, a forester in his hut; each his 
own master” (360). Karamzin responds with delight—“It follows that even in a wild 
desert one can be happy!”—and he gives over to Rousseau’s version of wild bliss, 
reciting a quotation from Emile: “He alone is able to be free who can satisfy his own will 
independent of others” (360).  
 And yet, while solitude, when temporary, is meaningful for the balance it restores 
to the active, well-educated mind, Karamzin nonetheless considers isolation a 
counterproductive condition. His perspective is later theorized in his 1802 essay, 
“Thoughts on Solitude” (“Mysli ob uedinenii”), which, teeming with cultural anxiety, 
reveals an author who on many levels tries to forge a new Russian sentimental voice, one 
that parodies and plays with the Sentimentalism of Rousseau, yet also a voice that is 
trying desperately to write its way out of barbarism into assimilation. As Boym argues 
about Shklovsky’s poetics of exile, ostranenie came out of his own feelings of 
estrangement, a connection that he does not explicitly state but that lingers in the 
background as a point of reference for understanding why he might make artistic play out 
of the dissonance between the normative and the strange. I believe her methodology 
might also suit Karamzin’s relationship to primitivism and solitude. Not unlike 
Shklovsky, Karamzin transforms his own cultural anxiety into an aesthetic program in 
which feelings of isolation, and expansive, unrepressed wilderness are condemned as 
lifeless and unproductive. “Thoughts on Solitude” takes direct aim at Rousseau’s 
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philosophy as a means for returning to a primordial essence: 
Some words have a particular beauty for the sensitive heart, representing 
to him ideas that are melancholy and kind. The name of solitude belongs 
to these magic words. Name it—and the sensitive person imagines an 
amiable desert, the thick shadows of trees, the languid murmur of the light 
stream, and the river bank where sits a deeps reverie with its own 
sorrowful and sweet memories! But the fate of tender hearts deceives! As 
in love and in friendship they rarely find their hopes fulfilled, so too does 
their own solitude not correspond to their expectations; its flowers are 
fragrant in the imagination and wither in the crude element of existence.124 
 
Solitude is not ripe for philosophical reverie as it is in Rousseau. Karamzin finds the 
solitude deafening, inhibiting, and overall counterproductive. It recalls the feeling of 
barbarism, which for Karamzin is reminiscent of Russia’s pre-Enlightenment era when 
art and philosophy were not practiced with nearly as much fervor as in the West and 
Russia was isolated from the Western European cultural dialogue. The entirety of the 
essay shows its author yearning to join the universal community. The close of his essay in 
response to Rousseau, “Some thoughts on the sciences, arts, and the Enlightenment” 
speaks most poignantly to this: 
When the light of science, the light of truth, will shine upon the earth and 
penetrate the darkest caves of ignorance: then maybe all the moral harpies 
will disappear, having hitherto defiled mankind […] then maybe there will 
be a Golden Age of poets, an age of virtue […] In the meantime, you are 
my consolation, you, tender children of the mind, feelings and 
imagination! With you I am rich without riches, with you I am not alone in 
solitude, with you I know neither boredom nor heavy emptiness. Although 
I live at the edge of the north, in the homeland of the terrible Aquilons, 
with you, dear muses! with you the Vale of Tempe is everywhere—touch 
it with your hand and the sad pine laurels of Apollo transforms; you 
breathe with divine lips, and on the golden, frigid sands, Olympian flowers 
bloom. (140-41) 
 
The strength of his desperation is palpable in the ellipsis and frequent exclamations; 
however, it is a desperation that can be easily remedied through the power of the 
                                                 
124 N. M. Karamzin, Izbrannye sochineniia v dvykh tomakh, ed. G. P. Makogonenko (Moscow: 
Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1964), 2:180. My translation.   
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imagination. Creative thought bridges the geographical divide, such that, against all odds, 
a member of the “Aquilon” tribe (a Latin epithet for those who live in the north) meets 
the “tender children of the mind, feelings and imagination!” “Aquilon” is a rhetorical 
reconciliation of the cultural divide; using the epithet designed by the Romans, Karamzin 
offsets his ‘barbarism’ with the lexicon of his mentors.  
 Karamzin is an interesting subject for analysis not only for how he contests 
Rousseau’s primitivism, but also for how his sentimental work circumvents the primitive 
impulse, and for how his texts resist, both consciously and unconsciously, the narrative 
techniques that are typically at play in Rousseau’s enactment of primitive nostalgia. If in 
Rousseau the primordial is an impulse of partial return, in Karamzin it is emblematic of 
where Russians came from and where they dare not return. Karamzin’s poetics 
collectively express an urgency to run from the space of Rousseau’s sentimental return. 
Karamzin finds comfort in the trajectory that Rousseau actively works against—primitive 
to society—as the lifeline that will rescue Russia and himself from the traps of 
uncivilized reality. If we were to contextualize this argument, we might note that 
Karamzin, a member of a culture Rousseau himself named “barbaric” (Social Contract), 
does not have the luxury of pining for an earlier time and must use his creative energy 
more wisely. Much like the negative poetics at work in the previous chapter, the desert 
registers as a void or absence from which Karamzin’s authorial persona is born. The 
looming threat of returning to the void/desert propels him to write his way out of 
barbarism.125  
 The portrait episode that unites Rousseau’s Julie, Karamzin’s Julia, and 
                                                 
125 According to Fraajne, a particular character of Russian Sentimentalism is that it has to combat a 
stereotype that Russians are incapable of sentimentality. (Maarten Fraanje, “La sensibilité au pays du froid: 
Les Lumières et le sentimentalisme russe,” Revue des études slaves 74.4 (2002-3), 664.) 
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Shklovsky’s Zoo provides us with a viable opportunity and productive framework for 
assessing how the themes of love and primitivism interact. To set the tone for the analysis 
to follow, I remind my reader of the words professed by Rousseau’s editor figure, “R,” in 
the “Second Preface” of Julie, here quoted in full: 
Love is but an illusion; it fashions for itself, so to speak, another Universe; 
it surrounds itself with objects that do not exist, or to which it alone had 
given being; and as it renders all its sentiments by images, its language is 
always figurative But such figures lack precision and sequence; its 
eloquence is in its disorder; it convinces more when it reasons less. 
Enthusiasm is the final degree of passion. When passion is at the full, it 
perceives its object as perfect; makes it into its idol; places it in Heaven; 
and just as the enthusiasm of devoutness borrows the language of love, so 
does the enthusiasm, of love borrow also the language of devoutness. It 
can see nothing but Paradise, Angels, the virtues of Saints, the delights of 
the celestial abode. In these transports, in the midst of such lofty images, 
will love evoke them in pedestrian terms? Will it bring itself to lower, to 
sully its ideas with vulgar phrases? Will it not elevate its style? Give it 
nobility, dignity? How can you speak of Letters, of epistolary style? When 
writing to one’s beloved, who cares about that! It is no longer Letters one 
writes, but Hymns. (10-11) 
 
It is difficult to know exactly how this passage fits into Julie as a whole, mostly because 
it comes in the context of a debate regarding not only whether “R” authored or edited this 
text, but more significantly, whether figures such as Julie and Saint-Preux could have 
even existed. Readers begin to question whether this passage is an implicit admission on 
the part of the Editor (“R”) that Julie is brought to life through the sheer power of fantasy 
(which explains why later editions of Julie place the preface at the end of the novel). As 
the Pygmalion of Rousseau’s retelling, who brings Galatea to life through wishful 
thinking, “R” seems to admit to the same act. Or, if he did not create Julie, then he stirs 
up doubt as to whether Julie is a mere fantasy of Saint-Preux, who is an “enthused” lover 
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guilty of heightening his beloved to the level of divine incarnation.126 However, 
regardless of whether or not Julie and Saint-Preux existed, the relationship between love 
and destabilization in Julie is made explicitly clear at the novel’s outset. Love behaves 
not unlike what Lotman terms a semiosphere, a semiotic space that creates a ‘world-
picture’ to which its participants conform. Love, in this case, becomes a tool for 
generating the specificity of the Saint-Preux’s semiosphere—it distinguishes between 
where a particular worldview persists and where it does not.127 In the “Julies” of 
Rousseau, Karamzin, and Shklovsky, the distinction between isomorphic realms is 
amplified by the portrait, which brings into stark relief the semiotic differences between 
two worlds—the world governed, tainted, and augmented by love, and the world of 
commonsense.   
 It is most appropriate to begin with Rousseau’s Julie since Rousseau sets the stage 
for the portrait episode that will be repeated by both Karamzin and Shklovsky; moreover, 
the portrait episode seems an integral part to any exposition, literary or otherwise, of 
love. After Saint-Preux and Julie are separated, Julie sends Saint-Preux, who is living in 
France, a secret package. “I warn you not to open it until you are alone and in your 
room,”128 Julie cautions Saint-Preux, heightening his anticipation regarding the package’s 
contents. Before discovering that it is a portrait, Saint-Preux is informed that in the 
package can be found an “amulet,” “a small furnishing intended for your use,” something 
                                                 
126 Later in Julie, Saint-Preux returns to this notion of enthusiasm: “Love is deprived of its greatest charm 
when honesty abandons it. To appreciate its full value, the heart must delight in it and raise us up by raising 
up the loved one. Take away the idea of perfection and you take away enthusiasm; take away esteem and 
love is reduced to nothing” (70). 
127 Yuri Lotman, Universe of the Mind: A Semiotic Theory of Culture, trans. Ann Shukman (New York: 
Tauris, 1990), 129. 
128 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Julie, in The Collected Writings of Rousseau, eds. Roger D. Masters and 
Christopher Kelly, 13 vols. (Hanover, NH: Published for Dartmouth College by University Press of New 
England, 1990) 6: 216. 
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that “must be gazed upon every morning for a quarter-hour until one feels possessed of a 
certain tenderness,” a “prophylactic,” a “talisman,” and something that “operates only 
between faithful lovers” (216). From the outset, through cryptic description, Julie implies 
there is something mystical about her portrait, as if, though inanimate, it somehow 
possesses some of her same qualities. The portrait is thus autonomous in its ability to take 
hold of its viewer, to safeguard him from “the unhealthy air of the land of gallantry 
[Paris]” and to “communicate” the feeling of a kiss (216-17). This moment in Julie is 
capital in terms of assessing Rousseau’s philosophical perspective on artistic 
representation. Cassirer argues, “Rousseau wants to let the knowledge of the physical 
emerge from such direct intercourse with objects. In every field, direct acquaintance with 
things—which can be attained only through activity—should prepare for and lay the basis 
of the knowledge of them.”129 As Rousseau writes: “Je me reposais agréablement au 
retour, en me livrant à l'impression des objets, mais sans penser, sans imaginer, sans rien 
faire autre chose que sentir le calme et le bonheur de ma situation.”130 Here we see that 
Saint-Preux functions similarly. The portrait takes on its own spirit in Julie, ultimately 
taking possession of Saint-Preux so completely that exorcism is impossible. When Julie 
sends her cousin Claire to retrieve the portrait from Saint-Preux, he refuses to relinquish 
it. As Claire reports to Julie: “[H]e would sooner consent never to see you again than 
surrender your portrait” (359). Julie is more desirable to Saint-Preux in the form of an 
object that he can hold and possess at will.  
 In the lexicon of Baudrillard, the copy has replaced the original as “the 
                                                 
129 Ernst Cassirer, The Question of Jean Jacques Rousseau, ed. and trans. Peter Gay (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1963), 119. 
130 Letter from Rousseau to M. de Malesherbes, À Montmorency, le 26 janvier 1762. 
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hyperreal”;131 and, as an object of hyperreality, the portrait becomes an effective 
surrogate for Julie with which Saint-Preux can simulate acts and satisfy otherwise 
forbidden desires, all in (near-)chaste ways. Unwrapping the portrait from its packaging 
is a figurative disrobing, and beholding the portrait is beholding Julie in all her “naked” 
simplicity: 
Finally, I arrive, I hurry, I shut myself in my room, I sit down out of 
breath. I place a trembling hand on the seal. O the first effect of the 
talisman! I felt my heart throb with every paper I removed, and soon found 
myself so greatly oppressed that I was forced to catch a moment’s breath 
at the last layer…Julie!...O my Julie!...the veil is rent…I behold you…I 
behold your divine charms! My lips and my heart pay them their first 
homage, my knees bend…charms I worship, once more you will have 
enthralled my eyes. (229)    
 
It takes “a minute, an instant,” for Julie’s “talisman” to take effect, and the swiftness of 
the act of infection draws our attention to the rift between time frames, which severs the 
passage nearly in half. Once the process of unwrapping the secret package begins, so too 
does the temporal frame shift from the past (imparfait) to the present: Saint-Preux 
arrives, hurries, shuts himself in his room, and sits down. With the rending of the 
portrait’s “veil,” Saint-Preux is brought even closer to the text’s surface, to the reader’s 
present, and, in this one compelling narrative moment, Rousseau rends the pages of his 
work as the narrative begins to disintegrate with ellipses leaving gaping holes in the text 
(“Julie!...O my Julie!...the veil is rent….”). Rendered with ellipses and in the present 
tense, Saint-Preux’s declaration brings readers nearer to him than ever before. Although 
Saint-Preux makes sure to emphasize the moment in which he beholds Julie’s portrait—
“at the moment I write this letter, at the moment your portrait is receiving all that your 
idolatrous Lover addressed to your person” (229)—the overwhelming presence of the 
                                                 
131 Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, trans. Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1994).  
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portrait strikes a chord with Saint-Preux’s memory and transports him to the past: “How 
powerfully [Avec quelle violence] it recalls times that are no more! When I look at it I 
think I am beholding you once more; I think I am once more living those delightful 
moments of which the memory now constitutes the grief of my life, given by Heaven and 
revoked in its anger!” (229). His time with Julie that takes place in the past and the 
aesthetic moment that takes place in the present are understood similarly: both are 
instantaneous and in dialogue with Julie. For Saint-Preux, viewing Julie and viewing a 
portrait are both narrative events, and, while he revels in revisiting on a figurative level 
his lost relationship with Julie, the superimposition of one temporal frame onto another, 
the past onto the present, unnerves Saint-Preux and registers in his mind as an intolerable 
“violence.”132  
 Despite his initial euphoria, in a response letter to Julie Saint-Preux notes his 
disappointment with the artist’s rendering. Saint-Preux is not impressed and makes an 
attempt at painting his own verbal portrait of Julie replete with convoluted metaphors—
“purple branches” that are her veins, or the “nestfuls of cupids” that sit in the corners of 
her mouth (238)—rendering his literary portrait just as baroque as the one that is painted. 
He detests the painted portrait first because it is not Julie herself, second because art is 
insufficient, and third because it is ‘momentous’ and cannot capture linear time: “in order 
                                                 
132 The absurdity of his infatuation with the portrait is rendered even more so when Julie reveals that Saint-
Preux might not even behold a portrait of her—that is, a work of art that is separated from its subject by 
one degree—but rather a replica of Julie’s portrait, a portrait of her portrait, a work of art that is separated 
from its subject by two degrees. “Then without minding which was the original or the copy,” Julie notes, “I 
adroitly chose the best likeness of the three to send to you” (237). The wording here is quite peculiar, and 
telling for the argument at hand: “Ensuite sans m'embarrasser de copie ni d'original, je choisis subtilement 
le plus ressemblant des trois pour te l'envoyer.” Julie wishes to avoid that which we already know is the 
result—that Saint-Preux will heighten her portrait to the realm of the hyperreal, that her portrait would 
surpass her: “I do not want you by whatever means to acquire a taste for charms I do not possess.” 




to express all your charms, you would have to be painted at every instant of your life” 
(238). Saint-Preux amends the portrait using his own imaginative version of Julie. 
“Love!” he insists, “thou alone knowest these secrets…Indeed, your face is too chaste to 
tolerate the disorder of your breast; it is obvious that one of these two objects must 
preclude the appearance of the other; only the delirium of love can reconcile them, and 
when its eager hand dares to unveil the one that modesty conceals…” (239). Saint Preux, 
using only his ‘lover’s memory,’ commissions another portrait: “I explained them [Julie’s 
attributes] to a skilled painter, and judging by what he has already done, I hope soon to 
see you more like yourself. For fear of spoiling the portrait we try out the alterations on a 
copy I had him make, and he transfers them to the original only once we are quite sure of 
their effect” (239). However, even this portrait does not come even close to resemblance. 
It seems the only cohesive, authentic, true to form portrait exists not even in reality, not 
even in Julie’s presence, but only in Saint-Preux’s mind: “Ah! How much more touching 
your portrait would be if I could invent the means of having it show your soul alongside 
your face, and depict at once your modesty and your charms!” (239-40).  
In a letter to Julie’s cousin, Claire, Wolmar priggishly rewraps, so to speak, 
Julie’s portrait: “A veil of virtue and honesty makes so many folds around her heart, that 
it is no longer possible for the human eye to enter it, not even her own” (417). Wolmar, 
the one voice of pragmatism and cold rationality (“the living eye,” according to 
Starobinski [The Living Eye, 9]), decides that Saint-Preux is in love with a projection: 
“[H]e does not hate me as the possessor of the person he loves (qu’il aime), but as the 
ravisher of the one he has loved (qu’il a aimée)” (417). Wolmar’s testimony brings 
remarkable closure to the portrait’s appearance in the novel, not only because he rewraps 
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and thereby embargos all future engagements with Julie d’Etange, but also because he 
dispels the portrait’s allure and in so doing swiftly deconstructs the image of Saint-
Preux’s love. What Saint-Preux believes is his present reality—“la personne qu’il 
aime”—is actually the past—“celle qu’il a aimée.” As Wolmar harshly concludes, 
“[Saint-Preux] loves in the past tense” (“Il l’aime dans le temps passé”); “the past,” he 
emphasizes, is “the key to the enigma” (“le vrai mot de l’enigme”). “Take away his 
memory,” Wolmar gathers, “and he will have no love left” (417). 
Love as a condition of the temporal and grammatical past reflects Rousseau’s 
relationship to memory, which, as Judith Shklar argues in her article “Rousseau’s Images 
of Authority,” is indebted to Locke, who inspired Rousseau and his contemporaries to 
recognize the immense psychological importance of memory. However, for Rousseau, 
Shklar remarks, memory like love is unnatural—neither love nor memory is built to last; 
in their inherent temporality, both are designed to decline and fade.133 In Second 
Discourse, Rousseau explicitly argues that love comes from memory, a cognitive faculty 
that is only awakened when man leaves the “State of Nature,” an exit journey in which 
every step is challenged by nostalgia’s resistance. Memory is necessitated only by civil 
society; it becomes the one secure locus for the “state of Nature” once man leaves the 
primitive nest. Thus, for Rousseau, Wolmar’s statement is painfully true: Saint-Preux’s 
relationship to the portrait is like that between memory and a mnemonic; without it, his 
love for Julie would fade. Once again I turn to de Man’s essay, “Rhetoric of Blindness”:  
Representation is an ambivalent process that implies the absence of what 
is being made present again, and this absence cannot be assumed to be 
merely contingent. However, when representation is conceived as 
imitation, in the classical sense of eighteenth-century aesthetic theory, it 
                                                 




confirms rather than undermines the plenitude of the represented entity. It 
functions as a mnemotechnic sign that brings back something that 
happened ….the model for this idea of representation is the painted image, 
restoring the object to view as if it were present and thus assuring the 
continuation of its presence. (123) 
 
If representation is where memory finds expression beyond the confines of the 
imagination, then for Rousseau mimesis is not a testament to artistic ability, but rather to 
sentimentality. Saint-Preux’s critique and then remake of Julie’s portrait reveal love as 
the ultimate artistic device. For Rousseau, love is not only a sentiment through which the 
self can develop and become self-aware, but also a primary agent of phenomenology. To 
restate the Editor’s opinion, through love Saint-Preux assembles an alternative version of 
the world. Love provides, on the one hand, a Vicovian ‘pre-gentile’ worldview: a perfect 
system, completely self-referential, with Saint-Preux as the author-God of his immediate 
reality. However, on the other hand, the system’s seemingly perfect unity is accompanied 
by an “ambivalence,” as de Man rightly points out, since the world of representation is 
never literal but always figurative: portraits stand in for loved ones, and the utopia from 
which we all supposedly emerged lingers only in the memory. While Emile and Sophie 
are allowed to progress in tandem from “love” to “conjugal love,” Saint-Preux and Julie 
are not nearly as fortunate. There is no real world program through which they can 
recoup a love lost (unlike Emile and Sophie, they cannot just set up a home in the 
woods). Along with Wolmar, Julie advances to “conjugal love,” while Saint-Preux 
remains a victim of nostalgia. Both ‘new world’ couples—Emile and Sophie, Wolmar 
and Julie—are able to return to the (modified) “state of Nature,” since their lives 
reconcile the dissonance between time periods, between a past “love” and a present and 
soon to be future “conjugal love,” thereby offsetting their (temporal) civility with an 
  
144 
element of the (timeless) primitive.  Lovesick Saint-Preux, to the contrary, is mired “dans 
le temps passé”: so long as he belabors the hyperreal (his love for Julie), he will be 
condemned to the hypercivilized world.  
 The relationship of the primitive world to society as distinct realms according to 
Rousseau’s axiomatic worldview is informative for pursuing a critical reading of 
Karamzin’s primitive outlook in “Julia.” After reading La Nouvelle Héloïse, Julia turns to 
Aris and questions the strength of a love born and bred in solitude:  
The pleasure of a happy love is the prime pleasure in life; but can it 
always be uniformly vivacious, always satisfy the soul? Can it replace all 
other pleasures? Can it people the wilderness for us? Ah, the human heart 
is insatiable; it constantly desires something new, new impressions, which 
like the morning dew refresh its inner feelings and give them new 
strength. For example, I think that the warmest love can grow cold in 
complete solitude; it needs to compare in order to recognize the value of 
its object all the more. (143)   
 
Julia wants to situate her love within a rotating tableau of objects so that it may be 
revivified in its constant comparison to new things. Her inquiry, “Can it people the 
wilderness for us” (mozhet li naselit’ dlia nas pustyniu), is striking on multiple levels. For 
one, Julia’s desire to populate the wilderness reflects Karamzin’s own counter-
sentimental contentions against solitude, seen most explicitly in “Thoughts on Solitude.” 
Karamzin argues against the fecundity of solitude by in essence paraphrasing the words 
spoken by his Julia eight years earlier: “[The] heart,” he writes, “is made to feel along 
with others and to delight in their pleasures. Separated from society, the heart dries up, 
like a plant deprived of the invigorating influence of the sun….” (181). Love cannot 
thrive in the desert, not because, as Rousseau would argue, conjugal love is a civilized 
notion, unsupported by the wilderness’s unrestrained space, but because the desert is 
lifeless, literally a void where nothing can persist. Love needs to appear in society to live: 
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“Isn’t it true,” Julia asks, “that the amusements of town and the variety of objects 
revitalize our love even more? My heart exhausted by the social tumult, enjoys repose in 
this embrace” (143).  
 And yet, though Julia shares Karamzin’s harsh perspective on solitude, it is 
precisely her inability to love in the desert that drives Aris away. When Aris leaves Julia, 
he takes with him her portrait—“a portrait—of my former spouse…I shall speak with it 
as with the shade of a dying friend; as with the sole and last sweet object of a dying 
heart!” (145). Julia is despondent and regrets her inability to live in solitude: “My rural 
cottage! I could have been happy within your quiet walls but knew not how to be; I left 
you with a most worthy, a tender, husband. I return alone, a poor widow, but with a heart 
that loves virtue” (146-47). Both Aris and Julia conceive of their separation as a death 
(Aris thinks of her as a dying shade; she thinks of herself as a widow) and an explicit 
rupture between a past and present, wherein the portrait serves as the only bridge between 
what existed prior to Aris’ departure. However, for both Aris and Julia, the portraits they 
hold are neither of the present nor past, but portray future possibilities. For Aris, the 
portrait of Julia, which he takes with him when he leaves Julia after finding her with 
Prince N*, is a projection of what he thought she could become (a quiet, homebound wife 
despite her restlessness, outstanding beauty and countless suitors); and, for Julia, the 
portrait of Aris portrays the moment when he loved her for this very future potential.  
When Julia beholds his portrait from the past, there is no desire to return as there is for 
Saint-Preux (“I do not dare to wish your return—I wish only the serenity of your dear 
soul; I wish you to forget your wife if her image torments your heart” [147]). Now that 
Julia has reconciled herself to living in solitude (“Here my days will pass in quiet solitude 
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[v bezmolvnom uedinenii]” [146]), the break with the past comes as a welcome relief.  
 As Julia continues to live alone in their country home, the narrator informs us that 
her “vain desires” begin to wither away. Aided by the portrait and her memory (“she 
devoted her life to the memory of her dear spouse” [147]), Julia starts a slow 
transformation towards realizing the potential Aris saw in her, towards actualizing the 
portrait. This reverse mimesis—wherein Julia aspires to become the portrait, as opposed 
to what occurs in Rousseau’s Julie, wherein the portrait aspires to capture Julie—suits not 
only Julia’s literary trajectory (as an enactor of love’s literary history), but also 
Karamzin’s literary outlook on a whole. In Chapter Two, I discuss Karamzin’s impulse to 
turn life into literature (in proto-formalist fashion, to revivify byt through its 
representation and reorganization in art), rather than to turn literature into life as we see 
in Rousseau. Moreover, Karamzin’s method of reverse mimesis echoes his perspective on 
history and primitivism. When Aris returns to the country to find Julia a perfectly 
changed woman, he remarks, “You were born to be virtuous…the immodest desire to 
please, the fruit of an injudicious upbringing [vospitaniia] and bad examples, produced 
your momentary aberrations…” (151). Julia, Aris argues, was not born virtuous, but born 
to be virtuous, to follow a trajectory ending in virtue; however, a bad education delayed 
her potential and held her back in her development. Not unlike Russia’s savage start, the 
beginning, for Karamzin, is not a sacred space to which one should ever hope to return, 
but rather, like the pustynia, a warning of one’s crude beginnings before ‘proper’ 
vospitanie (“acculturation”) or, more appropriately, obrazovanie (“education”), before 
one is able to actualize the portrait (notably obraz in “Julia”) of the ideal, enlightened 
self.   
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 In the previous chapter, I noted the distinctness of time in Karamzin’s sentimental 
prose. “Natalie” in particular presents a cogent picture of the artistic value of marrying a 
pastoral past with a sentimental present. As his essay “Some thoughts on the sciences” 
demonstrates, Karamzin conceives of art and life as contiguous, a forward movement 
away from a pastoral past. Sentimentalism is valuable for Karamzin insofar as it 
functions within his prose as a method for bringing the pastoral past to meet the present. 
For instance, when Julia says to Aris, “the distance which separates us, will be warmed, 
will be vivified by my love,” Karamzin demonstrates on a metaphoric level that love 
when mechanized can bridge two worlds that are otherwise irreparably disparate. 
Paradoxically, however, through estranging Rousseau’s sentimentalism, in the act of 
what Tynianov might term “parody,” Karamzin mocks Rousseau, disfigures him in such 
a way that reproduces and erases literary history at the same time. As per Tynianov’s 
definition, Karamzin’s “Julia” forms a “dual structure”134—it both engages Rousseau’s 
Julie while simultaneously repurposing it to a different end, effectively “parodying” 
Rousseau by replacing the anticipated literary outcome (Julie’s death and unhappy 
marriage) with another (Julia ends happily married to Aris). In other words, through 
reinterpreting Rousseau, through the juncture of two literary models (the model of the 
past and the ‘new’ model of the present), Karamzin joins two temporal worlds, and, in so 
doing, unwittingly commits an act of noble savagery (cf. the temporal fusion that 
comprises the domestic bliss of Emile and Sophie, Wolmar and Julie).  
Typically in an epistolary novel, existence is confined to correspondence—aside 
from the Editor, who in Rousseau especially finds his most self-expressive moments in 
                                                 
134Yuri Tynianov, “Dostoevsky and Gogol’: Toward a Theory of Parody” (“Dostoevskii i Gogol’ (k teorii 
parodii)” 1921), translated in Twentieth-Century Russian Criticism, ed. Victor Erlich (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1975) 104.  
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his critical asides that appear in the text’s margins, no character is allowed to breathe, 
think, or in any way persist outside of correspondence with another. Karamzin, however, 
circumvents Rousseau’s tradition by unfurling the epistolary structure to form a narrative 
in which all voices, layers, and threads are compressed into a narrative fabric. To the 
same end, yet via a different modality, Shklovsky’s para-epistolary novel breaks free 
from Rousseau’s tradition by inverting it and structuring an anti-love story in which 
correspondence takes place outside of the confines of time linear: the traditional cause 
and effect, question and response patterning of Rousseau’s model is annulled and the 
problem of time resolved precisely by dramatizing a love that is unrequited. To this end, 
the portrait moment is executed counter-traditionally. In the seventh letter of Zoo, 
Shklovsky, in the voice of the Editor, informs his reading public that the following letter 
will be “about Grzhebin on canvas, Grzhebin in the flesh” (27) (“O portrete Grzhebina, o 
samom Zinovii Isaeviche Grzhebine”).  Like Shklovsky, Zinovii Grzehbin, an artist, poet 
and publisher, is also living abroad in Berlin and his works are also denied publication in 
Russia. The traditional mixing of unattainable love and portraiture remain. Shklovsky, 
however, manages to rearrange the parts and to estrange the literary system: the 
unrequited relationship is between Grzhebin and Russia, and the passion is for property. 
Writing about love, Shklovsky reminds us, as per Triolet’s instructions, is “forbidden, so 
I’ll write about Zinovy Grzhebin, the publisher” (27). Within this letter, where passion 
for an individual is replaced by a “passion for property,” in response to a Russia that 
denies his books entry, Grzhebin behaves “like a rejected suitor who ruins himself buying 
flowers to turn the room of his unresponsive beloved into a flower shop and who admires 
this absurdity” (29-30).135 
                                                 
135 Letter Seven, “O Grzhebine…,” appears in the first and second publications, but was removed from the 
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Like Saint-Preux before him, Shklovsky begins to describe the portrait by casting 
a critical eye on its execution:  
In Yury Annenkov’s portrait of Zinovy Isaevich Grzhebin, the face is a 
soft pink color and looks downright delectable. In real life, Grzhebin is 
pastier. In the portrait, the face is very fleshy; to be more precise, it 
resembles intestines bulging with food. In real life, Grzhebin is more tight 
and firm; he might well be compared to a blimp of the semirigid type. (27)  
 
Like Saint-Preux, Shklovsky regrets the portrait’s inability to capture its subject; 
remarkably, however, Shklovsky is not concerned with the psychology of the portrait’s 
subject, as Saint-Preux is, but rather only with the accuracy of the physical features. He 
stresses on two accounts the distinction between the portrait’s features and Grzhebin’s 
features “in real life” (“samom”) and ironically, the portrait is more life-like, more 
Grzhebin in the flesh (“In the portrait, the face is very fleshy”) than Grzhebin in real life, 
leading one to wonder which portrait falls under which category—is Annenkov’s portrait 
“Grzhebin on canvas” or “Grzhebin in the flesh.” And the ambiguity of this situation 
brings into focus once again Shklovsky’s penchant for art that estranges, art that does not 
wish to seem life-like or mimetic, but rather art that defies byt, exceeds it.  
 While set apart from the main narrative thread, that is, from his love for Elsa 
Triolet, this portrait moment nonetheless parallels those in Rousseau and in Karamzin. As 
Karamzin’s Julia gazes on the portrait and reminisces about her prior intolerance for 
sitting still within the walls of her country abode,136 Shklovsky considers the portrait and 
                                                                                                                                                 
third edition and thus is neither in the fourth nor the fifth edition. Here, I cite from the novel’s first edition 
([Berlin: Gelikon, 1923], 33-36).   
136 The relationship between the walls of the country home as instigating Julia’s near-primitive 
transformation remind me of Gaston Bachelard’s comments on the home in The Poetics of Space: “Now 
my aim is clear: I must show that the house is one of the greatest powers of integration for the thoughts, 
memories and dreams of mankind. The binding principle in this integration is the daydream. Past, present 
and future give the house different dynamisms, which often interfere, at times opposing, at others, 
stimulating one another.” Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, trans. Maria Jolas (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1994), 6.  
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regrets that he once disliked Grzhebin “for having gulped down so much Russian 
literature” (28). The portrait provokes Shklovsky to consider a previous time and 
condition, accentuating the divide between past and present selves. By insisting on the 
divide between Grzhebin in the flesh and Grzhebin on canvas, Shklovsky’s prose 
ameliorates and overcomes the rupture between original and copy and also between time 
frames—when the portrait was painted and the present “portrait,” so to speak, of 
Grzhebin in the mind of the Shklovsky. That which is so troubling for Saint-Preux—that 
Julie exists more clearly in the portrait than in reality (that the past and present are unable 
to meet, forever irreconcilable)—is ameliorated in Shklovsky’s moment of estrangement 
where two time periods meet in the work of art, where Grzhebin in the flesh is the 
backdrop against which Grzhebin in the portrait is better assessed; and where artifice, 
described as “fleshy” and “bulging,” is indistinguishable from real life.  
Thus in Shklovsky’s novel a discussion of the portrait gives way to a discussion 
of temporality, and to the themes of regret and progress as they relate to the past and 
present. On the subject of portraiture as an instantiation of clarity, Shklovsky, with regard 
to Pushkin’s 1835 poem “The Commander” (“Polkovodets”) writes, “The portrait does 
not matter for the poetry, it is not a pretext for talking about the commander—it serves to 
clarify the plot.”137 In a large way, Shklovsky’s remarks on Puhskin’s poem can be 
applied to the portrait moment in Zoo, not only because in “The Commander” Pushkin 
explores the triangulated relationship between man, his image, and the viewer, but also 
because, as in Pushkin’s poem, in Shklovsky’s para-epistolary novel, the portrait serves 
to “clarify the plot,” providing the narrator with an opportunity to insist once again that, 
                                                 




contrary to appearances, Zoo is not a novel about love. With this in mind, one might 
reason that Shklovsky keeps love out of the picture in order to keep unwelcomed 
temporality out of his epistolary novel, an artistic decision he ascribes to a bitter Alya 
who demands that he cease writing about love. Shklovsky reveals to Alya, “Even so, I’m 
not going to write about love. You see, Alya? I never write about anything but literature” 
(123). Without love as a guiding principle, Shklovsky’s Zoo is displaced from its 
customary context and can thereby fulfill its potential as a work of art. As I have noted in 
previous chapters, Shklovsky believes that art should require maximal effort on the part 
of the audience. The work of art is a functional object whose purpose is to change the 
mode of our perception from everyday to artistic. This change can be enacted in several 
ways, most simply by extracting an object from among the facts of life; from Theory of 
Prose: “In order to transform an object into a fact of art, it is necessary first to withdraw 
it from the domain of life” (61).  
 Shklovsky’s estrangement demonstrates that primitivism can be taken as a 
principle that guides the aesthetic process, and that regulates the way in which we 
appreciate, value, and come to terms with art, all of which should ‘primitivize’ us, 
rendering us de-historicized. For Shklovsky, the primitive consciousness provides the 
model for proper hermeneutics, by means of which the reader engages with an 
autonomous text that, in its superimposition of temporal periods, past and present, 
renders its viewer timeless and, in this way, primitive. Rousseau expresses a similar 
desire to join past and present as a central part of any savage world, where primitive man 
lives in an a-temporal idyll set apart from impending civilization (cf. Shklovsky’s void 
discussed in Chapter Two). For Karamzin, the primitive is empty and uninhabited, the 
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antithesis of life—an interesting counterpoint to Rousseau’s natural world.  
To sum up, love for Rousseau is dependent on memory in order to persist, and the 
minute memory is engaged, man steps out of the “state of Nature.” In Rousseauian terms, 
primitive man cannot be in love; love (whether amour-propre or desire) inspires a series 
of modernizing, civilizing tasks, such as setting up house.  Moreover, love, always 
dictated by time, is a sentiment that inhibits autonomy since it runs counter to the 
supposed a-temporality of the primitive world. For Karamzin, love is liberation from the 
primitive past precisely because it makes us un-autonomous, dependent, and rescues us 
from the desert/void of solitude.  Finally, for Shklovsky, love is taken to be a backdrop 
for the execution of literary devices, but, ironically, has no place in literature; and yet, 
love’s residual effects—temporality and civilization—are still guiding principles in 
Shklovsky’s Zoo. Extracting love from the narrative quite literally, Shklovsky rescues the 
text from the fate of civilization and deems it autonomous. Like Karamzin’s Julia, Zoo 
parodies the literary models from the past (Rousseau) and generates new forms while 
defying expectations, effectively marrying disparate temporal frames through the act of 
reading. And we as readers also reap the benefits: reading an epistolary novel that is not 





 In the previous chapter, I argued that Shklovsky, Karamzin, and Rousseau 
confront and conceptualize time in three different ways. For Rousseau, man, in 
accordance with linear time, moves along the x-axis retrospectively, that is, with his back 
to the finish line in constant yearning for his humble beginnings. Karamzin conceives of 
man’s historic start similarly, as from a primitive space, but while the Rousseauian man 
moves with caution away from savagery, the Karamzinian man moves forward with 
haste. Shklovsky’s relationship to how time moves is difficult to diagram similarly. In 
proper modernist fashion, Shklovsky takes the eighteenth-century linear mentality and 
contorts and bends it, twists and turns it, compressing it into one moment in the work of 
art.  
 One way in which we might imagine Shklovsky’s perspective on time comes 
from Knight’s Move. In the first preface, Shklovsky considers the “strangeness” of the 
knight’s fixed path in a game of chess: “forbidden to take the straight road,” Shklovsky’s 
knight must move in an “L-shaped manner” (3). He writes, “[t]here are many reasons for 
the strangeness of the knight’s move, the main one being the conventionality of art, about 
which I am writing. The second reason lies in the fact that the knight is not free” (3). 
Although he slavishly follows a path that he did not forge, the knight, Shklovsky wishes 
to make clear, is neither a slave, nor a “coward”: “Our torturous road is the road of the 
brave” (4). In her work Another Freedom, Svetlana Boym argues that “Shklovsky 
proposes the figure of the knight’s move…preferring it to the official teleology of the 
revolution or the master-slave dialectics of dutiful pawns and kings.”138 Her reading 
                                                 
138 Svetlana Boym, Another Freedom (Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 8. 
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offers another suitable way for conceiving of Shklovsky’s temporality, imagined as “off-
linear,” as Boym might argue, or, to return to my original thesis, as the eighteenth 
century’s linearity set askew, or made strange.  
 Regardless of their differing views on time, each author takes literature as a 
means for exacting justice or revenge against a world that ceases to hold him; against a 
seemingly unstoppable historical progression that runs counter to his very hopes and 
desires. Through literary expression, Rousseau, Karamzin, and Shklovsky seek to realize, 
even on a minute level, the utopian fantasies that may or may not be realizable in their 
own lifetimes, either because current cultural trends make living in accordance with 
nature impossible (Rousseau); or because geographical, linguistic, and cultural divides 
are often too stark to be defeated (Karamzin); or because modernization has already 
wiped the world clean of all sensations (Shklovsky). Delusional though they may be, 
each author cherishes literature as a method for exploring possible worlds and for coping 
with his place in history.  
 Among Formalism’s most noted accomplishments—Eikhenbaum’s literaturnaia 
domashnost’ (literary domesticity) and literaturnyi byt (literary everydayness); 
Jakobson’s literaturnost’ (literariness); and Tomashevsky’s siuzhet/fabula dichotomy—
Shklovsky’s estrangement stands out for its poetic and philosophical potential, and for its 
ability to function as a life program rather than simply operating as a literary device or 
construct. The way estrangement demands that we view art might also provide answers to 
many of the problems that persist outside of art’s frame. Art, according to Shklovsky, 
fulfills its potential by rendering life strange, forcing its viewer/reader to experience it 
with more diligence, more consideration, and much more cognitive labor. Might living 
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life to the fullest demand the same amount of effort? In 1929, Eikhenbaum effuses that 
Shklovsky “had literature in his blood”; he was “soaked through with literature, and vice 
versa”; “literature is as inherent to him as breathing or walking. Literature is part of his 
appetite. He tastes it and he knows what it should do, and he loves to prepare it himself 
and to variegate it [и любит сам ее приготовлять и разнообразить].”139   
 In a similar way, the creative method provides Karamzin with the tools to cope 
with his way of living outside of literature. In his essay “Some thoughts on the sciences, 
arts, and the Enlightenment,” in which he takes up the philosophy of Rousseau, Karamzin 
asks the question: “What lies at the heart of art [Что суть искусства]?” And his answer 
is: “A reflection of nature” (126). Karamzin takes creation as an indigenous bricolage: 
much like nature’s creatures, who make due with their immediate environment, seeking 
only that which their present reality provides, Karamzin reads creativity as derived 
exclusively from necessity; the poet learns from nature all the poetic techniques he could 
possibly need. Karamzin uses the “primitive hut” (первая хижина) as a perfect example: 
“Thick, fused branches made the image of the primitive hut and were the foundation of 
architecture” (126). The primitive hut, according to Vitruvius, developed purely from 
need: branches, caught in a storm’s breeze, rubbed against each other, igniting a fire. 
Primitive man found the fire comfortable and, wanting to live comfortably from that 
moment forward, decided to build a structure.140 For Karamzin, just as need gave 
primitive man the outline for his first abode, the natural environment gives the poet all 
                                                 
139 Boris Eikhenbaum, Moi vremmenik: marshrut v bessmertie (Moscow: Agraf, 2001), 130.  
140 Here, Karamzin seems to pay tribute also to Marc-Antoine Laugier, who valorized the primitive hut as 
an example of the development of sciences in response to utility (An Essay on Architecture [Essai sur 
l’architecture, 1754]); however, more so to Vitruvius’ Ten Books of Architecture, wherein the art of 
building structures is traced back to a savage origin (at which point “men of old were born like the wild 
beasts, in woods, caves, and groves, and lived on savage fare”). Vitruvius, The Ten Books on Architecture, 
trans. Morris Hicky Morgan (New York: Dover Publications, 1960), 38.  
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the tools he needs to survive, that is, to write poetry, and more importantly, to feel 
poetically. Man, Karamzin argues, learned even elegy from his environment, specifically, 
from “the turtledove mourning the death of its friend” (126).  
 Art, in this respect, accomplishes much more than pure “imitation.” Like 
Rousseau’s Emile, art is born of the natural world, which educates it, raises it. In turn, art 
builds upon nature and makes considerable improvements. In this way, art, for Karamzin, 
is a communal experience in correspondence with nature and with others. This policy 
leaves a doleful mark on Karamzin’s oeuvre, registering as an acute yearning for 
incorporation. For this reason, as Chapter Two demonstrates, any attempt at monologic 
thought or self-expression is thwarted, mismanaged, and treated as device. And yet, what 
seems to be literary play is revealed as a psychological apprehension about solitude or 
solitary activity.  To write his way out of barbarism, to make sure his ‘vernacular’ world 
is properly ripe for poetic expression, Karamzin must rearrange Rousseau’s parts—his 
tropes, emblems, and lexical markers—to estrange himself out of alienation into the 
Western European creative community.  
 To a certain extent, Rousseau’s oeuvre plays out its own literary assimilation: a 
Swiss-French writer who writes in French is bound to maintain his own feelings of 
alienation. Starobinski informs us that there is little linguistic difference that would set 
Rousseau’s ‘mother tongue’ apart from that of his French contemporaries, and that, for 
all intents and purposes, Rousseau was considered a French writer—that is, a writer who 
writes in grammatical French. Rousseau, although Swiss-French, also does not seem to 
consider his work to be “foreign” in terms of political borders; and yet, to a large extent 
his work takes up the theme of crossing borders—borders dividing normative and 
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strange, moral and immoral, natural and unnatural. Despite the cultural affinities between 
France and Rousseau’s native Republic of Geneva, as Starobinski argues, “a gap remains, 
and, like all gaps, I believe this one to be fertile. For difference invariably provokes 
reaction: it must be either abolished or magnified…” (Transparency, 335). The gap, for 
Starobinski, manifests in Rousseau’s prose foremost as a moral divide (compounded by 
Rousseau’s philosophical and particularly religious inclinations that set him apart from 
the French philosophes), and he argues that writing novels was the primary way in which 
Rousseau hoped to bridge that gap. For instance, Starobinski reads Rousseau’s 
Confessions as an escape from the rural ‘simplicity’ into which he was born: “The 
romantic dreams of Jean-Jacques’ youth were incompatible with the narrow limits of the 
small city…” (341). Not unlike how I read Karamzin’s sentimental and critical prose as a 
collective effort to escape the void of barbarism, Starobinski reads Confessions as a 
testimony of, among many things, Rousseau’s regretful start in Geneva. Confessions 
becomes a safe place for considering (while, never having to actualize) the ‘simple’ life 
that could have been “had [Rousseau] remained in Geneva, had his dreams not taken him 
beyond the walls, had he grown up to be a humble artisan” (340). Much like the anxiety-
ridden Karamzin we find at the end of “Some thoughts on the sciences,” who, through the 
power of the imagination, leaves his “Aquilon tribe” and rejoins the literary universe, 
Rousseau, argues Starobinski, harnesses his imagination’s power to extricate himself 
from the simple rural life into Paris’ cosmopolitan circle. “His imagination,” writes 
Starobinski, “was responsible for his rejection of the simple life, his flight, his adventure, 
his exorbitant hopes” (341).  Both Karamzin and Rousseau embrace literature as a 
method of overcoming the shame and disgust with one’s beginnings; with, however, one 
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notable difference: imagination’s ability to perform assimilation remains figurative in 
Karamzin, and literal in Rousseau.   
 If Shklovsky, Karamzin, and Rousseau are joined not by Sentimentalism, then 
certainly a sentimental attitude towards literature, one that credits writing with the 
promise of life alteration, unites these three authors. At the opening of this dissertation, I 
posed the following question: what did Sentimentalism offer Shklovsky in terms of 
solace? Through the course of this analysis I have provided my reader with some 
examples of the forms (epistolary), themes (love), and motifs (portraiture) that constitute 
Shklovsky’s idiosyncratic sentimentalism. However, in terms of solace, it seems 
Sentimentalism—not just a literary philosophy, but a program for survival—was a culture 
club to which the literary hungry belonged, providing Shklovsky with compatriots across 
generational and national borders to join him in what Eikhenbaum reads as his literary 
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